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This thesis is comprised of four chapters examining the impact of mood-state 
and emotion regulation on negative appraisals and neutralising activity in obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD).  Chapter one presents an introduction to OCD, and 
overviews of cognitive appraisal models, and the cognitive-behavioural 
conceptualisation, of OCD.  The chapter also reviews the literature exploring the 
relationship between mood and cognition (in general terms), and relationships between 
particular mood-states and different OCD-relevant belief and appraisal domains (in 
specific terms).  Chapter one concludes by proposing an experimental study aimed at 
enhancing current understanding of the role of mood in OCD by investigating the 
impact of different negative mood-states on patterns of negative appraisal and 
neutralising activity in response to an obsession-like thought.  
Chapter two introduces the field of emotion regulation (ER) and reviews the 
literature assessing the relevance of ER-related constructs (e.g., mindfulness, 
experiential acceptance, and psychological flexibility) and treatment modalities (e.g., 
acceptance and commitment therapy, mindfulness-based therapy, and dialectical 
behaviour therapy) to OCD.  Chapter two reports a second experimental study which 
aimed to replicate (and further explicate) mood-state-dependent patterns in appraisal 
and neutralising responses observed in chapter one. In addition, the study investigated 
whether enhanced capacity to regulate emotion translates to attenuation of mood-state-
dependent patterns, by examining the impact of emotion regulation skills training 
(ERST) on responses to an obsession-like thought.   
Chapter three reviews the nature and effectiveness of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT) for OCD and provides preliminary investigation into the application and 
integration of ERST in traditional CBT for OCD.  Chapter three further reports a 
clinical (N = 4 case-series analysis) study in which a six-session ERST program was 
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inserted into traditional CBT for OCD in an attempt to provide preliminary exploration 
of possible covariation in specific mood-states and negative appraisals among OCD 
sufferers.  The study also explored the potential utility of enhanced emotion regulation 
skills in contributing to reductions in negative appraisals and symptom severity in OCD.   
Chapter four provides general discussion of the results of the three studies 
comprising the research program, focusing in particular on how findings may be used to 
enhance and extend current theoretical models and potentially contribute to the 
development of clinical applications to improve treatment efficacy in obsessive-




















Cognitive appraisal models propose that obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
develops as a consequence of dysfunctional beliefs which give rise to distress-
provoking, negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts, subsequently promoting 
compulsive neutralising behaviour.  Previous research has established the relevance of 
numerous dysfunctional belief and appraisal domains in the pathogenesis and 
maintenance of OCD, including over-estimation of threat (OET), inflated responsibility, 
and over-importance of thoughts (OIT).  Increased awareness of the processes, 
conditions and contexts under which OCD-relevant beliefs and appraisals may operate 
differentially is important in enhancing our understanding of the disorder and its 
treatment.  Teasdale’s (1983) associative networks model of cognition implies that 
mood may represent a condition under which different types of dysfunctional beliefs 
and negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts vary in their salience and function.  The 
current research comprised two empirical studies and one clinical case series analysis 
designed to investigate the impact of mood-state and emotion regulation skills on 
negative appraisals, neutralising activity, and symptom severity in obsessive-
compulsive contexts.  
Study 1 examined the impact of induced anxious, dysphoric, and neutral mood-
states on negative appraisals and neutralising motivations in response to an 
induced obsession-like thought.  This analogue study utilised a non-clinical sample (N = 
120) and employed an obsession-like thought provocation protocol to generate an 
obsession-like experience (i.e., an experience modelling the level of obsession-related 
distress and urge to neutralise that is seen in OCD, for a non-clinical sample).  Results 
revealed mood-state-dependent patterns in participants’ appraisals of the obsession-like 
thought and their neutralising motivations.  Specifically, anxious mood-state produced 
elevated OET appraisals and reduce threat (RT) neutralising motivations, whereas 
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dysphoric mood-state produced inflated responsibility appraisals and reduce sense of 
responsibility (RSR) neutralising motivations.  In contrast, negative appraisals were 
equivalent across all domains and diminish importance of the thought (DIT) neutralising 
motivations were elevated in the context of neutral mood-state.  These findings suggest 
that the prominence of particular types of OCD-relevant dysfunctional appraisals are 
differentially associated with specific mood-states, and that these mood-state-dependent 
increases in appraisals appear to subsequently exert unique influences on individuals’ 
motivations for engaging in neutralising behaviour.  Results advise a theoretical 
expansion of prevailing appraisal (and cognitive-behavioural) models of OCD to 
incorporate consideration of the impact of affective processes in the broader process of 
negative appraisal.  The primary clinical implication of these findings is that enhanced 
capacity to manage or regulate negative affect may attenuate the impact of mood-state 
on negative appraisals and neutralising activity in obsessive-compulsive disorder.  
Study 2 was a replication and extension of Study 1.  Study 2 investigated the 
impact of emotion regulation skills training (ERST) on mood-state-dependent patterns 
in 198 adult participants' negative appraisals and neutralising motivations in response to 
an induced obsession-like thought.  Results replicated Study 1 findings of mood-state-
dependent patterns in participants’ appraisals of an obsession-like thought and their 
subsequent motivations for neutralising.  Study 2 additionally found that enhanced 
emotion regulation skills translated to an attenuation of mood-state-dependent patterns 
in negative appraisal and neutralising motivations.  Specifically, among participants in 
the anxiety mood-induction condition, those who received ERST reported significantly 
lower OET appraisals compared with those who did not receive ERST.  Enhanced 
emotion regulation skills also produced significant reductions in the strength of mood-
state-dependent neutralising motivations.  Participants in the anxiety mood-induction 
condition who received ERST reported significantly less reduce threat (RT) motivations 
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compared with those who did not receive ERST, and participants in the dysphoria 
mood-induction condition who received ERST reported significantly less reduce sense 
of responsibility (RSR) motivations compared with those who did not receive ERST.  
These findings identify mood-state as an important pathogenic process which appears to 
intersect with cognitive processes in the development and maintenance of OCD.  A key 
clinical implication arising from these findings is that OCD sufferers may benefit from 
an incorporation of emotion regulation skills training within traditional cognitive-
behavioural interventions for the disorder.  
Study 3 was a case series analysis assessing the impact of the addition of a six-
session emotion regulation skills training (ERST) program into a traditional course of 
CBT for OCD for four OCD patients.  ERST was inserted between different phases of 
therapy creating a multiple baseline design.  Visual analyses revealed that ERST was 
associated with obsessive-compulsive symptom decline and reductions in OET, inflated 
responsibility, and OIT appraisals for three of the four participants, suggesting that 
ERST may represent a valuable augmentation to CBT for some OCD sufferers.  There 
was evidence of generalised covariation in participants’ negative mood-states and 
negative appraisals of their obsessions.  However, compared with the specific 
relationships observed in the analogue studies, the relationships between mood-state, 
emotion regulation, and negative appraisal were less clearly defined in the case series 
analysis. 
In summary, the current research provided an expanded account of the role of 
mood in the aetiology and maintenance of OCD.  Results supported the hypothesis that 
mood-state constitutes a condition under which appraisal domains operate differentially 
in OCD.  Implications for existing cognitive-behavioural conceptual and treatment 
models of OCD were explored.   
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Study One: The Impact of Mood-State on Negative Appraisals and 
Neutralising Motivations 
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1.   Introduction 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a chronic, often disabling, mental 
illness.  Once considered rare (e.g., Black, 1974, cited in Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon, 
& Thibodeau, 1993), epidemiological studies have more recently revealed that OCD is a 
relatively common disorder, with a lifetime prevalence estimated at 1% to 3% (Kessler, 
et al., 2005; Ruscio, Stein, Chiu, & Kessler, 2010; Weissman et al., 1994).  The 
essential features of OCD are recurrent, distressing, intrusive thoughts, urges or 
impulses (obsessions) and repetitive, ritualistic behaviours and mental acts 
(compulsions).  In an early description, which remains very much concordant with 
modern definitions, Westphal (1872, cited in Neziroglu & Stevens, 2002) indicated that 
obsessions are parasitic ideas within an intact intellect, intruding, against the will, into 
the normal thought process or ideation.  Typically, OCD sufferers feel driven to perform 
compulsions and other activities such as avoidance or reassurance-seeking to attenuate 
(or “neutralise”) the distress associated with obsessions, or to prevent the negative event 
or situation portended by an obsession from occurring (APA, 2013).  For example, 
OCD patients whose obsessions centre on issues of contamination may attempt to 
reduce their distress and protect against the perceived risk of contamination by washing 
their hands until their skin is raw (APA, 1994).  In summary, obsessions are intrusive 
and distress provoking, while compulsions are, at least in the short-term, distress 
reducing (Hollander, 1993).  
Until as recently as the early 1970s, OCD was considered a treatment-refractory 
condition.  Neither pharmacological nor psychodynamic therapies that were available at 
the time produced significant clinical improvement (Emmelkamp, van Oppen, & van 
Balkom, 2002).  However, advances in cognitive-behavioural interventions for OCD 
during the latter part of the twentieth century promoted dramatic improvements in 
treatment effectiveness.  Evidence has been produced to show that effective use of 
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cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT; involving exposure with response prevention 
therapy) can reduce both functional impairment and symptoms of OCD (Lampe, 2007).  
Meta-analyses of the treatment literature indicate that CBT is effective for 60-80% of 
OCD patients, with 50-80% symptom reduction commonly observed (e.g., Abramowitz, 
1996, 1997; Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Roche, 2001; Fisher & Wells, 2005).  Indeed, CBT 
for OCD is currently regarded as the only empirically-validated psychological treatment 
for the disorder (Abramowitz, 2006a; Abramowitz, Taylor, & Mackay, 2009). 
Despite recent gains, the treatment outcome picture for CBT for OCD may not 
be quite as positive as the meta-analyses suggest.  CBT for OCD drop-out rates are 
approximately 25% (Abramowitz et al., 2009; Franklin, Abramowitz, Kozak, Levitt, & 
Foa, 2000) and exposure with response prevention (E/RP) overt refusal rates represent 
an additional 5–22% of participants (Foa et al., 2005; McLean et al., 2001).  These 
considerations have led some authors to estimate that the actual percentage of treatment 
non-responders to CBT for OCD oscillates between 50 and 60% (Cottraux, Bouvard, & 
Millinery, 2005; Fisher & Wells, 2005).  Lasting remission or recovery (i.e., complete 
absence of symptoms) is rarer still, being observed in less than 20% of patients (Skoog 
& Skoog, 1999), revealing that even when improvement is achieved, the majority of 
CBT for OCD patients are left with significant symptoms at the end of treatment 
(Wilhelm, 2000).    
These findings indicate that CBT for OCD is lagging behind CBT for other 
psychological disorders in terms of treatment effectiveness and suggests that there 
remains considerable scope for improvements in OCD treatment efficacy (Fisher & 
Wells, 2005).  The sub-optimal effectiveness of CBT for OCD contributed to a surge in 
OCD-related research in recent years (Smith, Wetterneck, Hart, Short, & Bjorgvinsson, 
2012).  Investigation has sought to provide better understanding of the heterogeneous 
processes underlying the pathogenesis and maintenance of OCD.  Among the processes 
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identified, cognitive appraisal processes received the most interest and attention in 
modern OCD theory, research and practice (Clark, 2004).  In comparison, investigation 
of the impact of affective processes, especially the potential impact of anxious and 
dysphoric mood-states on appraisal processes, has been meagre.  In the quest for 
increasingly effective OCD treatment, deeper investigation of the cognitive-affective-
behavioural nexus of OCD appears overdue. 
1.1   Cognitive Appraisal Models of OCD 
1.1.1   Overview of Appraisal Models and the Cognitive-Behavioural 
 Conceptualisation of OCD 
The prevailing cognitive models of OCD assume that obsessions have their 
origins in normal intrusive thoughts (Rachman, 1997, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985).  These 
cognitive “appraisal” models propose that certain dysfunctional beliefs give rise to 
negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts (ITs) and that these appraisals are crucial in the 
development of clinical obsessions and the pathogenesis and maintenance of the 
disorder more generally (Clark & Purdon, 1993; Teachman, Woody, & Magee, 2006).  
This proposition is supported by research evidence demonstrating that negative 
appraisals are important in predicting OCD symptoms (Barrera & Norton, 2011).  The 
term ‘negative appraisal’ refers to the process of appraising or evaluating the occurrence 
and/or content of obsessions in a manner that is unrealistic or illogical (Sochting & 
March, 2002).  According to appraisal models, when intrusions are negatively 
appraised, ignoring them becomes more difficult, emotional distress typically ensues, 
and attempts to remove or neutralise the intrusions are more likely to be initiated 
(Freeston, Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1996; Rachman, 1993; Salkovskis, 1985, 1989).  
Figure 1 provides graphic illustration of the conceptual pathway from dysfunctional 
beliefs to negative appraisals, distress, and subsequent neutralising activity envisaged 
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within the cognitive-behavioural conceptualisation of OCD, to which cognitive 
appraisal models contributed significantly.    
 
Figure 1.  The cognitive-behavioural conceptualisation of OCD in which cognitive  
      appraisal models highlighted the role of negative appraisal of intrusive  
      thoughts 
 
Neutralisation includes both overt behaviours (such as washing and checking – 
typically referred to as compulsions; Rachman, 1976) and covert behaviours (such as 
mental checking and restitution activity), which may include “putting right” by saying 
prayers, thinking good thoughts in response to bad thoughts, and repeatedly running 
over details of events in memory (Salkovskis & Westbrook, 1989).  Neutralising 
activities are performed in order to “put right” the thought, prevent or mitigate the 
anticipated consequences of the thought, and/or relieve the subjective experience of 
distress associated with it (Clark, 2002; Freeston & Ladouceur, 1997).  For instance, a 
patient who experiences an intrusive thought (IT) of harming another person (e.g., “I 
will swerve into oncoming traffic”) and negatively appraises the IT as being important 
or indicating that the event is likely to happen may experience acute distress and a sense 
of personal responsibility to do something about the thought.   The patient might 
consequently try to neutralise or “put right” the thought by repeatedly re-thinking it but 













compulsive behaviours, covert neutralisation is often successful in the short-term, as 
evinced by studies which have found that acts of covert neutralisation are followed by 
significant reductions in distress (Ahern, Kyrios, & Meyer, 2015; van den Hout, Kindt, 
Weiland, & Peters, 2002; van den Hout, van Pol, & Peters, 2001).   
The short-term anxiolytic property of neutralisation serves to negatively 
reinforce its use (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980; Ahern et al., 2015), which is unfortunate, 
because in the long-term neutralisation is considered a maladaptive means of dealing 
with negatively appraised ITs for two main reasons.  First, neutralisation shields 
dysfunctional beliefs and negative appraisals from dis-confirmatory, threat-
incompatible evidence, which helps maintain the patient’s belief that the IT was indeed 
“dangerous” and that the act of neutralising was responsible for preventing the feared 
consequence of the thought from occurring (Rachman, 1998; see Figure 1).  Thus the 
act of neutralising leads to an increased likelihood of future neutralising in the face of 
an IT, image or impulse (Zucker, Craske, Barrios, & Holguin, 2002).  In a rare 
experimental study, Salkovskis and colleagues (1997) demonstrated this phenomenon in 
a non-clinical sample of individuals who were prone to experiencing ITs and 
neutralising.  In comparison to participants who were instructed to distract themselves 
upon the presentation of an IT, participants who were instructed to neutralise reported 
more discomfort and greater urge to neutralise when later presented with an IT and 
asked not to neutralise.  The second maladaptive aspect of neutralisation is that the very 
performance of such activity may elicit a paradoxical increase in the occurrence of the 
ITs that the neutralisation is employed to attenuate (Tolin, Abramowitz, Przeworski, & 
Foa, 2002; see Figure 1).  In particular, neutralising in the form of thought suppression 
may, according to Wegner’s (1994) “ironic process” theory, increase the accessibility to 
consciousness of the “to be suppressed” thought, resulting in a paradoxical “rebound 
effect” wherein the IT recurs with increased frequency.  In sum, rather than diminishing 
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ITs, neutralisation appears to exacerbate both the occurrence of intrusions and the 
distress they cause. 
1.1.2   OCD-Related Belief and Appraisal Domains 
While the behavioural principles underlying the negative reinforcement of 
neutralisation in OCD have a long history (e.g., Meyer, 1966; Mowrer, 1939, 1960), 
cognitive appraisal processes implicated in the disorder have only more recently been 
identified and empirically investigated.  All appraisal models share the same essential 
configuration (see Figure 1); however, individual authors highlight different belief and 
appraisal domains.  In an early progenitor to the appraisal models, Carr (1971, 1974) 
emphasised the importance of unrealistic threat appraisals in OCD, with rituals (i.e., 
neutralisation/compulsions) viewed as attempts to reduce perceived danger.  Carr 
proposed that OCD patients over-estimate both the probability and the cost of negative 
events associated with ITs (Carr, 1974).   
Salkovskis (1985) highlighted responsibility appraisals, suggesting that intrusive 
thoughts (ITs) develop into obsessions only when they are appraised as posing a threat 
for which the individual is personally responsible.  A responsibility appraisal of an IT 
involving stabbing a loved one, might take the following form: “Thinking about 
stabbing a loved one means that I really want to – that means I’m a dangerous person 
who must take extra precautions to make sure that I don’t lose control and bring these 
thoughts to fruition”.  According to Salkovskis’ (1989) model, neutralising can increase 
the person’s sense of responsibility because they believe that their neutralisation 
stopped the intrusion from coming true.  
Rachman’s (1997, 1998) appraisal model of OCD described similar mechanisms 
to those elucidated by Salkovskis (1985), but additionally emphasised the role of 
catastrophic appraisals made by the subject about the personal meaning and importance 
of ITs.  From this point of view, OCD sufferers mistakenly believe that ITs reveal their 
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“hidden nature” which has negative moral characteristics (Belloch, Morillo, Lucero, 
Cabedo, & Carrio, 2004).  If a person appraises her unwanted ITs about harming other 
people as signifying that she is inherently dangerous, then an array of formerly neutral 
stimuli are transformed into potential threats (e.g., sharp objects are turned into potential 
weapons) (Rachman, 1998).  As a result, intrusions are provoked by an increased 
number of feared external stimuli, and negative appraisals of personal meaning 
transform these intrusions from a mere nuisance into an egregious torment (Rachman, 
1997; Sookman & Pinard, 2002).  
Other authors emphasised different domains of belief and appraisal.  For 
instance, Purdon and Clark (1999, 2001, and 2002) postulated that appraisals about the 
need for and importance of controlling and/or suppressing undesirable thoughts are 
critical in OCD.  Indeed the past two decades has seen a proliferation in the number of 
belief and appraisal domains implicated in OCD.  The Obsessive Compulsive 
Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG; an international consortium of clinical 
researchers dedicated to the study of the cognitive aspects of OCD) highlighted this 
trend when they identified, within the many already existing self-report and laboratory 
instruments pertinent to cognition in OCD, 19 different belief domains hypothesised to 
be important in OCD (OCCWG, 1997; Taylor, Kyrios, Thordarson, Steketee, & Frost, 
2002).  The OCCWG condensed and reduced these 19 domains to a set of six based on 
the extent to which each domain was considered a vulnerability factor for the 
development of OCD, specific to OCD in contrast to other disorders, and also on the 
basis of the aetiological significance of the domain, regardless of its association with 
other disorders (Taylor et al., 2002).   
The six domains identified by the OCCWG were: over-estimation of threat 
(OET), inflated responsibility, over-importance of thoughts (OIT), controllability of 
thoughts, perfectionism, and intolerance of uncertainty (OCCWG, 1997, 2001).  Strong 
 20 
interrelationships have been identified between these domains (OCCWG, 2003).  
Indeed, recent analyses have proposed a four-factor structure of obsessional beliefs, 
with the original six domains being condensed to four; OET, inflated responsibility, 
OIT/need to control thoughts, and perfectionism/intolerance of uncertainty (Moulding et 
al., 2011; Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2008).  OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT have 
assumed particular prominence in conceptual models of OCD and have been important 
in informing models of cognitive therapy for OCD (Abramowitz, 2006b; Rachman, 
1997, 1998; Salkovskis, 1985).  These three domains are of particular interest in the 
present study because they represent three distinct and unique aspects of the provision 
of meaning to intrusive thoughts.  OET appraisals are inherently future- and danger-
oriented, whereas inflated responsibility appraisals are, by their nature, self-focused and 
self-evaluative.  Both OET and inflated responsibility are distinct from OIT appraisals 
which are concerned with the significance of thoughts and the fundamental relationship 
between thoughts and actions.  As will be explored below, this differential provision of 
meaning likely translates to different emotional responses associated with specific 
obsessional beliefs and appraisals.  Given their centrality in the present thesis, these 
three domains require operational definition. 
1.1.3   Defining OET, Inflated Responsibility, and OIT Beliefs and Appraisals 
The over-estimation of threat (OET) construct encompasses beliefs and 
appraisals indicating an exaggerated estimation of the probability and/or severity of 
harm.  Examples of such beliefs and appraisals include; “terrible things are more likely 
to happen to me than anyone else”, “when anything goes wrong in my life, it is likely to 
have terrible effects”, and “any harm that comes about because of this thought will be 
severe” (OCCWG, 2001).  OET beliefs engender appraisals that intrusions portend 
catastrophe. 
 21 
The definition of inflated responsibility, as it relates to OCD, has undergone 
several refinements since Salkovskis’ (1985) seminal formulation.  The currently 
accepted definition is: “The belief that one is especially powerful in producing and 
preventing personally important negative outcomes.  These outcomes are perceived as 
essential to prevent.  Such beliefs may pertain to responsibility for doing something to 
prevent or undo harm, and responsibility for errors of omission and commission” (p.7, 
Taylor, 2002).  For example, “if I imagine something bad happening, then I am 
responsible for making sure that it doesn't happen” (OCCWG, 2001).  In some 
instances, inflated responsibility in OCD reaches extraordinary extremes in which the 
affected person “confesses” to crimes or accidents of which they actually have little or 
no knowledge (Rachman & Shafran, 1999).  
The over-importance of thoughts (OIT) domain of cognition in OCD refers to 
beliefs and appraisals that the mere occurrence of negative intrusive thoughts (ITs) 
implies something very important and likely to be, or to come, true.  Specifically, OIT 
refers to general beliefs and specific appraisals in any of three themes (Thordarson & 
Shafran, 2002): (a) Negative ITs must be important because they have occurred, (b) 
Moral thought-action fusion – Having negative ITs is morally equivalent to actually 
performing the action contained in the thought, (c) Likelihood thought-action fusion – 
Negative ITs increase the likelihood that bad things will happen (i.e., having the thought 
makes it more likely to come true).   
1.1.4   The Relationships of OET, Inflated Responsibility, and OIT, to OCD 
Early research that arose in the wake of the cognitive appraisal models centred 
on attempts to establish the relevance, specificity, or primacy of particular dysfunctional 
belief and appraisal domains to OCD.  In the literature that emerged, OCD-relevance 
was established for numerous domains however specificity was rarely demonstrated and 
the issue of primacy remained inconclusive (Frost & Steketee, 2002).  
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Extant research specifically examining perceived probability and severity of 
harm in OCD provides some support for the role of over-estimation of threat (OET) in 
predicting OCD symptoms (e.g., Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1992;  
Frost & Sher, 1989; Steketee, Frost, & Cohen, 1998; Tolin, Woods, & Abramowitz, 
2003; and Woods, Frost, & Steketee, 1998, cited in Farrell, 2003).  The most pressing 
limitation of studies investigating the relationship between OET and OCD is that they 
generally fail to address causality or directionality of the relationship (Riskind, 
Williams, & Kyrios, 2002).  In a rare experimental study, Jones and Menzies (1997) 
successfully manipulated the perceived degree of danger during a behavioural 
avoidance task.  Results indicated that individuals with higher perceptions of danger 
report higher mean ratings of distress and the urge to engage in compulsive behaviour 
than individuals with lower perceptions of danger.  Taylor and colleagues (2002), the 
OCCWG (2003), and Tolin, Worhunsky, and Maltby (2006) all failed to significantly 
discriminate OCD patients from anxious controls on measures of OET beliefs and 
appraisals.  In summary, these findings suggest OET is not exclusive to OCD, but also 
pertains to other psychological disorders.  That is, OET is likely to be OCD-relevant 
rather than OCD-specific.   
Clinical observation and numerous empirical studies have provided moderate to 
strong support for inflated responsibility as an important component in understanding 
OCD.  Rachman (1993) reported clinical observations of OCD patients in a hospital 
setting where patients’ compulsions abated during the first days in the new 
environment, and then returned after a few more days.  Rachman attributed the decrease 
in compulsions to the decrease in the patients’ sense of responsibility when they first 
entered the hospital setting.  As their sense of affiliation to the new environment 
increased, patients began to feel more responsibility for their surroundings, and their 
compulsions subsequently returned.  Psychometric studies have consistently found 
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significant associations between inflated responsibility and obsessions/ITs (e.g., 
Freeston, Ladouceur, Thibodeau, & Gagnon, 1992) and discomfort and obsessive-
compulsive symptoms (e.g., Mancini, D’Olimpio, & D’Ercole, 2001; Pleva & Wade, 
2006; Wilson & Chambles, 1999; Yorulmaz, Karanci, & Tekok-Kilic, 2006).  
Additionally, numerous studies have found responsibility beliefs and appraisals are 
more prominent in obsessional patients than both clinically anxious and non-anxious 
controls (Cougle, Lee, & Salkovskis, 2007; OCCWG, 2003; Salkovskis et al., 2000; 
Steketee, Frost, & Cohen 1998).   
Evidence consistent with a causal role for responsibility beliefs and appraisals in 
OCD is provided by experimental studies investigating the manipulation of 
responsibility.  Lopatka and Rachman (1995) successfully manipulated perceived 
responsibility among a sample of OCD patients.  To decrease subjects’ perceived 
responsibility the authors assumed entire responsibility for all potential negative 
consequences during a fixed time-period.  During the control period, patients assumed 
the entire responsibility.  The result showed that in the decreased responsibility 
condition, discomfort and urge to check compulsively were significantly reduced.  
Shafran (1997) used a more ecologically valid approach to manipulating responsibility: 
patients were exposed to threatening stimuli either in the presence (low responsibility 
condition) or in the absence (high responsibility condition) of their therapist.  The high 
responsibility situation led to significant increases in discomfort, anxiety and the urge to 
neutralise.  The results of these experimental studies have been replicated (e.g., 
Bouchard, Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1999; Mancini, D’Olimpio, & Cieri, 2004; 
Ladouceur et al., 1995; Ladouceur, Rheaume, & Aublet, 1997).  Together, these 
findings suggest that a linear relationship may exist between inflated responsibility 
appraisals and both discomfort and the frequency of neutralising activities.  In 
summary, a case for the specificity of inflated responsibility beliefs to OCD is 
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mounting, although more evidence is required before any conclusive assertions can be 
made. 
The majority of research conducted within the OIT domain has focused on 
moral- and likelihood-thought-action fusion (TAF).  Psychometric studies have 
consistently found that TAF is strongly associated with measures of obsessionality 
(Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary, & Brigidi, 2001; Rachman, Thordarson, Shafran, & 
Woody, 1995) and exacerbation of ITs (Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Spaan, 1999).  
In an experimental study, Rassin and colleagues (1999) provided evidence for the 
possible causal contribution of OIT appraisals in the transformation of normal ITs into 
clinical obsessions.  Naïve participants in the experimental condition were told that an 
EEG recording device to which they were attached could detect their thoughts of a 
usually innocuous word (“apple”) and that if they thought “apple” another person would 
receive an electric shock.  In the control condition, participants were told that the EEG 
device could detect their thoughts, but they were given no instruction about real-world 
negative consequences for other people of any specific thoughts.  The researchers found 
that participants in the experimental group reported over three times as many intrusions 
and more than three times the discomfort reported by the control group.  Furthermore, 
the participants in the experimental condition engaged in neutralising behaviour in 
about half of the intrusions.  Elsewhere, psychometric studies have failed to 
significantly discriminate OCD patients from anxious controls on measures of TAF 
(e.g., Rassin, Diepstraten, Merckelbach, & Muris 2001; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & 
Schmidt, 2001) and OIT beliefs and appraisals (OCCWG, 2003).  Together, these 
results suggest that OIT is likely to be OCD-relevant rather than OCD-specific.  Muris, 
Meesters, Rassin, Merckelbach, and Campbell (2001) have provided some preliminary 
evidence that TAF may nevertheless be more relevant for OCD than for any of the 
anxiety disorders. 
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1.1.5   The Relationship between Inflated Responsibility and OET Beliefs  
The Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG; Frost & 
Steketee, 2002), developed the only extant measure of dysfunctional beliefs relevant to 
OCD.  This measure, the obsessive beliefs questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 1997, 2001), 
provides assessment of six OCD-relevant cognitive domains (including OET, inflated 
responsibility, and OIT) presented as putatively separate constructs (OCCWG, 1997).  
Psychometric validation of the OBQ (OCCWG, 2001, 2003) however, revealed high 
correlations among the six OBQ subscales, raising doubts about whether the cognitive 
domains are in fact distinct.  The OCCWG (2005) subsequently submitted items from 
the six subscales of the OBQ to exploratory factor analysis in a clinical sample of OCD 
patients (N = 410).  The analysis yielded three factors (and a subsequent three-factor 
scale, the OBQ-44), one of which consisted of the OET and inflated responsibility 
constructs.  This analysis of the OBQ validation data suggested that OET and inflated 
responsibility beliefs might be better understood as a single construct.  In accordance 
with this psychometric union of the two domains, contemporary cognitive-behavioural 
conceptualisations of OCD typically join OET and inflated responsibility in a single 
category of beliefs (Abramowitz, 2006b).  More recently however, Myers, Fisher, and 
Wells (2008) proposed a four-factor solution (including separate OET and inflated 
responsibility dimensions) following a principle components analysis of the OBQ-44, 
and Moulding and colleagues (2011) proposed a similar four-factor solution (again 
involving separate OET and inflated responsibility dimensions) using multiple 
exploratory methods including exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis.    
Research in relation to these cognitive domains in the field of OCD remains 
nascent.  For example, the question of whether further distinctions between OET and 
inflated responsibility cognitions in OCD may become more evident and measurable in 
contexts alternative to those under which they have been examined using the OBQ has 
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yet to be explored.  Sub-optimal CBT for OCD efficacy, in combination with limited 
evidence of specificity for particular belief/appraisal domains to OCD and the lack of 
firm evidence of links between specific appraisal domains and specific OCD symptoms 
(e.g., types of compulsive behaviours) in clinical settings (e.g., Julien, O’Connor, 
Aardema, & Todorov, 2006), suggests that appraisal in OCD may be dependent not 
only on the content of ITs, but also the context of IT occurrence.  With a substantial 
body of evidence implicating OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT cognitive domains 
in OCD accumulated, increased awareness of the processes, conditions or contexts 
under which these beliefs and appraisals may operate differentially is now important in 
moving forward our understanding, and crucially our treatment, of the disorder.    
1.2   Mood and Cognition  
Mood-state appears to constitute one condition or context with the capacity to 
significantly and differentially impact cognitive processes, including appraisal processes 
within OCD.  Teasdale (1983), in an early “associative networks” model of cognition, 
hypothesised that depressed mood results in increased accessibility of negatively-
valenced cognitions (Teasdale & Bancroft, 1977, cited in Teasdale, 1983).  Teasdale’s 
(1983) model explained this enhanced accessibility as the result of strong associations 
between moods and thoughts, which are linked in memory such that moods tend to 
trigger mood-related thoughts.  In a series of experimental investigations, Miranda and 
colleagues (1988, 1990, and 1998) and Persons and Miranda (1991) provided support 
for their mood-state-dependent hypothesis which replicated and extended Teasdale’s 
findings by suggesting that dysfunctional attitudes associated with depression tend to 
remain dormant until activated by negative mood.  Specifically, Miranda and colleagues 
found that individuals who hold dysfunctional beliefs related to depression fail to report 
such beliefs when they are in a positive mood, but readily endorse such beliefs when in 
a dysphoric mood.  The authors thus concluded that the ability of individuals to access 
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and report dysfunctional depression-relevant attitudes is dysphoric mood-state-
dependent.  Miranda and colleagues (1990) applied the same hypothesis to anxiety, 
stating, “We expect that reporting of dysfunctional beliefs that predispose persons to 
anxiety and anxiety disorders is facilitated by the presence of an anxious mood-state” 
(p.239).   
1.2.1   Mood and Appraisal in OCD  
Despite these established links between mood-states and enhanced access to 
mood-state-relevant cognitions, mood has received limited attention in OCD theory and 
research.  The lone existing model of OCD which affords mood a central position in its 
conceptualisation of the disorder is the mood-as-input theory which views mood as 
important in determining the perseverance of neutralising activity (MacDonald & 
Davey, 2005a, 2005b; Martin & Davies, 1998) but doesn’t seek to understand how 
emotion impacts on catastrophic appraisals of intrusive cognitions.  Researchers 
investigating cognitive appraisal models of OCD focused their investigation of the 
relationship between mood and appraisal in OCD almost exclusively on the emotional 
distress that arises subsequent to negative appraisals of intrusions.  That is, cognitive 
models focused on mood disturbance as a typically emergent product or output of 
negative appraisals of intrusions (e.g., Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002; Rachman, 2003).  
Meanwhile, the potential impact of different mood-states on the appraisal process itself 
remained unexplored.  The relationship between mood and appraisal received only 
cursory attention in statements of theory, and suffered from a dearth of empirical 
examination (Purdon, 2001).  This is regrettable as the mood-state-dependent 
hypothesis implies that negative affective states may also be important input factors in 




1.2.2   OCD-Specific Mood-State-Dependent Hypotheses 
The primary implication of the mood-state-dependent hypothesis to OCD is 
increased likelihood of negative appraisal of ITs (due to enhanced accessibility of 
negative, mood-congruent beliefs) in the context of negative mood-states.  Furthermore, 
specific negative mood-states can be expected to differentially activate specific types of 
OCD-relevant belief and appraisal domains.  Evidence from experimental studies 
establishes a firm link, for example, between anxiety and over-estimation of threat 
(OET) beliefs and appraisals.  Butler and Mathews (1987) conducted a study that 
maximised ecological validity by testing the prediction that state-anxiety, arising from 
anticipation of a stressful upcoming university exam, would be associated with an 
inflation of estimates of the occurrence of negative events related to oneself.  Consistent 
with the hypothesis, results indicated that increases in anticipatory anxiety as the exam 
approached were associated with increased subjective risk of examination failure.  
Using a sample of non-referred children in a study that employed an ambiguous story 
paradigm, Muris, Rapee, Meesters, Schouten, & Geers (2003) found that high levels of 
state-anxiety were associated with increased threat perception.  Muris and van der 
Heiden (2006) replicated this finding.  Arntz, Hildebrand, & van den Hout (1994), in a 
study conducted with anxious patients (N = 37; 8 of whom were OCD patients), found 
that reported anxiety prior to an exposure task was related to self-reported danger 
expectations.  In a study linking threat appraisals (as opposed to threat beliefs) with 
anxious mood-state, Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, and Mathews (1991) presented 
clinically anxious, recovered clinically anxious, and normal control subjects with a 
mixture of ambiguous and unambiguous sentences.  The ambiguous sentences could be 
interpreted in threatening or non-threatening ways.  A subsequent recognition memory 
test indicated that the currently anxious subjects were more likely than normal controls 
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and recovered anxiety subjects to interpret the ambiguous sentences in a threatening 
manner.   
While these studies do not establish a causal relationship between anxiety and 
OET, they do suggest that anxious mood-state may represent a condition under which 
OET beliefs and appraisals become more salient.  As such, the following OCD-specific 
mood-state-dependent hypothesis may reasonably be drawn:  In the presence of anxious 
mood-state, the accessibility of pre-existing dysfunctional OET beliefs will be increased 
(in accordance with the mood-state-dependent hypothesis) making them a ready source 
of assumptions upon which OET appraisals of intrusive thoughts may be based (in 
accordance with the basic premise of the appraisal models of OCD), thus promoting 
OET appraisals (see Figure 2).   
 
Figure 2.  An OCD-specific mood-state-dependent hypothesis in the special case of  
      anxious mood-state concurrent with intrusive thoughts 
 
Numerous authors have suggested a link between dysphoric mood-state and 
inflated responsibility beliefs and appraisals (see: APA, 2013; Bargh & Tota, 1988; 
DeSteno & Salovey, 1997; Rachman, 1997) and there is some limited research evidence 


















non-OCD anxious, and non-clinical controls, Steketee and colleagues (1998) reported 
that two self-report responsibility belief measures correlated at 0.39 and 0.44 with a 
measure of depressive symptoms.  Freeston and colleagues (1992) also successfully 
tested the hypothesis that greater perceived responsibility would be associated with 
dysphoria.  Although again failing to test a causal relationship, these results 
nevertheless suggest that dysphoric mood-state may represent a condition under which 
inflated responsibility beliefs and appraisals become more salient.  Thus, another OCD-
specific mood-state-dependent hypothesis may be drawn: In the presence of dysphoric 
mood-state, pre-existing dysfunctional inflated responsibility beliefs are likely to be 
activated and may subsequently promote appraisals of negative ITs in terms of inflated 
responsibility (see Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3.  An OCD-specific mood-state-dependent hypothesis in the special case of  
      dysphoric mood-state concurrent with intrusive thoughts 
 
In contrast to OET and inflated responsibility, it is difficult to envisage how the 
mood-state-dependent hypothesis could be logically applied to the over-importance of 
thoughts (OIT) belief and appraisal domain.  OIT can perhaps most accurately be 


















cause-and-effect beliefs about the nature of the relationship between thoughts and 
actions.  OIT is a less future- and danger-oriented domain than OET and a less 
subjective, self-focused, or self-evaluative domain than inflated responsibility.  OIT has 
no rational link to any specific mood-state, and as such, OIT beliefs are less likely to be 
prone to activation by affective stimuli.  Reinforcing this conceptualisation of OIT is the 
fact that, to date, no research supports a link between OIT beliefs and appraisals and any 
particular mood-state (e.g., Lee, Cougle, & Telch, 2005; van den Hout, van Pol, & 
Peters, 2001), with the exception of a series of studies reporting mild correlations 
between OIT and measures of dysphoria (e.g., Bhar & Kyrios, 2007).  As such, an 
additional aim of the study is to explore if, in the absence of negative mood-state (i.e., 
in neutral mood) and the absence of any activation of mood-state-dependent 
dysfunctional beliefs, relatively mood-independent OIT appraisals become more 
prominent, perhaps achieving equivalent prominence with OET and inflated 












Figure 4.  A possible model of negative appraisal in OCD in the special case of  
      neutral mood-state concurrent with intrusive thoughts 
 

















  “Salkovskis (1985) suggested that the unique feature of obsessional problems 
lies not in the occurrence of ideas of danger or threat, although such threat perception is 
a necessary component of the cognitive theory of the way obsessional problems occur..., 
but rather in the motivation of the compulsive component [i.e., the neutralisation] of the 
problem” (p.48, Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002).  This statement highlights the 
importance of exploring precisely why individuals with OCD employ the compulsive 
neutralising strategies that they do.  Two major motivations have been identified: 
neutralising activities are performed in order to “put right” the thought, prevent or 
mitigate the anticipated consequences of the thought, and/or relieve the subjective 
experience of distress associated with it (APA, 2013; Clark, 2002; Freeston & 
Ladouceur, 1997; Freud, 1909).  However, a fine-grained analysis of neutralising 
motivations has yet to be conducted.  Little is known about whether certain mood-states 
or specific types of negative appraisals might be associated with particular neutralising 
strategies and motivations.  Investigation of these issues has the potential to shed new 
light on the cognitive-affective nexus of OCD.    
1.3   Aims and Hypotheses 
The current study investigates the impact of different mood-states on 
individuals’ negative appraisals of an obsession-like thought and their motivations for 
selecting strategies to respond to (i.e., neutralise) that thought.  Specifically, the study 
tests the main effects of experimentally induced mood (i.e., anxious, neutral, and 
dysphoric mood) on three dependent variables associated with appraisal of an 
obsession-like thought (over-estimation of threat (OET), inflated responsibility, and 
over-importance of thoughts (OIT) appraisals) and three dependent variables associated 
with motivations for neutralising (reduce threat (RT), reduce sense of responsibility 
(RSR), and diminish importance of the thought (DIT) motivations).  
1.3.1   Mood and Appraisal Hypotheses 
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It was expected that induced anxious mood-state would increase the salience and 
accessibility of OET beliefs, thus promoting negative appraisal of an obsession-like 
thought in the OET domain compared with the inflated responsibility and OIT domains.  
Similarly, it was expected that induced dysphoric mood-state would increase the 
salience and accessibility of inflated responsibility beliefs, thus promoting negative 
appraisal of an obsession-like thought in the inflated responsibility domain compared 
with the OET and OIT domains.  In contrast, it was expected that OET, inflated 
responsibility, and OIT appraisals would be approximately equivalent in the absence of 
negative mood (i.e., in the context of induced neutral mood-state).  In a set of between-
groups predictions, it was expected that OET appraisals would be most prominent in the 
anxious group, inflated responsibility appraisals would be most prominent in the 
dysphoric group, and OIT appraisals would be equivalent in prominence across the 
anxious, neutral and dysphoric mood groups.   
1.3.2   Mood and Neutralising Strategies and Motivations Hypotheses 
Neutralising behaviours are often not connected with what they are intended to 
reduce or prevent in logical or realistic ways (APA, 2013).  It was thus not expected that 
participants’ selection of neutralising strategies would differ as a function of their 
mood-state.  Theoretically, an individual might engage in any kind of neutralising 
behaviour, in response to any kind of IT - no matter how strange or seemingly 
disconnected from the IT the behaviour might be.  It was expected however, that 
different mood-states (and associated mood-state-dependent appraisals of an obsession-
like thought) would generate different motivations for the utilisation of various 
neutralising strategies.  Specifically, it was predicted that neutralising motivations to 
reduce the perceived threat associated with an obsession-like thought would be more 
prominent in the context of anxious mood-state (as individuals in the anxious group 
work to address prominent OET appraisals) than neutral or dysphoric mood-state.  It 
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was also predicted that neutralising motivations to reduce one’s sense of responsibility 
associated with an obsession-like thought would be more prominent in the context of 
dysphoric mood-state (as individuals in the dysphoric group work to address prominent 
responsibility appraisals) than neutral or anxious mood-state.  Finally, it was predicted 
that neutralising motivations to diminish the perceived importance associated with an 
obsession-like thought would be equivalent across the three mood-induced groups. 
2.   Method 
2.1   Participants 
The participants were 114 students and 6 employees from the Australian 
National University.  Participants ranged in age from 17 to 68 years (M = 23.08, SD = 
9.18) and 72.5% were female.  First year psychology students (n = 77) who volunteered 
received course credit in return for their participation. Subjects were randomly assigned 
to one of three experimental groups: anxious mood (n = 40), neutral mood (n = 40), and 
dysphoric mood (n = 40) prior to arriving for the experiment, using sampling without 
replacement.  The final five participants were assigned to specific experimental groups 
to ensure equivalent numbers of participants in each group.  
2.2   Measures 
2.2.1   OCD Characteristics  
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002).  The 18-
item OCI-R, a shortened version of the original OCI, was used to measure participants’ 
baseline level of obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  Participants were asked to rate the 
degree to which they were bothered or distressed by common symptoms of OCD in the 
past month on a five-point Likert-type scale from 0 (Not at all) to 4 (Extremely).  In the 
present study only the OCI-R total score was calculated.  The OCI-R possesses good 
internal consistency for the total score (Cronbach’s alpha coefficients across samples 
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range from .81 to .93; Foa et al., 2002).  Adequate test-retest reliability (.57 to .91 
across samples) and construct validity, and good convergent validity with the original 
OCI and other OCD symptom measures (e.g., Y-BOCS and MOCI) have also been 
reported for the OCI-R (Abramowitz & Deacon, 2006; Wu & Watson, 2003).  In the 
current study the OCI-R displayed satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.74). 
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 1997, 2001).  An abridged 
version of the OBQ (an 87-item self-report instrument) was used to measure the degree 
to which participants agreed with various dysfunctional beliefs associated with OCD.  
OBQ scores were used to establish equivalence of experimental groups on OCD-
relevant beliefs prior to experimental manipulation.  The 87-item OBQ contains six 
subscales, however, only the subscales measuring the three belief domains relevant to 
the current study (i.e., OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT) were surveyed.  The three 
utilised subscales constituted a 44-item instrument.  Participants were asked to rate their 
level of agreement with each of the 44 statements on a seven-point Likert-type scale 
from 1 (Disagree very much) to 7 (Agree very much).  This abridged version of the 
OBQ displayed satisfactory internal consistency in the current study (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .85).  Initial validation of the full OBQ indicated that it possessed good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for subscales across samples range from .71 
to .93) and test-retest reliability (range from .75 to .90 across subscales; OCCWG, 
2001).  As mentioned above however, a subsequent validation study reported high 
correlations between the subscales of the OBQ (rs > 0.7; OCCWG, 2003).  The OBQ 
nevertheless remained the best available measure of OCD-relevant OET, inflated 
responsibility, and OIT beliefs at the time the current study was being designed.  
The Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (III; OCCWG, 1997, 2001).  The 31-
item III was designed to measure individuals’ appraisals of their unwanted intrusions 
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across three appraisal domains (Inflated Responsibility, Control of Thoughts, and OIT).  
A new subscale, designed to assess OET appraisals, was developed for the present study 
(see Appendix A).  The OET subscale replaced the control of thoughts subscale to 
create the 30-item III-Modified (III-M).  In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient for the newly developed OET subscale of the III-M was .78, providing 
preliminary evidence for the internal consistency of the subscale.  Participants identified 
two examples of ITs they had recently experienced and then rated their degree of belief 
in 30 appraisal statements that related to those ITs.  Ratings were recorded using a scale 
from 0 (I did not believe this idea at all) to 100 (I was completely convinced this idea 
was true).  Participants also rated the frequency, recency and distress associated with 
their ITs.  The OCCWG (2001, 2003) reported that the III has good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha for the subscales ranging from .79 to .96 across samples) and 
adequate test-retest reliability (.64 to .83 across samples).  In the current study The III-
M showed good overall internal consistency, with Cronbach’s alpha of .89.  As with the 
OBQ, high correlations have been reported between the subscales of the III (rs 
approximately 0.7; OCCWG, 2003), however, this is understandable given that 
appraisal of a specific intrusion is likely to be based on the interaction between 
numerous beliefs.  The III represented the best available measure of OCD-relevant 
appraisal domains at the time the current study was being designed. 
2.2.2   Mood, Appraisal, and Neutralising Urge, Strategies, and Motivations       
Two 125mm visual analogue scales (VAS) were utilised to measure 
participants’ short-term mood-state fluctuations on anxious and dysphoric dimensions 
(Appendix B).  The order in which the mood VAS were presented was reversed after 
the first 60 participants to negate any potential order effect.  Six 125mm VAS questions 
were also developed to tap participants’ appraisals of an obsession-like thought in three 
domains: over-estimation of threat (OET), inflated responsibility, and over-importance 
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of thoughts (OIT; two questions were dedicated to each domain; see Appendix C).  One 
further VAS question was used to tap participants’ urge to neutralise (Appendix D).  
Participants rated the degree that they endorsed each VAS question by marking the line 
between the 0- and 100-point “anchors” at either end of the scale.  VAS ratings have 
been shown to provide valid and sensitive estimates of the nature and intensity of 
experienced mental states (Gift, 1989), and VAS assessing mood-states have been found 
to correlate with other established mood scales (Lindsay & Powell, 1994).  Mean inter-
item correlations (appropriate to use in lieu of Cronbach’s alpha for scales with less 
than ten items; Pallant, 2005) for the VAS OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT 
appraisal subscales in the current study were r = .26, r = .38, and r = .26, respectively.  
These values fall within the optimal range of .2 to .4 (Briggs & Cheek, 1986), indicating 
good internal consistency.  
Neutralising Strategies Inventory (NSI). Participants endorsed the neutralising 
strategies they used in responding to an induced obsession-like thought by placing ticks 
in boxes corresponding to 12 separate strategy options on the NSI (Appendix E).  
Strategies contained in this novel inventory included items associated with each of three 
broad categories of neutralising activity (i.e., Change the Thought, Remove the 
Thought, and Ignore the Thought) identified by Freeston, Ladouceur, Provencher, and 
Blais (1995).  Four items were derived from the Change the Thought category (i.e., 
‘Reappraised the Thought’, ‘Tried to “Undo” the Thought’, ‘Planned an Action’, and 
‘Performed a Ritual’).  Four items were derived from the Remove the Thought category 
(i.e., ‘Replaced the Thought’, ‘Tried to Stop the Thought’, ‘Physically Altered the 
Sentence’, and ‘Punished Yourself’).   Three items were derived from the Ignore the 
Thought category (i.e., ‘Reassured Yourself’, ‘Used Meditation or Relaxation’, and 
‘Did Nothing’).  A ‘Used another Strategy (please specify)’ option was also included.  
Participants’ responses on the ‘Used another Strategy (please specify)’  item were 
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analysed by the researcher and recoded as one of the other neutralising strategies where 
appropriate (i.e., when the strategy described by the participant was not included in the 
examples describing each strategy but nevertheless conformed to the basic premise of a 
particular strategy).   
Neutralising Motivations Inventory (NMI).  Participants endorsed their reasons 
(i.e., motivations) for utilising each of the neutralising strategies they ticked on the NSI 
by placing ticks in boxes corresponding to eight specific motivations (grouped into 
three broad categories of motivation) on the NMI (Appendix F).  Two motivation items 
were included in relation to the (i) Reduce Threat (RT) neutralising motivation category 
(i.e., ‘To Keep the Friend or Family Member That I Imagined Safe from Danger’ and 
‘To Make Myself Feel Safer’).  Two motivation items were included in relation to the 
(ii) Reduce Sense of Responsibility (RSR) neutralising motivation category (i.e., ‘To 
Fulfil My Responsibility to do something about the Thought’ and ‘To Diminish My 
Sense of Responsibility for Any Negative Outcomes Associated with Having the 
Thought’).  Two motivation items were included in relation to the (iii) Diminish 
Importance of the Thought (DIT) neutralising motivation category (i.e., ‘To Make the 
Thought Have No Effect’ and ‘To Make Me Feel Like I’m a Good Person’).  An opt-
out, ‘I Don’t Know Why I Used This Strategy’, option was also included, as was an 
‘Other Reason/s (please specify)’ option.  As with the NSI (above), participants’ 
responses on the ‘Other Reason/s (please specify)’ item were analysed by the researcher 
and recoded as one of the other neutralising motivations where appropriate (i.e., when 
the motivation described by the participant clearly corresponded with Reduce Threat, 
Reduce Sense of Responsibility or Diminish Importance of the Thought).  
2.3   Procedure       
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The experimental protocol was ratified by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee, and was conducted in small groups (range, 1 to 4 participants, mode = 2 
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Figure 5.  The experimental method (Study 1) 
 
Participants were trained in the use of visual analogue scales, scored the baseline 
anxiety and dysphoria VAS and answered three demographic questions regarding their 
age, gender, and number of years studying psychology.  Next, participants were guided 
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and dysphoria VAS (Time 1).  Three questionnaires were then administered: OCI-R, 
OBQ, and III-M, and the anxiety and dysphoria VAS were scored again (Time 2).   
During the next phase of the experiment participants in each of the three 
experimental groups underwent different mood-induction procedures.  Participants first 
read a list of instruction points preparing them for what would be expected of them in 
this phase of the experiment.  Participants were then asked to attend to a mood-
congruent musical selection.  Participants in the dysphoric group heard an eight-minute 
clip from Albinoni’s “Adagio in G Minor” (1981).  Previous research has suggested that 
this piece can induce dysphoric mood-state (Bisson & Sears, 2007).  Participants in the 
anxious group heard an eight-minute clip from “Erwartung (Anticipation)” by Arnold 
Schoenberg (1909/1996).  Previous research has suggested that this piece can induce 
anxious mood-state in undergraduates (Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2005).  
Participants in the neutral group heard an eight-minute clip from “Summer III - Tempo 
impettuoso d'Estate” from The Four Seasons (Vivaldi, 1991).  This piece has been used 
to successfully induce neutral mood-state in previous studies (McCabe, Gotlib, & 
Martin, 2000).  After the music had been playing for one minute, participants received a 
set of 20 cards with mood-congruent self-referential statements typed on them.  Self-
referential statements are an effective means of inducing various mood-states 
(Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996).  The sets of neutral and dysphoric self-
referential statements used were adapted from longer sets of statements developed by 
Seibert and Ellis (1991), whereas the anxious statements were developed specifically 
for use in the present study (see Appendix G).  The mood-induction procedure took 
approximately eight minutes, following which participants again scored the anxiety and 
dysphoria VAS (Time 3). 
Next, for all three groups, the experimenter began the provocation procedure to 
generate an obsession-like unacceptable thought/image/impulse.  Participants were 
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asked to call to mind a friend or family member who they are close to, after which they 
were provided with a written sentence that read ‘I hope………is in a car accident’.  
Participants were asked to write the name of the person they had called to mind into the 
blank space in the sentence.  Participants then wrote out the entire sentence again on a 
blank page, read it out aloud, and were encouraged to produce a clear and vivid 
visualisation of the situation depicted in the sentence for 30 seconds.  This was in 
accordance with van den Hout and colleagues’ (2001) detailed modifications to 
Rachman, Shafran, Mitchell, Trant, & Teachman’s (1996) original paradigm.  The 
paradigm represents a valid experimental model of obsessions, modelling the level of 
distress and urge to neutralise that is seen in OCD with non-clinical samples (Bocci & 
Gordon, 2007; Marcks & Woods, 2007; Rassin, 2001; Zucker, Craske, Barrios, & 
Holguin, 2002).  Following the obsession-like thought provocation, participants scored 
the obsession-like-thought-related mood, appraisal, and urge to neutralise VAS (Time 
4). 
Participants were then asked to sit for a two minute free-time (neutralising) 
period during which they could do whatever they chose.  After this free-time period, 
participants completed the Neutralising Strategies Inventory (NSI) and Neutralising 
Motivations Inventory (NMI).  They then scored the appraisal VAS for a second time 
and the anxiety and dysphoria VAS again (Time 5).  Next, participants were guided 
through the relaxation procedure for a second time, however on this occasion they heard 
Mozart’s “Sonata for two pianos in D major, K.448” (1985) during the procedure.  This 
piece of music has been found to induce positive moods in students (Thompson, 
Schellenberg, & Husain, 2001).  Finally, participants scored the anxiety and dysphoria 
VAS once more (Time 6).   
2.4   Planned Statistical Analysis 
2.4.1   Baseline Equivalence of Groups       
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A series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to assess 
baseline equivalence of the three experimental groups (Anxious, Neutral, and 
Dysphoric) in age, number of years studying psychology, anxiety, dysphoria, OCD-
relevant beliefs and appraisals, and OCD symptoms (prior to the mood-induction and 
obsession-like thought induction experimental manipulations).  The equivalence of the 
sex distribution between the groups was assessed using Chi-Square analysis.   
2.4.2   Experimental Manipulation Checks 
 The manipulation effect of the mood-induction procedures was assessed using 
Time(Time 2, Time 3)Group(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) ANOVA for mean anxiety 
and dysphoria ratings.  The Tukey HSD test was used for post-hoc comparisons where 
appropriate.  In addition, t-tests were used to assess within-group differences on the 
anxiety and dysphoria dimensions at Time 3 (post-mood induction).   
The manipulation effect of the obsession-like thought provocation procedure 
was checked using two Time(Time 3, Time 4)Group(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) 
ANOVA to assess changes in participants’ anxiety and dysphoria ratings.  The Tukey 
HSD test was used for post-hoc comparisons where appropriate.  In addition, 
participants’ urge to engage in neutralising activity following the obsession-like thought 
provocation (Time 4) was assessed using a between-groups ANOVA.  Finally, the 
Pearson correlation coefficient was used to investigate the degree of association 
between participants’ ratings of their urge to neutralise and their emotional distress 
following the obsession-like thought provocation.   
The manipulation effect of the free-time (neutralising) period was investigated 
using two Time(Time 4, Time5)Group(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) ANOVA to 
assess the impact of the free-time period on participants’ urge to engage in neutralising 
activity and their overall distress ratings (anxiety and dysphoria ratings combined).   
2.4.3  Comparative Analysis of Appraisal Ratings 
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Means and standard deviations were calculated for the mood groups’ appraisal 
ratings in the three appraisal domains at Time 4 and Time 5.  Three repeated measures 
ANOVA with planned comparisons were conducted to assess expected differences in 
appraisal ratings across the three domains (i.e., OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT) 
within each of the mood groups following the obsession-like thought provocation (Time 
4).  Between-groups ANOVA with planned contrasts were conducted to assess 
hypothesised group differences on appraisal ratings for each of the domains following 
the obsession-like thought provocation (Time 4).   
2.4.4  Comparative Analysis of Neutralising Strategies and Motivations 
A series of Chi-Square tests were used to determine whether the mood groups 
differed in proportion of participants using Change the Thought, Remove the Thought, 
and Ignore the Thought neutralising strategies.  A series of Mann-Whitney U tests were 
used to assess predicted differences between the three mood groups in proportion of 
endorsed neutralising motivations in each of the three neutralisation motivation 
categories (i.e., Reduce Threat (RT), Reduce Sense of Responsibility (RSR), Diminish 
Importance of the Thought (DIT)).   
Where appropriate, tests of simple main effects were employed to clarify the 
source of the significant interaction effects.  A significance level of .05 was adopted for 
all tests.  No adjustment was made for Type-I error since concerns in this regard needed 
to be weighed against concerns about Type-II error, relating to the relatively small 
sample size.  All analysis was conducted using SPSS version 22.0. 
3.  Results 
3.1  Preliminary Data Screening 
Prior to analysis, data were screened for accuracy of data entry, missing values, 
normality, univariate and multivariate outliers, linearity, homoscedasticity, 
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multicollinearity and singularity.  Initial data screening revealed plausible means and 
standard deviations for each variable and no missing or out-of-range values.  
Distributions of the variables were screened for univariate normality.  Most variables’ 
distributions were slightly to moderately (but none were significantly) positively 
skewed, and none were significantly kurtosed.  Linearity, homoscedasticity and 
multicollinearity were all at acceptable levels and no singularities were detected.   
Box plots revealed three univariate outliers with p < .001.  These outliers were 
checked for accuracy and a decision was made to include them in analyses as they were 
deemed to represent normal variation found within the population under measurement.  
No multivariate outliers were identified using the Mahalanobis distance statistic with 
critical value for 2(27) = 55.48, p < .001.   
3.2  Baseline Equivalence of Groups 
The characteristics of the participants in each of the mood groups are displayed 
in Table 1.   
Table 1.  Baseline characteristics of the three mood groups (Study 1) 
 
 Variable                               Anxious Group             Neutral Group             Dysphoric Group        Between-Group  
                                                      n = 40                             n = 40                             n = 40                      Differences 
                                               Mean        (SD)              Mean        (SD)               Mean        (SD)                    F(2, 117)         
 
  Sex ratio (M:F)        13:27               10:30        10:30 
  Age          22.7         (8.6)        23.0         (9.1)                23.6       (10.0)             .096 
  Psych. Years    1.7         (1.2)          1.9         (1.5)                  2.0         (1.6)             .297 
  Baseline anxiety   23.0       (15.4)        24.5       (15.8)                22.9       (16.4)             .132 
  Baseline dysphoria       17.6       (12.4)        18.7       (14.0)                16.7       (16.5)             .189 
  OBQ: 
        OET  38.4         (9.4)        40.7         (9.7)                40.2       (11.9)             .581 
        Responsibility  58.4       (12.4)        62.4       (11.7)                58.7       (15.8)             .933 
        OIT   36.5         (7.5)        36.2         (7.8)                37.4         (7.6)             .235 
  III-M: 
        OET               243.5       (94.8)      243.8     (115.1)              249.8       (80.8)             .052 
        Responsibility               342.0     (202.6)      330.0     (171.4)              307.8     (169.5)             .366 
        OIT                261.8       (94.3)      241.3     (110.2)              256.0       (72.1)             .511 
  OCI-R: 
        Total  19.5         (7.3)        19.1         (7.6)                17.7         (6.9)             .623
  
      Note:   Psych. years = number of years spent studying psychology in a tertiary institution. 
                      OBQ:   OET/Responsibility/OIT = Obsessional-Beliefs Questionnaire over-estimation of threat/ inflated  
               responsibility/over-importance of thoughts subscale scores. 
   III-M:  OET/Responsibility/OIT = Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory-Modified over-estimation of threat/ 
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                                   inflated responsibility/over-importance of thoughts/subscale scores. 
 
The three groups did not differ significantly (F(2, 117) < 1 in each instance) on 
measures of age, number of years studying psychology, anxiety, dysphoria, clinical 
questionnaires, or sex distribution (2(2) = .75, p > .05) prior to the mood-induction 
experimental manipulations.  Mean scores for the groups fell within the non-clinical 
range for the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002).  The mean subscale scores for the OBQ, and the 
inflated responsibility and OIT subscale scores for the III-M, were comparable to those 
previously reported in non-clinical samples (Teachman et al., 2006; Tolin, Woods, & 
Abramowitz, 2003), and substantially lower than those reported in clinical samples 
(Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2005).   
3.3  Experimental Manipulation Checks  
 An overview of the impact of the various elements of the experimental 
procedure on participants’ ratings of anxiety and dysphoria is provided graphically in 
figures 6a and 6b.  
 





Figure 6b.  Group means for VAS dysphoria ratings across the seven assessment points 
3.3.1  Mood Induction Effects 
 The effect of the mood-inductions by group can be seen in Figures 6a (anxiety) 
and 6b (dysphoria), between Time 2 and Time 3.  Participants’ self-reported anxiety 
(F(2,117) = 68.65, p < .001) and dysphoria (F(2,117) = 65.71, p < .001) mood ratings 
increased significantly between Time 2 and Time 3.  Significant Time(Time 2, Time 
3)Group(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) interactions were observed for anxiety (F(2,117) 
= 28.55, p < .001) and dysphoria (F(2,117) = 32.17, p < .001), indicating that the increase 
in participants’ mood ratings between Time 2 and Time 3 differed significantly 
depending on which mood group participants belonged to.  
 Post-hoc comparisons between the three mood groups revealed that prior to the 
mood-inductions (Time 2), groups did not differ significantly on ratings of anxiety 
(F(2,117) = .01, p = .99) or dysphoria (F(2,117) = .03, p = .98).  Following the mood-
inductions however (Time 3), there were significant differences between groups for 
anxiety (F(2,117) = 16.29, p < .001) and dysphoria (F(2,117) = 22.65, p < .001).  Further 
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post-hoc comparisons (using the Tukey HSD test) at Time 3 revealed that mean anxiety 
ratings were significantly higher for the anxious group than the dysphoric group (MD = 
14.75, SE = 4.75; p = .007) or the neutral group (MD = 27.08, SE = 4.75; p < .001).  The 
dysphoric group’s mean anxiety ratings were significantly higher than the neutral 
group’s (MD = 12.33, SE = 4.75; p = .03).  Mean dysphoria ratings were significantly 
higher for the dysphoric group than the anxious group (MD = 20.25, SE = 4.57; p < 
.001) or the neutral group (MD = 30.20, SE = 4.57; p < .001), and the anxious and 
neutral group’s mean dysphoria ratings did not differ significantly (p = .08).  
 Within the anxious group, mean anxiety ratings were significantly higher than 
mean dysphoria ratings at Time 3 (t = 6.65; p < .001).  Within the dysphoric group, 
mean dysphoria ratings were significantly higher than mean anxiety ratings at Time 3 (t 
= 3.97, p < .001).  Within the neutral group, there was no significant difference between 
mean anxiety and dysphoria ratings at Time 3 (p = .31) indicating that the neutral mood-
induction procedure was successful in holding mean negative mood ratings constant for 
the neutral group.  Overall, these results suggest that the mood-induction procedures 
successfully differentiated the groups on anxious, dysphoric, and neutral mood 
dimensions.  
3.3.2  Obsession-Like Thought Provocation Effect 
 The effect of the obsession-like thought provocation by group can be seen in 
Figures 6a (anxiety) and 6b (dysphoria), between Time 3 and Time 4.  Participants’ 
self-reported anxiety (F = 92.86, p < .001) mood ratings increased significantly between 
Time 3 and Time 4.  The Time(Time 3, Time 4)Group(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) 
interaction for anxiety was significant (F = 4.55, p = .013), indicating that increases in 
anxiety ratings between Time 3 and Time 4 differed significantly between the groups.  
Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test to clarify the significant Time by 
Group interaction indicated that the mean difference between anxiety ratings at Time 3 
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and Time 4 for the anxious group was significantly different from (i.e., lower than) the 
dysphoric group (MD = 11.46, SE = 4.53; p < .05) and the neutral group (MD = 20.39, 
SE = 4.53; p < .001).   
 Participants’ self-reported dysphoria (F = 108.04, p < .001) mood ratings also 
increased significantly between Time 3 and Time 4.  The Time(Time 3, Time 
4)Group(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) interaction for dysphoria was not significant (p 
> .05), indicating that the three mood groups experienced approximately equal changes 
in dysphoria following the obsession-like thought provocation.  No other significant 
differences between groups were present.  These results indicate that the anxious 
group’s anxiety increased less than the anxiety ratings for the neutral and dysphoric 
groups following the obsession-like thought provocation, but that otherwise, group 
increases in distress were similar.  
A significant difference was observed between the three mood groups (F(2,117) = 
4.43, p = .01) in relation to participants’ self-reported urge to engage in neutralising 
activity following the obsession-like thought provocation.  Post-hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey HSD test indicated that the anxious group reported significantly greater urge 
to neutralise compared with the neutral group (p = .01).  No other significant differences 
among the mood groups were found in relation to urge to neutralise. 
 Correlational analysis revealed that, across all participants, urge to neutralise 
was strongly correlated (r = .77, p < .001) with distress (i.e., anxiety and dysphoria 
ratings combined) post the obsession-like thought provocation.  Overall, these results 
suggest that the obsession-like thought provocation not only increased participants’ 
distress, but also motivated them to do something about the thought (i.e., neutralise).    
3.3.3  Free-Time (Neutralising) Period Effect 
Participants’ self-reported urge to neutralise was significantly reduced (F(2,117) = 
35.15, p < .001) following the free-time (neutralising) period (Time 5).  There was no 
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significant main effect of Group, nor a significant TimeGroup interaction (both p > 
.05) indicating that reductions in urge to neutralise were similar across the three groups.  
Participants’ self-reported distress (i.e., anxiety and dysphoria ratings combined) was 
also significantly reduced (F(2,117) = 261.76, p < .001) following the neutralising period.  
There was no significant main effect of Group nor a significant TimeGroup interaction 
(both p > .05), indicating that reductions in distress were similar across the groups.  
3.4  Comparative Analysis of Appraisal Ratings  
Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations for appraisal ratings for the 
three mood groups at Times 4 and 5.   
Table 2.  Group means and standard deviations (SDs) for VAS ratings in the three 
   cognitive appraisal domains at Time 4 and Time 5 
   
                                              Anxious Group                   Neutral Group                 Dysphoric Group 
  Appraisal                                   n = 40                                  n = 40                                   n = 40 
  Domain                             Mean          (SD)                   Mean         (SD)                   Mean         (SD) 
 
  OET 
  Time 4       95.10     (37.00)     72.67       (37.21)       81.68       (48.26) 
  Time 5       66.43     (35.17)     58.83       (34.43)       67.85       (45.80) 
 
  Responsibility  
  Time 4        83.77     (48.14)     66.05       (40.73)       93.02       (46.46) 
  Time 5      73.95     (46.17)     57.90       (35.30)       67.53       (42.98) 
 
  OIT  
  Time 4       65.52     (48.11)     80.18       (38.11)       64.83       (35.77) 
  Time 5       56.62     (44.88)     51.85       (34.91)       57.45       (43.00) 
 
Note:        Appraisal Domain:  OET/Responsibility/ OIT = Visual analogue scale over-estimation of threat/inflated responsibility/ 
  over-importance of thoughts subscale scores.  
 
Within-groups analyses across the three appraisal domains revealed significant 
differences between appraisal ratings for the anxious group (F(2,117) = 9.83, p < .001) at 
Time 4.  Planned comparisons showed that for the anxious group, OIT ratings were 
significantly lower than OET ratings (MD = 29.58, SE = 7.50; p = .001) and inflated 
responsibility ratings (MD = 18.25, SE = 4.86; p = .002).  There were also significant 
differences between appraisal ratings for the dysphoric group (F(2,117) = 8.68, p = .001) 
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at Time 4.  Planned comparisons showed that for the dysphoric group, inflated 
responsibility ratings were significantly higher than OIT ratings (MD = 28.20, SE = 
6.69; p < .001).  No other significant differences between appraisal domains were 
present at Time 4, including no significant differences for the neutral group (p > .05).  
Between-groups analyses assessing each of the appraisal domains revealed 
statistically significant differences between the three mood groups in relation to OET 
appraisals (F(2,117) = 3.20, p = .048) and inflated responsibility appraisals (F(2,117) = 3.68, 
p = .03) but not OIT appraisals (F(2,117) = 1.79, p = .17) at Time 4.  Planned contrasts 
revealed that the anxious group reported significantly more OET appraisals than the 
other two groups combined (t = 5.06, p = .03), but not significantly more than the 
dysphoric group alone (t = 2.13, p = .15).   The dysphoric group reported significantly 
more inflated responsibility appraisals than the other two groups combined (t = 4.28, p 
= .04), but not significantly more than the anxious group alone (t = 0.84, p = .36).   
3.5  Comparative Analysis of Neutralising Strategies and Motivations 
 Table 3 presents the total number (or frequency) of times that participants in the 
mood groups reported using particular neutralising strategies and motivations.  The 
table also displays the proportion that endorsement of each strategy or motivation 
represented relative to the total number of strategies or motivations selected within each 
group.  Results revealed no group differences in proportion of strategy selection across 
Change the Thought, Remove the Thought, and Ignore the Thought neutralising 
strategy sub-categories (χ2 = 2.19, p = .34; χ2 = 2.14, p = .34; and χ2 = 3.50, p = .17; 
respectively).  These results indicate that mood did not impact on individuals’ selection 
of strategies to neutralise the obsession-like thought.  
Significant differences were observed among the three mood groups in 
proportion of neutralising motivation endorsement in all three categories (i.e., RT, RSR 
and DIT).  The anxious group reported a significantly larger proportion of reduce threat 
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(RT) neutralising motivations in response to the obsession-like thought than the 
combined dysphoric and neutral group (Z = 3.03, p = .002; anxious group M = 38.9%, 
SD = 24.0, dysphoric/neutral group M = 23.5%, SD = 18.3).  The dysphoric group 
reported a significantly larger proportion of reduce sense of responsibility (RSR) 
neutralising motivations than the combined anxious and neutral group (Z = 3.03, p = 
.002; dysphoric group M = 38.4%, SD = 25.2, anxious/neutral group M = 23.3%, SD = 
16.5).  The neutral group reported a significantly larger proportion of diminish 
importance of the thought (DIT) neutralising motivations than the combined anxious 
and dysphoric group (Z = 2.73, p = .003; neutral group M = 52.9%, SD = 31.8, 
anxious/dysphoric group M = 38.2%, SD = 27.4).  
Table 3.  Frequency and proportion of endorsed neutralising strategies and motivations  
    across the three experimental groups 
   
                                              Anxious Group                   Neutral Group                  Dysphoric Group 
                                                       n = 40                                   n = 40                                   n = 40 
                                        Frequency    Proportion       Frequency    Proportion        Frequency    Proportion                    
 
  Neutralising Strategy  
  Change           37     (27.2%)       42           (32.3%)          43          (33.9%) 
  Remove      56     (41.2%)       58           (44.6%)          56          (44.1%) 
  Ignore           43     (31.6%)       30           (23.1%)          28          (22.0%) 
 
  Neutralising Motivation 
  RT       75     (38.9%)       38          (24.8%)          38          (22.1%) 
  RSR           47     (24.4%)       34           (22.2%)          66          (38.4%) 
  DIT           71     (36.8%)       81           (52.9%)          68          (39.5%) 
 
Note:        Neutralising Strategy: Change/Remove/Ignore = Neutralising Strategies Inventory (NSI) Change the Thought/Remove the  
                                                Thought/Ignore the Thought scores.   
                       Neutralising Motivation:  RT/RSR/DIT = Neutralising Motivations Inventory (NMI) Reduce Threat/Reduce Sense of    
       Responsibility/Diminish Importance of the Thought scores.        
  
4.  Discussion 
Results provided evidence in support of hypotheses regarding the impact of 
mood-state on appraisal processes and neutralising activity.  Mood-state-dependent 
patterns of responses were evident in relation to participants’ negative appraisals of an 
obsession-like thought and their motivations for neutralising behaviour. 
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4.1  Mood and Appraisal 
Results indicated that different mood-states exerted unique influences on 
participants’ negative appraisals, generating mood-state-dependent appraisal profiles.  
As predicted, participants who received anxious mood-induction reported significantly 
more OET than OIT appraisals.  However, unexpectedly, their inflated responsibility 
appraisal ratings were also significantly higher than their OIT ratings, and the difference 
between their OET ratings and inflated responsibility ratings failed to reach statistical 
significance (p = .09).      
As predicted, participants who received dysphoric mood-induction reported 
significantly more inflated responsibility appraisals than OIT appraisals.  Unexpectedly 
however, the difference between their inflated responsibility ratings and OET ratings 
failed to reach statistical significance (p = .08).  As predicted, in contrast to the anxious 
and dysphoric groups, no significant differences were observed among the appraisal 
domains within the group that received the neutral mood-induction.  This finding 
provides additional evidence for the role of specific negative mood-states in promoting 
OET and inflated responsibility appraisals.   
In relation to between-group comparisons, as expected, OET appraisal 
endorsement was significantly greater in the group receiving anxious mood-induction 
compared with the other two groups combined.  Anxious mood-state appeared to 
increase the salience and accessibility of OET beliefs and thus engender increased 
negative appraisal of the obsession-like thought in the OET domain, relative to inflated 
responsibility and OIT domains.  It is important to note however, that contrary to 
expectations, OET appraisals in the anxious group were not significantly greater than 
OET appraisals in the dysphoric group (p = .07). 
Similarly, and also in accordance with expectations, inflated responsibility 
appraisal endorsement was significantly greater in the group receiving dysphoric mood-
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induction compared with the other two groups combined.  Dysphoric mood-state 
appeared to increase the salience and accessibility of inflated responsibility beliefs and 
thus engender increased negative appraisal of the obsession-like thought in the inflated 
responsibility domain relative to OET and OIT domains.  However, contrary to 
expectations, inflated responsibility appraisals in the dysphoric group were not 
statistically greater than inflated responsibility appraisals in the anxious group (p = .10).  
As predicted, in contrast to OET and inflated responsibility, no significant differences 
were observed among the three groups in relation to OIT appraisal ratings, providing 
evidence for the hypothesised mood-independent nature of the OIT domain.    
Overall, these findings indicated that, among participants who all completed the 
same obsession-like thought induction task (i.e., thinking about a loved one being in a 
car accident), differences in mood-state were responsible for substantial differences in 
the way that people appraised the thought.  The findings of anxiety-dependent activation 
of OET appraisals, dysphoria-dependent activation of inflated responsibility appraisals, 
and equivalence of appraisals across the three domains in the context of neutral mood-
state, are consistent with the theoretical models proposed by Teasdale (1983) and 
Miranda and colleagues (1988, 1990, and 1998).  Results are also consistent with 
previous research demonstrating links between anxiety and OET beliefs and appraisals 
(e.g., Muris et al., 2003), dysphoria and inflated responsibility (e.g., Steketee et al., 
1998), and the lack of any links between negative affect and OIT (e.g., Lee, Cougle, & 
Telch, 2005).  Crucially, the current findings imply that causal relationships exist 
between pairs of mood and appraisal variables (i.e., anxiety/OET and dysphoria/inflated 
responsibility) which were previously linked only by correlation. 
4.2  Mood and Neutralising Strategies and Motivations 
As predicted, current results demonstrated that participants’ selection of 
strategies to respond to (i.e., neutralise) the obsession-like thought (across the Change 
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the Thought, Remove the Thought, and Ignore the Thought categories) did not differ as 
a function of their mood-state.  In contrast, there was strong evidence, again in 
accordance with expectations, that participants were differentially motivated during 
their neutralising activities dependent upon their mood group membership.  As 
predicted, reduce threat (RT) motivations were most prominent in the context of 
anxious mood-state and reduce sense of responsibility (RSR) motivations were most 
prominent in the context of dysphoric mood-state.  In an unexpected finding, diminish 
importance of the thought (DIT) motivations were more prominent than RT or RSR 
motivations in the context of neutral mood.  This interesting result suggested that, in the 
absence of negative-mood, DIT neutralising motivations appear to become the most 
prominent in promoting obsessive-compulsive symptoms, hinting at an underlying, 
perhaps constitutive role for over-importance of thoughts (OIT) appraisals and DIT 
motivations in OCD.  In summary, these results suggest that mood-specific negative 
appraisal profiles subsequently promote different mood-specific motivational profiles 
regarding the employment of neutralising activity.  
4.3  General Discussion 
 The current research represents the first experimental study to explicitly 
investigate mood-state-dependent hypotheses in the OCD context.  Results provide 
preliminary evidence that different mood-states activate specific types of negative 
appraisals, yielding effects on neutralising motivations.  Findings support the hypothesis 
that mood-state may constitute a condition under which appraisal domains may operate 
differentially in OCD.  This novel hypothesis substantially extends existing 
conceptualisations of the role of mood in OCD.   Beyond the role of emotion in the 
perseverance of compulsive activity as per MacDonald and Davey’s (2005a, 2005b) 
mood-as-input model, and in contrast to the typical cognitivist view of emotion as only 
an outcome of cognitive activity, the current results also identify mood as a potentially 
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important causal agent in negative appraisal and neutralising motivation processes in the 
OCD context.  The current findings hint at a new way forward in our understanding of 
the cognitive-affective factors contributing to the pathogenesis and maintenance of 
OCD and advise an expansion of prevailing appraisal (and cognitive-behavioural) 
models of OCD to incorporate consideration of the impact of affective processes in the 
broader process of negative appraisal.   
4.4  Limitations 
A key issue arising from the current results relates to the anxious group/OET 
appraisal and dysphoric group/inflated responsibility appraisal data at Time 4.  
Specifically, counter to expectations, anxious and dysphoric group differences in OET 
and inflated responsibility appraisals failed to reach statistical significance (in both 
within- and between-group comparisons) post the obsession-like thought provocation.  
These findings may be attributable to several factors including cross-contamination that 
was observed in the mood-induction procedures whereby the anxious mood-induction 
also tended to produce moderate increases in participant dysphoria and the dysphoric 
mood-induction also tended to produce moderate increases in participant anxiety.  Thus, 
genuine mood-state-dependent differences in appraisal may have been obscured by 
mood cross-contamination.  An alternative explanation is that differences may have 
been obscured as a consequence of the modest sample size of the current study which 
inevitably reduced the statistical power available to identify significant results 
(increasing risk of Type II errors).  Alternatively, these results might be understood in 
terms of being consistent with suggestions of considerable conceptual overlay between 
the OET and inflated responsibility appraisal constructs.  Such an analysis would be 
accordant with previous research reporting that manipulation of responsibility can also 
lead to greater subjective reports of threat (e.g., Moulding, Kyrios, & Doron, 2007).  It 
would follow, from this interpretation, that OET and inflated responsibility appraisals 
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may be associated with negative mood in more generalised as opposed to specific ways.  
Future research is warranted to investigate these possible explanations.      
A methodological limitation of the present experiment is its heavy reliance on 
self-report both for assessment of the experimental manipulations and for measurement 
of the appraisal and neutralising motivations variables.  Several researchers (e.g., 
MacLeod, 1999) have highlighted the limitations of studying cognition and emotion 
solely with self-report measures, which rely on introspection.  However, the nature of 
the phenomena studied in obsessional thinking tends to dictate the use of self-report 
(Salkovskis, Westbrook, Davis, Jeavons, & Gledhill, 1997) and Abramowitz and 
colleagues (2014) argue that analogue studies are highly relevant for understanding 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  Nevertheless, future research may benefit from the 
use of non-introspective methodologies such as implicit memory tasks or physiological 
measures.  Investigations could be conducted for example to test if, and to what degree, 
physiological responding (e.g., electro-dermal or cardiovascular function) to mood-
induction procedures including not only anxiety but also dysphoria (see Salomon, 
Blysma, White, Panaite, & Rottenberg, 2013; Schwerdtfeger & Rosenkaimer, 2011) 
correlate with subjective, self-report anxiety and depression measures in the context of 
cognitive-affective appraisal studies.  There is however, no a priori reason to expect that 
physiological measures would reveal between-group differences that were absent on 
subjective measures.   
Limitations of statistical analysis included the lack of evidence for construct 
validity (e.g., concurrent and convergent validity) of the novel self-report measures 
utilised (i.e., III-M, VAS, NSI and NMI), and the absence of correlational analyses 
(between OCD symptom measures and distress-ratings following the obsession-like 
thought provocation procedure) to assess the OCD-relevance (as opposed to TAF-
relevance) of the obsession-like thought procedure.  
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Additional methodological limitations of the present study include the use of a 
non-clinical sample, an analogue obsession-like thought (not an actual obsession) that 
does not take into account the diversity and frequency of obsessions typically 
experienced by OCD sufferers, and the fact that it is not clear to what degree the mood-
inductions utilised simulate the kind of ongoing mood disturbance typically experienced 
by OCD patients.  Hence the generalisability of the current findings to the clinical 
population is inevitably limited.  Consequently, examination of clinical links is 
necessary before any definitive conclusions about the relationship between clinical 
OCD symptoms, mood-states, and appraisals of obsessions can be drawn.   
4.5  Strengths 
 A notable strength of the present study was the utilisation of an experimental 
design which permitted exploration of the temporal relationships between the variables 
under investigation.  Another strength was the demonstrated equivalence of groups on 
all characteristics measured prior to the mood-inductions.  Equivalence suggested that 
differences observed between the groups in relation to cognitive appraisals and 
neutralising motivations were the consequence of experimental manipulation as 
opposed to pre-existing differences in mood-state, obsessive-compulsive symptoms, or 
OCD-related beliefs and appraisal.   
 The present experiment was an analogue study in which an obsession-like 
thought provocation was used to model a clinical obsession (obsessions are 
characteristically associated with increases in distress and the urge to neutralise).  
Results indicated that the thought provocation produced substantial, obsession-like 
increases in distress which were similar across the groups (with the exception that 
anxiety ratings for the anxious group increased less dramatically than for the neutral and 
dysphoric groups).  This exception is likely to have been the consequence of a ceiling 
effect whereby the anxious group exhibited the highest mean anxiety ratings post-mood-
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induction, with some group members endorsing a maximum anxiety rating of 100, 
leaving little or no room for meaningful expression of potential increases in anxiety 
following the obsession-like thought provocation.  Participants’ urge to neutralise was 
found to be strongly correlated with their distress following the obsession-like thought 
provocation.  Only one group difference was observed in relation to urge to neutralise 
following the obsession-like thought provocation: the anxious group reported 
significantly greater urge to neutralise compared with the neutral group.  This finding is 
likely accounted for by the anxious groups’ greater overall distress ratings (especially 
anxiety) following mood-induction.  Overall, these results suggested that the obsession-
like thought provocation increased participants’ distress, motivated them to neutralise, 
and was thus analogous to a clinical obsession, constituting a strength of the present 
research.    
4.6  Treatment Implications 
 Although caution must be taken in any attempt to translate analogue-study 
findings to clinical populations, there are some basic implications for the treatment of 
OCD that can nevertheless be outlined.  Perhaps the most important implication of the 
current findings is that the impact of negative mood-states on appraisal might possibly 
be attenuated by emotion-regulation skills training and that this may potentially 
contribute to alleviation of OCD symptoms beyond that provided by traditional CBT for 
OCD.  In addition, the current findings highlight the potentially temporal, shifting 
nature of negative appraisal in OCD as a function of patients’ fluctuating mood-states 
and the need for clinician flexibility to be aware of, and adapt to, these changes.  
Finally, an interesting and potentially important therapeutic implication arising from the 
mood-state-dependent hypothesis is that attempts to modify dysfunctional beliefs and 
appraisals during therapy may be more successful when patients are experiencing the 
specific negative mood-states that facilitate access to targeted beliefs and appraisals. 
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4.7 Future Research 
 A clear direction for future research arising from the present study is 
investigation of the impact of emotion regulation skills training on appraisal and 
neutralising motivation profiles.  In particular, it is important to assess whether 
enhanced emotion-regulation capacity offers protection for individuals against negative 
mood-state-dependent influences on appraisal and neutralising motivation.  These 
questions have potentially important treatment implications for OCD and thus 
motivated a second study, which is reported in chapter two. 
Investigation of mood-state-dependent impacts on the activation of other OCD-
relevant appraisal domains (e.g., control of thoughts, intolerance of uncertainty, and 
perfectionism) also represents a valuable avenue for future research.  As does 
exploration of neutralising strategy endorsement across the two-factor distinction (i.e., 
‘confront’ or ‘avoid’; Lee & Kwon, 2003; Lee, Kwon, Kwon, & Telch, 2005) as 
opposed to the three-factor distinction (i.e., ‘change’, ‘remove’, and ‘ignore’;  Freeston, 
Ladouceur, Provencher, & Blais, 1995).  Additional research could also provide a more 
thorough investigation of the impact of mood-state on dysfunctional beliefs relevant to 
OCD.  Demonstrating changes in the accessibility of dysfunctional beliefs concurrent 
with changes in dysfunctional appraisals following negative mood-induction would 
further explicate the operation of effects consistent with the mood-state-dependent 
hypothesis in OCD.  Finally, longitudinal studies would have the advantage of tracking 
appraisals across time and naturalistic fluctuations in mood-state.   
5.  Conclusion 
 Cognitive appraisal models of OCD ascribe a crucial role for dysfunctional 
appraisals of intrusive thoughts in the development and maintenance of OCD.  Recent 
research has established the importance in OCD of several dysfunctional appraisal 
domains, including OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT, which furnish ITs with 
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meaning and subsequently evoke distress and motivate neutralising.  Very little is 
known however about the conditions under which such appraisal domains operate 
differentially.  The present study provides the first enquiry into the differential mood-
state-dependent activation of appraisal domains in OCD.  Results indicate that specific 
negative mood-states have unique, activating influences on particular appraisal 
domains, and subsequently exert unique influences on obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
(including neutralising motivation), hinting at a kind of cognitive-affective-behavioural 
conceptualisation of OCD.  In particular, anxious mood-state appears to prioritise OET 
appraisals (over inflated responsibility and OIT appraisals) and motivate neutralising 
aimed at reducing one’s sense of threat (RT; see Figure 7).  Dysphoric mood-state, in 
contrast, appears to prioritise inflated responsibility appraisals (over OET and OIT 
appraisals) and motivate neutralising aimed at reducing one’s sense of responsibility 
(RSR; see Figure 8).   Results also indicate that in the absence of negative mood (i.e., in 
a neutral mood-state), OIT appraisals become relatively more prominent (i.e., 
equivalent in prominence with OET and inflated responsibility) and neutralising 
motivations aimed at diminishing the importance of thoughts (DIT) appear to become 
prioritised in this context (see Figure 9).  The current study thus provides an expanded 
account of the potential role of mood in the aetiology and maintenance of OCD.  
Findings support a deeper consideration of the impact of affective processes in the 
broader mechanisms of “negative appraisal” conceived within contemporary cognitive 
models of OCD.  Results suggest that enhanced capacity to regulate emotional 
experience may attenuate the negative impact of mood-states on appraisal and 
neutralising processes and thus confer benefits for OCD sufferers above and beyond 
those currently available using traditional CBT.  Additional analogue investigation 
utilising larger samples is warranted to further explicate the mood-state-dependent 
appraisal and neutralising patterns observed in the current study and to explore the 
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potential for attenuation of such patterns in the context of enhanced emotion regulation 
skills.  Clinical investigation may subsequently be required to test the generalisability of 
findings to the OCD population.   
 
 
Figure 7.  Cognitive-affective-behavioural conceptualisation of OCD in the case of  








Figure 8.  Cognitive-affective-behavioural conceptualisation of OCD in the case of  



















































Figure 9.  Cognitive-affective-behavioural conceptualisation of OCD in the case of  



























Study Two:  The Impact of Emotion Regulation Skills Training on Mood-
State-Dependent Negative Appraisal and Neutralising Motivation Profiles 
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1.   Introduction  
  Chapter one provided preliminary evidence that anxious and dysphoric mood-
states differentially promote certain types of negative appraisals and neutralising 
motivations in response to an obsession-like thought.  An important inference arising 
from these finding was that enhanced emotion regulation capacity may potentially 
attenuate the impact of negative mood-states, and thus translate to reductions in mood-
state-dependent response patterns.  Evidence of attenuation in negative appraisals and 
neutralising motivations associated with enhanced emotion regulation skills would have 
obvious treatment implications for OCD, identifying emotion regulation as a possible 
new pathway by which negative appraisals (and their impact in the pathogenesis and 
maintenance of the disorder) might be clinically addressed.   
1.1   Emotion Regulation 
  The impact of emotion on cognition and behaviour was historically under-
valued within the cognitive-behavioural tradition of psychology (Greenberg & Safran, 
1987; Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000).  Theorists in the early behaviourist tradition 
dismissed emotion as a causal entity, viewing it instead as a disruptive biological 
response, inaccessible to observation and control (Samoilov & Goldfried, 2000).  
Skinner (1953) for example, stated, “‘emotions’ are excellent examples of the fictional 
causes to which we commonly attribute behaviour” (p. 160).  Emotion variables were 
also underplayed in early cognitive science, largely as a consequence of the inherent 
subtlety and complexity of the fuzzy category of emotion (Gardner, 1985).  In the 
cognitive tradition, emotion was typically regarded as a by-product of cognition, and 
was often consigned to dependent variable status in cognitive-behavioural research 
investigating emotion dysregulation (Greenberg & Safran, 1987).   
  Emotions were historically viewed as passions that come and go, essentially of 
their own accord (Solomon, 1976).  Modern approaches to emotion however, are 
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characterised by a growing appreciation that individuals do in fact exert considerable 
influence over their affective experience (Gross, 1998; Gross & John, 2003).  The 
emotion regulation (ER) field of study, which emerged in the 1990’s and identified ER 
as a potentially unifying function of diverse symptom presentations and problem 
behaviours (Gross & Munoz, 1995), explores how individuals experience, influence, 
control, and express their emotions (Frijda, 1996; Gross, 1998; Richards & Gross, 2000).  
Early ER literature explored the role of emotion regulation deficits in disorders 
including substance abuse disorder (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl, 1996), 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Cloitre, 1998), generalised anxiety disorder (Mennin, 
Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco, 2002), and perhaps most notably, borderline personality 
disorder (Linehan, 1993).  The rise of emotion regulation coincided with (and in many 
cases catalysed) the emergence of “third wave” psychological therapies (Hayes, 2004) 
including acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999, 
2012), mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), mindfulness-
based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002; Segal, Williams, & 
Teasdale, 2002), and dialectical behaviour therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993).  Therapeutic 
enhancement of emotion regulation skills is central in each of these treatment modalities 
(Mennin, 2005).     
  Despite increased interest in emotion regulation around the turn of the 
millennium, researchers nevertheless continued to identify a general paucity of 
investigation regarding the role of emotion regulation deficits in the pathogenesis and 
maintenance of adult clinical problems (e.g., Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  Likely 
contributing to this lack of research was a bifurcation in theoretical conceptualisations 
of emotion regulation (Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  Some conceptualisations focused on 
the reduction of emotional arousal, and control of emotional experience and expression, 
in emotion regulation (e.g., Cortez & Bugental, 1994; Garner & Spears, 2000; Kopp, 
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1989; Zeman & Garber, 1996).  In contrast, other conceptualisations focused on the 
functional nature of emotions, proposing that emotional control and immediately 
diminishing negative affect are not essential components of emotion regulation (e.g., 
Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994; Thompson, 1994).  A key proposition of this second model 
is that deficits in individuals’ capacity to experience, differentiate, and respond 
spontaneously to the full breadth of human emotions may be equally as dysfunctional as 
deficits in individuals’ capacity to attenuate and modulate intense negative affect (Cole 
et al., 1994; Gross & Munoz, 1995; Paivio & Greenberg, 1998).  
  It was this second model of emotion regulation, the model emphasising the 
function of emotions (highlighting the importance of accepting and valuing emotional 
experience) as opposed to the control of emotions, which received support in the 
research literature.  Stewart, Zvolensky, and Eifert (2002), for example, provided 
empirical support for Hayes and colleagues’ (1996) theory that avoidance of unwanted 
thoughts and feelings underlies many psychological disorders.  Further, tendency to 
constrict emotional expression and experimental instructions to conceal emotional 
expression were both associated with increased physiological arousal (Notarius & 
Levenson, 1979; Gross & Levenson, 1997).  This suggested that efforts to control 
emotional expression may in fact increase the likelihood of emotion dysregulation given 
that higher levels of arousal are generally more difficult to regulate (e.g., Eisenberg, 
Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998; Flett, Blankstein, & Obertynski, 1996).  Consistent with 
these results, researchers demonstrated that the tendency to experience negative affect 
in response to one’s own emotional experiences (indicating lack of emotional 
acceptance) is dysfunctional and associated with increased difficulties with emotion 
regulation (Cole et al., 1994; Hayes et al., 1999; Paivio & Greenberg, 1998).  Together, 
this literature suggested that there may be paradoxical, dysregulating effects associated 
with attempts to control, rather than accept, emotional experience and expression. 
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  From this research platform, modern conceptualisations of emotion regulation 
developed to encompass numerous elements of the regulatory process, including 
awareness and understanding of emotions, acceptance of emotional experience, 
consistency between behaviour, goals, and values in the face of emotional distress, and 
impulse control (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Thompson and Calkins, 1996).  Modern ER 
conceptualisations thus incorporate three inter-related concepts; mindfulness, 
experiential acceptance, and psychological flexibility.  Mindfulness is an inherently 
difficult concept to define (Bishop et al., 2004).  It is fundamentally experiential in 
nature and thus evades comprehensive definition by language alone (Fairfax, 2008).  It 
is therefore perhaps not surprising that substantial differences exist among various 
definitions of mindfulness (Grossman, 2008).  In a frequently cited early definition, 
Kabat-Zinn (1994) referred to mindfulness as “paying attention in a particular way: on 
purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally” (p. 4).  After reviewing 
definitions provided by numerous prominent authors, Baer (2003) concluded that 
“mindfulness is nonjudgmental observation of the ongoing stream of internal and 
external stimuli as they arise” (p.125).  Experiential acceptance is a related but distinct 
concept, defined as “the developed capacity to fully embrace whatever is in the present 
moment” (p. 200, Sanderson & Linehan, 1999).  Mikulas (2011) argues that acceptance 
is an attitude that is brought to mindfulness but is not an inherent aspect of mindfulness.  
Finally, psychological flexibility is a higher order emotion regulation concept which 
encompasses aspects of mindfulness and acceptance and is defined as the ability to fully 
contact the present moment (and the thoughts and feelings it contains) without needless 
defences, and, depending on what the situation affords, persisting in or changing 
behaviour in the pursuit of goals and values (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 
2006).  Psychological flexibility is considered the core process of change in acceptance 
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and commitment therapy (Bluett, Homan, Morrison, Levin, & Twohig, 2014; Hayes et 
al., 2006, Hayes et al., 2012).    
  In summary, in modern conceptualisations of adaptive emotion regulation, the 
modulation of one’s experience of emotions is emphasised instead of the eradication of 
certain “negative” emotions.  Modulation is seen as pivotal in reducing the urgency 
associated with the emotion such that the person can control their behaviour, as opposed 
to controlling (or attempting to control) their emotion itself (Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  
This approach to emotion regulation therefore focuses on the capacity to inhibit 
inappropriate, impulsive (or compulsive) behaviours, and act in accordance with one’s 
goals, even in the presence of strong negative mood-states (e.g., Linehan, 1993; 
Melnick & Hinshaw, 2000).  This focus appears particularly pertinent in the OCD 
context, where developing sufferers’ capacities to identify and choose new sets of 
responses to obsessions (and associated emotional distress) and resist engaging in 
compulsive neutralising behaviour (even in the face of intense fear, discomfort and 
anxiety), are among the principle goals of CBT for OCD.    
1.2  Emotion Regulation and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder 
The relevance of emotion regulation to OCD is supported by numerous 
theoretical statements and an increasingly large and varied body of research evidence.  
The first, indirect suggestions that OCD sufferers experience difficulties with adaptive 
emotion regulation were provided by Rachman and de Silva (1978), McFall and 
Wollersheim (1979), and Rachman and Hodgson (1980) in the proposition that 
compulsive behaviour is the consequence of a lack of confidence in one’s ability to 
tolerate and modulate the anxiety and uncertainty generated by obsessions (i.e., poor 
emotion regulation skills).  In an experiment involving the presentation of emotion-
eliciting films to individuals with significant obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms and 
non-anxious controls, Oltmanns and Gibbs (1995) found that individuals with OC 
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symptoms were more likely to attempt to control emotional reactions (e.g., suppress 
feelings of fear by laughing).  In addition, significant positive relationships were 
reported between initial negative mood-state and smiling/laughing during the films.  
The authors concluded that poor emotion regulation skills (e.g., dysfunctional attempts 
at controlling emotional reactions) may be an essential component in the development 
of obsessions.  More recently, Holoway & Heimberg (2003) found that individuals with 
OC symptoms reported significantly more fear of negative emotions and significantly 
less clarity about their emotions, compared with non-anxious controls.  Additionally, 
poor psychological flexibility has been associated with increased OCD symptoms 
among adults and children (Abramowitz, Lackey, & Wheaton, 2009; Briggs & Price, 
2009).  Although not definitive, these findings are suggestive of the presence of deficits 
in the ability to manage and regulate emotional experience among OCD sufferers.  
Furthermore, Allen and Barlow (2009) provide evidence of positive associations 
between acquisition of enhanced emotion regulation skills and decreases in OC 
symptoms among OCD sufferers, underlining the potential utility of emotion regulation 
skills training in OCD treatment.     
1.3   Emotion Regulation-Focused Psychological Therapies in the Treatment of 
OCD  
1.3.1 Acceptance and Commitment Therapy   
Further evidence for the relevance of emotion regulation to OCD arises from 
literature investigating the clinical utility of ER-focused psychological therapies in the 
treatment of OCD.  A small but growing body of research literature has explored the 
effectiveness of acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) for obsessive-compulsive 
and related disorders (e.g., trichotillomania and chronic skin picking).  Results suggest 
that ACT can successfully reduce OCD symptoms (Twohig, 2009; Twohig, Hayes, & 
Masuda, 2006a; Twohig et al., 2010).  ACT has also been shown to be effective in the 
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treatment of trichotillomania (Twohig & Woods, 2004; Woods, Wetterneck, &Flessner, 
2006) and chronic skin picking (Twohig, Hayes, & Masuda, 2006b).  In a recent meta-
analysis of the effectiveness of ACT for anxiety and OCD spectrum disorders, Bluett 
and colleagues (2014) concluded that there is modest support for a unified ACT 
protocol with OCD and suggested that ACT should be considered a “viable second 
option” (p.620) in cases where CBT is refused or ineffective.  However Ost (2014), in a 
systematic review and meta-analysis of ACT efficacy, evaluated the current status of the 
treatment as no more than “possibly efficacious” for OCD.   
1.3.2  Mindfulness-Based Therapy  
Mindfulness, as a treatment component in clinical medicine and psychology, 
first emerged in Kabat-Zinn’s mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) program 
developed in the contexts of stress and pain management (Kabat-Zinn, 1982, 1990; 
Kabat-Zinn & Chapman-Waldrop, 1988; Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth, & Burney, 1985; 
Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth, Burney, & Sellers, 1986; Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992).  Mindfulness 
has since been incorporated within numerous third generation therapies including ACT 
(Hayes et al., 1999), dialectical behaviour therapy for borderline personality disorder 
(Linehan, 1993), and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) for depression 
(Segal et al., 2002) and generalized anxiety disorder (Roemer & Orsillo, 2002).   
The incorporation of mindfulness into CBT for OCD met with some initial 
concerns related to the potential for mindfulness to become a neutralising behaviour and 
thus prevent successful exposure with response prevention therapy (e.g., Freeston, 
2006).  A recent exploration of the application and integration of mindfulness to 
existing OCD treatment suggested however, that “far from undermining the process [of 
CBT for OCD], mindfulness compliments or even enhances it” (p. 57, Fairfax, 2008).  
Nevertheless, meta-analyses investigating the effectiveness of mindfulness-based 
therapy reveal that, while it is supported as a treatment for anxiety, depression, and 
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stress (Chiesa & Serretti, 2011; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Khoury et al., 
2013; Piet & Hougaard, 2011) its effectiveness as a treatment for OCD has yet to be 
empirically tested.  Clinical integration of mindfulness-based therapy and CBT in the 
OCD context has however, already commenced (e.g., Hershfield & Corboy, 2013), 
portending that empirical testing may be imminent.  Among other clinical applications, 
mindfulness-based interventions show potential for curbing the high treatment attrition 
rates observed in CBT for OCD.  Recent meta-analytic findings demonstrate 
consistently lower attrition rates in mindfulness-based therapy studies (16.25%) 
compared with cognitive and behavioural studies (22.5%; Khoury et al, 2013).  Overall, 
the aforementioned literature provides growing support for the relevance and 
effectiveness of emotion regulation-based approaches to the treatment of OCD.  
Nevertheless, in the limited empirical testing that has been conducted, ER-based 
interventions have thus far failed to demonstrate superior effectiveness to existing 
cognitive-behavioural treatment (e.g., Ruiz, 2012).  Further investigation and 
development of ER-based approaches to OCD appears warranted.   
1.4  The Relationship between Emotion Regulation and Negative Appraisal in 
OCD 
  Improvements in the effectiveness of ER-based interventions for OCD are likely 
to be associated with further advances in our understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms of change in ER and crucially, how such mechanisms function in relation 
to specific OCD symptoms.  Results reported in the previous chapter provide 
preliminary evidence that mood-states differentially impact key OC symptoms 
including negative appraisal and neutralising activity.  These findings imply that one 
ER-related mechanism of symptom change (particularly in the OCD context) may be 
through the potential impact of enhanced emotion regulation on mood-state-dependent 
patterns in negative appraisals and neutralising motivations.  Essentially, enhanced 
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regulation and modulation of negative mood-states may help to regulate and modulate 
negative appraisal and neutralising motivation processes.  This proposition is supported 
by numerous authors who identify an inter-connection between regulatory processes 
across response domains.  Dodge and Garber (1991) for example, propose that 
regulatory activity in one response domain (e.g., emotion regulation) may serve to 
modulate activation in another response domain (e.g., cognition).  From this 
perspective, Mennin (2005) argues that “emotion regulation is both regulated by and is 
a regulator of other process such as cognition” (p. 41).  Similarly, Cicchetti, Ackerman, 
and Izard (1995) identify the inter-coordination of the emotions and cognitive systems 
as a central component of emotion regulation, and Gross (1998), citing Solomon (1976), 
likens emotion regulation to a harmonious association between reason and the passions.  
This inter-relationship has also received support from investigations of the biological 
underpinnings of emotion which reveal multiple connections between the limbic system 
and the neocortex, suggesting a relational interdependence between emotion and 
cognition (e.g., Damasio, 1994, 2004; Davidson, Jackson & Kalin, 2000; LeDoux, 
1998).    
As a consequence of this inter-connection, coming into new, mindfully 
accepting relationships with one’s emotions during emotion regulation skills training 
(ERST) may also translate to a transformed relationship with one’s cognitions.  Block-
Lerner, Salters-Pedneault, & Tull (2005), for example, suggest that “bringing 
mindfulness and/or acceptance to our private experiences [e.g., thoughts and mood-
states] may fundamentally alter our relationship to these phenomena” (p. 72).  In the 
OCD context, this may translate to an attenuation of the impact of negative mood-states 
on appraisals and subsequent neutralising motivations.  Essentially, enhanced capacity 
for awareness, acceptance, openness and flexibility in interpretations of, and responses 
to, unwanted mood-states and cognitions, may attenuate rigid, mood-state-dependent 
 73 
processes and help break the links between negative mood-states, automatic (or 
intrusive) thoughts, and conditioned behavioural responses (Fairfax, 2008).  In sum, 
ERST appears to display potential for attenuating pathogenic mood-state-dependent 
processes in the OCD context.  While traditional CBT includes relaxation strategies, 
potentially a mode of emotion regulation, evidence of ER-related attenuation in mood-
state-dependent appraisals and neutralising motivations would hint at the possibility of 
new treatment gains for OCD sufferers, beyond those of traditional CBT.  To date, no 
research has conducted a fine-grained analysis of the impact of augmented emotion 
regulation skills training on negative appraisals and neutralising motivations.   
1.5   Aims and Hypotheses 
In an effort to enhance current understanding of the cognitive-affective nexus of 
OCD, the current study re-tests the mood-state-dependent appraisal and neutralising 
motivation hypotheses and patterns of results reported in chapter one via assessment of 
the replicability of those findings with a new, larger sample.  In addition, the current 
study extends the initial study by investigating the utility of augmented emotion 
regulation skills training (ERST) as a means of attenuating the impact of negative 
mood-states on appraisal and neutralising motivations in relation to a provoked 
obsession-like thought.  The current study thus attempts to provide a link between ER-
based approaches to psychological treatment and the cognitive processes that have 
dominated contemporary cognitive-behavioural conceptualisations of OCD.  
1.5.1   Mood and Appraisal Hypotheses 
  It was expected that enhanced emotion regulation skills would result in reduced 
OET appraisals among anxious mood-induced participants receiving emotion regulation 
skills training (ERST) compared with anxious mood-induced participants receiving no 
ERST.  It was expected that this attenuation would be specific to anxious participants 
(i.e., it would not be observed in relation to OET appraisals for the ERST and no ERST 
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groups of neutral and dysphoric participants).  It was expected that enhanced emotion 
regulation skills would result in reduced inflated responsibility appraisals among 
dysphoric mood-induced participants receiving ERST compared with dysphoric mood-
induced participants receiving no ERST.  It was expected that this attenuation would be 
specific to dysphoric participants.  In contrast, it was expected that OIT appraisal 
endorsement would be equivalent between ERST and no ERST participants in each of 
the mood-induction conditions.  
1.5.2   Mood and Neutralising Strategies and Motivations Hypotheses 
  It was expected that enhanced emotion regulation skills would result in a smaller 
proportion of total endorsed neutralising motivations in relation to the reduce threat (RT) 
motivation among anxious mood-induced participants receiving ERST compared with 
anxious mood-induced participants receiving no ERST.  It was expected that this 
attenuation would be specific to the anxious participants (i.e., it would not be observed 
in relation to RT motivations for the ERST and no ERST groups of neutral and 
dysphoric participants).  It was expected that enhanced emotion regulation skills would 
result in a smaller proportion of neutralising motivations in relation to the reduce sense 
of responsibility (RSR) motivation among dysphoric mood-induced participants 
receiving ERST compared with dysphoric mood-induced participants receiving no 
ERST.  It was expected that this attenuation would be specific to dysphoric participants.  
In contrast, it was expected that endorsement of diminish importance of the thought 
(DIT) motivations would be equivalent between ERST and no ERST participants in 
each of the mood-induction conditions.  Finally, it was expected that there would be 
equivalence in endorsement of neutralising strategies across the three strategy sub-
categories (Change the Thought, Remove the Thought, and Ignore the Thought) 
between the ERST and no ERST groups, and between the anxious, neutral, and 
dysphoric mood-induced groups of participants.     
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2.   Method   
2.1   Participants   
The participants were 154 students and 44 staff members from the Australian 
National University (N = 198).  Participants ranged in age from 17 to 69 years (M = 
25.04, SD = 11.11) and 73.7% were female.  First year psychology students (n = 111) 
who volunteered received course credit in return for their participation.  Participants 
arriving to Session 1 were randomly assigned to either the emotion regulation skills 
training (ERST; n = 99) or no training (No-ERST; n = 99) condition.  When scheduling 
participation for Session 2, participants were randomly assigned to the anxious, neutral, 
or dysphoric mood-induction conditions (n = 66 for each condition).  The final seven 
participants were assigned to specific conditions at Session 2 to ensure equivalent 
numbers in each group. 
2.2  Materials 
A brief (45-minute), single session (with additional home-based training), 
emotion regulation skills training (ERST) program was developed for the current study 
(the ERST booklet participants received during training is attached as Appendix H).  
The program was designed to promote emotion regulation and psychological flexibility 
skills and contained a mixture of psychoeducation and practical exercises derived from 
empirically validated “third-wave therapies” including dialectical behaviour therapy 
(DBT; Linehan, 1993), acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999) 
and mindfulness-based therapies (i.e., MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990, MBCT; Segal et al., 
2002).  Previous research demonstrates that brief ERST promotes emotion regulation 
skills, mental health, and positive treatment outcome (Berking et al., 2008). 
The first elements of the ERST program were three exercises (i.e., “hooked and 
unhooked”, “bad news radio”, and “passengers on the bus”) designed to promote 
mindfulness and acceptance of thoughts and emotions.  These well-established exercises 
 76 
were derived and adapted from within ACT (see Forsyth & Eifert, 2007; Hayes & 
Smith, 2005; Hayes et al., 1999).  The next component of the ERST program was The 
Guest House poem by 13
th
 Century Sufi mystic, Rumi (translated in Barks, Moyne, 
Arberry, & Nicholson, 1997).  This poem crystallises the essence of mindfulness and 
experiential acceptance and stands in sharp contrast to the approach that many people 
take towards internal experiences, particularly those that are labelled “unwanted” 
(Block-Lerner et al., 2005).  The Guest House has previously been incorporated in 
mindfulness-based therapeutic interventions (e.g., Roemer & Orsillo, 2002; Segal et al., 
2002).  Subsequent elements of the program were psychoeducation regarding the nature 
of emotions (adapted from McKay, Wood, & Brantley, 2007) followed by a 
psychological flexibility enhancement exercise involving the popular vase/lovers 
figure/ground illusion (based on a paradigm developed by Martin, 1997).  The final 
components of the ERST program were psychoeducation regarding the nature of 
mindfulness and practical tips for meditation practice (adapted from Forsyth and Eifert, 
2007) followed by a 20-minute guided mindfulness of thoughts and emotions 
meditation (adapted from Forsyth & Eifert, 2007; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Williams, 
Teasdale, Segal, & Kabat-Zinn, 2007; see Appendix I).  The mindfulness instructions 
were recorded to Compact Disc and provided to participants receiving ERST to 
facilitate ongoing diarized mindfulness practice during the 7-14 day intervening period 
between sessions 1 and 2.   
2.3   Measures 
2.3.1  Emotion Regulation and Cognitive Flexibility 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  The 
36-item DERS is a self-report measure designed to assess deficits in emotion regulation 
skills in six subscales.  Only two of the subscales (i.e., “lack of emotional awareness” 
and “non-acceptance of emotional response”) were surveyed in the current study.  The 
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two utilised subscales constituted a 12-item instrument.  Participants were asked to rate 
how often 12 statements regarding different cognitive, affective and behavioural 
responses to emotions applied to them using a five-point Likert-type scale from 1 
(Almost never/0-10%) to 5 (Almost always/91-100%).  Higher DERS scores indicate 
greater difficulties in emotion regulation.  The DERS demonstrates good internal 
consistency in clinical (e.g., Fox, Axelrod, Paliwal, Sleeper, & Sinha, 2007; Gratz, Tull, 
Baruch, Bornovalova, & Lejuez, 2008) and non-clinical populations (e.g., Johnson et 
al., 2008; Neumann, van Lier, Gratz, & Koot, 2010) and good test-retest reliability (.88; 
Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  Positive correlations reported between the DERS and 
measures of negative affect (Johnson et al., 2008; Roemer et al., 2009) and negative 
correlations with positive psychological constructs (e.g., Baer, Smith, Hopkins, 
Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Roemer et al., 2009) indicate that the DERS also has 
adequate convergent and discriminant validity.  In addition, support for the utility of the 
DERS subscales is provided by studies showing that particular subscales are 
differentially associated with specific forms of psychopathology (e.g., Salters-
Pedneault, Roemer, Tull, Rucker, & Mennin, 2006; Tull, Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer, 
2007).  
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire – II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011).  The 
AAQ-II is a 7-item self-report measure designed to assess the construct of 
psychological inflexibility (i.e., rigid dominance of psychological responses over 
chosen values which occurs when individuals’ attempt to avoid aversive internal 
experiences such as distressing thoughts or feelings; Bond et al., 2011).  Participants 
were asked to rate the truth of 7 statements relating to psychological inflexibility, as 
they applied to them, on a seven-point Likert-type scale from 1 (Never true) to 7 
(Always true).  Higher AAQ-II scores reflect greater psychological inflexibility.  The 
AAQ-II possesses good internal consistency (Cronbach’s coefficient alphas ranging 
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from .78 to .88 across multiple studies and samples; Bond et al., 2011; Pennato, 
Berrocal, Bernini, & Rivas, 2013) and satisfactory 3-month (.81; Bond et al., 2011) and 
12-month (.79; Bond et al., 2011, and .61; Pennato et al., 2013) test-retest reliability.   
Adequate concurrent, predictive, convergent and discriminant validity have also been 
reported for the AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011; Pennato et al., 2013).   
Cognitive Affective Mindfulness Scale – Revised (CAMS-R; Feldman, Hayes, 
Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 2007).  The 10-item CAMS-R is a self-report measure 
designed to assess awareness, attention, present-focus and acceptance/non-judgement 
aspects of the mindfulness construct.  Participants were asked to rate how much each of 
10 statements regarding ways in which people relate to their thoughts and feelings 
applied to them on a four-point Likert-type scale from 1 (Rarely/Not at all) to 4 (Almost 
always).  The CAMS-R has demonstrated acceptable internal consistency across 
samples (α = .81; Baer et al., 2006, α = .74 - .77; Feldman et al., 2007, α = .74; Siegling 
& Petrides, 2014) and evidence of convergent validity with other mindfulness measures 
(Feldman et al., 2007; Siegling & Petrides, 2014).   
Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS; Martin & Rubin, 1995).  The 12-item CFS is a 
self-report measure designed to assess cognitive flexibility (i.e., awareness of alternative 
ways of thinking and flexibility in cognitive responses; Martin & Rubin, 1995).  
Participants were asked to rate how much they agreed with 12 statements dealing with 
beliefs and feelings about behaviours on a six-point Likert-type scale from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 6 (Strongly agree).  The CFS possesses adequate internal consistency (α = 
.81 - .86 across three samples; Johnco, Wuthrich, & Rapee, 2014, α = .72; Martin & 
Anderson, 1998, α = .76 - .77 across two samples; Martin & Rubin, 1995) and high test-
retest reliability for 1-week (.83; Martin & Rubin, 1995).  Studies have also provided 
evidence of construct, concurrent, and criterion-related validity (Martin and Anderson, 
1998), and convergent validity (Johnco et al., 2014) for the CFS.  
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2.3.2  OCD Characteristics, Mood, Appraisal, and Neutralising Strategies and 
Motivations Measures      
One of the main aims of the current study was to attempt to replicate the results 
observed in chapter one.  As such, the same battery of assessment measures utilised in 
the study reported in chapter one was again employed in the Session 2 protocol of the 
current study.  Specifically, baseline assessment of participants’ OCD characteristics 
was facilitated using the Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory–Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 
2002), an abridged version of the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ; OCCWG, 
1997, 2001) and a modified version of the Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (III; 
OCCWG, 1997, 2001).  Similarly, the same visual analogue scales utilised in the 
previous study to track changes in participants’ mood-state (on anxious and dysphoric 
dimensions) and appraisals of an obsession-like thought in three domains (OET, inflated 
responsibility, and OIT) and the neutralising strategies inventory (NSI) and neutralising 
motivations inventory (NMI) were again utilised in the current study (refer to chapter 
one for detailed information regarding each of the measures listed above).   
2.4   Procedure 
The experimental protocol was ratified by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee, and was conducted in small groups (range, 1 to 4 participants, mode = 3 
participants).  A summary of the experimental design is provided in figure 10.  The 
protocol was divided into two one-hour sessions; a training/control protocol (Session 1) 
and an experimental protocol (Session 2).  Participants encountered a 7 to 14 day 
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Figure 10.  The experimental method (Study 2) 
Participants commenced the Session 1 protocol by completing the emotion 
regulation questionnaires (i.e., DERS, AAQ-II, CAMS-R, and CFS) and answering two 
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the emotion regulation skills training (ERST) condition, commenced the ERST 
program.  The researcher guided the ERST participants through the psychoeducation 
and practical exercises contained in the ERST booklet (approximately 25 minutes).  
After completing the booklet, the ERST participants were guided through a 20-minute 
mindfulness of thoughts and emotions meditation.  They subsequently received 
instructions and encouragement for diarised mindfulness practice (including provision 
of an instructional meditation Compact Disc) during the 1-2 week intervening period 
before undertaking the Session 2 protocol.  Participants assigned to the No-ERST 
condition did not engage in the ERST program after completing the questionnaires but 
instead heard a 45-minute null script on the aerodynamic properties of Frisbees.  The 
No-ERST group did not receive the meditation CD or instructions for mindfulness 
homework.   
The Session 2 experimental protocol represented a replication of the protocol 
utilised in the study reported in chapter one (for details see chapter one).  The only 
difference was the addition of the four emotion regulation measures in the questionnaire 
package between Time 1 and Time 2.    
2.5   Planned Statistical analysis 
2.5.1   Baseline Equivalence of Groups  
  A series of univariate analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to assess 
Session 1 baseline equivalence for participants receiving emotion regulation skills 
training (ERST) and participants not receiving emotion regulation skills training (No-
ERST) on measures of emotion regulation and psychological flexibility (i.e., DERS, 
AAQ-II, CAMS-R, CFS).  A series of univariate ANOVA were also conducted to 
assess Session 2 baseline equivalence of participants assigned to the three mood groups 
(i.e., anxious, neutral and dysphoric, collapsed across the ERST and No-ERST 
conditions) in age, number of years studying psychology, anxiety, dysphoria, OCD-
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relevant beliefs and appraisals, and OCD symptoms (prior to the mood-induction 
experimental manipulation).  The equivalence of the sex distribution between the 
groups was assessed using Chi-Square analysis.   
2.5.2   Experimental Manipulation Checks  
 The effect of the emotion regulation skills training (ERST) program was 
assessed using a series of four Time(pre-ERST/pre-No-ERST, post-ERST/post-No-
ERST)Group(ERST, No-ERST) ANOVA with planned paired-samples t-tests to 
assess changes in self-reported emotion regulation skills on the four ER measures (i.e., 
DERS, AAQ-II, CAMS-R, CFS).  Additional Time(pre-ERST, post-ERST)Mood 
(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) ANOVA were used to assess engagement with 
mindfulness meditation homework among participants receiving the ERST.  
 The manipulation effect of the mood-induction procedures was assessed using 
three-way Time(Time 2, Time 3)Group(ERST, No-ERST)Mood(Anxious, Neutral, 
Dysphoric) ANOVA for mean anxiety and dysphoria ratings.  The Tukey HSD test was 
used for post-hoc comparisons where appropriate.  In addition, t-tests were used to 
assess within-group differences on the anxiety and dysphoria dimensions at Time 3 
(post-mood-induction).   
 The manipulation effect of the obsession-like thought provocation procedure 
was checked using two three-way Time(Time 3, Time 4)Group(ERST, No-ERST) 
Mood(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) ANOVA to assess changes in participants’ 
anxiety and dysphoria ratings.  The Tukey HSD test was used for post-hoc comparisons 
where appropriate. 
2.5.3  Comparative Analysis of Appraisal Ratings 
Means and standard deviations were calculated for appraisal ratings in the three 
domains (i.e., OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT) for the three mood groups 
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(collapsed across ERST/No-ERST conditions) at Time 4.  Three repeated measures 
ANOVA with planned comparisons were conducted to assess expected differences in 
appraisal ratings within each of the mood groups (collapsed across ERST conditions) 
following the obsession-like thought provocation procedure (Time 4).  Between-groups 
ANOVA with planned comparisons were conducted to assess hypothesised mood group 
differences (collapsed across ERST conditions) on appraisal ratings for each of the three 
domains (i.e., OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT) following the obsession-like 
thought provocation (Time 4).  Mean OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT appraisal 
ratings were also compared between ERST and No-ERST mood groups at Time 4 using 
a series of 9 one-tailed t-tests to directly test hypotheses predicting attenuation of mood-
state-dependent appraisal patterns in the context of enhanced emotion regulation skills 
(i.e., in the ERST condition).   
2.5.4  Comparative Analysis of Neutralising Strategies 
A series of Chi-Square tests were used to determine whether the three mood 
groups (collapsed across ERST/No-ERST conditions) differed in participants’ 
proportion of endorsement of Change the Thought, Remove the Thought, and Ignore the 
Thought neutralising strategies to respond to the obsession-like thought.  Additional 
Chi-Square analyses tested differences between the two ERST groups (i.e., ERST and 
No-ERST, collapsed across mood conditions) in proportion of neutralising strategies 
used.   
2.5.5  Comparative Analysis of Neutralising Motivations 
A series of Mann-Whitney U tests were used to assess predicted differences 
between the three mood groups (collapsed across ERST/No-ERST conditions) in 
proportion of endorsed neutralising motivations in each of three neutralisation 
motivation categories (i.e., Reduce Threat, Reduce Sense of Responsibility, Diminish 
Importance of the Thought).  Proportion of neutralising motivations endorsed in the 
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three categories was also compared between ERST and No-ERST mood groups using a 
series of nine one-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests to directly test hypotheses predicting 
attenuation of mood-state-dependent neutralising motivation patterns in the context of 
enhanced emotion regulation skills (i.e., in the ERST condition).   
Where appropriate, tests of simple main effects were employed to clarify the 
source of significant interaction effects.  A significance level of .05 was adopted for all 
tests.  No adjustment was made for Type-I error since concerns in this regard needed to 
be weighed against concerns about Type-II error, relating to the moderate sample size.  
All analysis was conducted using SPSS version 22.0. 
3.  Results 
3.1  Baseline Equivalence of Groups  
The ERST and No-ERST groups did not differ significantly (F(1, 97) < 1 in each 
instance) on baseline measures of emotion regulation skills (i.e., DERS, AAQ-II, 
CAMS-R, and CFS; see Table 5, below, for group means and standard deviations). 
The Session 2 characteristics of the participants in the three mood groups 
(collapsed across ERST and No-ERST conditions) are displayed in Table 4.  The three 
groups did not differ significantly (F(2, 195) < 1 in each instance, see Table 4) on 
measures of age, number of years studying psychology, anxiety, dysphoria, clinical 
questionnaires, or sex distribution (2 = .21, p = .90) prior to the mood-induction 
experimental manipulations.   
3.2  Experimental Manipulation Checks 
3.2.1  Emotion Regulation Skills Training Effect 
Table 5 displays group means and standard deviations on measures of emotion 
regulation skills (i.e., DERS, AAQ-II, CAMS-R, CFS) for the ERST and No-ERST 
groups at pre- and post-training time points.  Participants’ self-reported emotion 
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Table 4.  Baseline characteristics of the three mood groups (Study 2) 
 
                               Anxious Group              Neutral Group              Dysphoric Group     Between-Group  
                                                       n = 66                              n = 66                              n = 66                    Differences 
Variable                                 Mean        (SD)               Mean        (SD)                Mean        (SD)                 F(2,195)       
 
  Sex ratio (M:F)           16:50  18:48            18:48 
  Age    26.3       (12.5)          24.9       (11.1)   24.0         (9.6)              .70 
  Psych. years     1.4         (1.5)            1.3         (1.4)     1.3         (1.3)              .07 
  Baseline anxiety   29.4       (19.7)          32.9       (21.1)   33.8       (22.1)              .80 
  Baseline dysphoria  17.9       (18.3)          20.4       (19.5)   20.4       (14.8)              .45 
  OBQ: 
        OET   39.9       (15.3)          41.0       (19.0)   42.1       (16.1)              .28 
        Responsibility   62.1       (12.5)          61.6       (14.7)   60.4       (15.9)              .24 
        OIT    36.6       (12.5)          37.4       (15.2)   38.4       (14.7)              .26 
  III-M: 
        OET                251.5     (167.0)        254.4     (216.7) 255.5     (173.9)              .01 
        Responsibility                337.0     (198.7)        336.7     (225.3) 349.6     (219.0)              .08 
        OIT                 232.9     (178.7)        243.5     (194.4) 225.9     (156.6)              .17 
  OCI-R: 
        Total   18.6       (12.0)          18.6       (11.4)   19.1       (12.0)             .04 
    
      Note:   Psych. years = number of years spent studying psychology in a tertiary institution. 
                       OBQ:  OET/Responsibility/OIT = Obsessional-Beliefs Questionnaire /over-estimation of threat/ inflated  
              responsibility/over-importance of thoughts subscale scores. 
   III-M:  OET/Responsibility/OIT = Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory-Modified over-estimation of threat/ 
                                   inflated responsibility/over-importance of thoughts/subscale scores. 
 
 
Table 5.  Pre- to post-emotion regulation skills training (ERST) manipulation check 
 
                              ERST Group                                             No-ERST Group                 
TimeGroup 
                                                  n = 99                                                            n = 99                                      Interaction  
                                Pre-ERST             Post-ERST                  Pre-No-ERST          Post-No-ERST                  Effect  
Measure               Mean    (SD)         Mean    (SD)                   Mean    (SD)          Mean    (SD)                     F(1,196)      
 
DERS                30.9     (6.6)          26.5     (7.3)     30.6      (7.5)          30.9     (7.7)               54.27* 
AAQ-II                34.5     (9.6)          30.0     (9.2)     33.3      (9.9)          33.2     (9.2)              36.77* 
CAMS-R                30.9     (5.0)          33.8     (5.0)     31.2      (6.9)          31.6     (6.2)              32.70* 
CFS                52.0     (7.5)          54.3     (6.8)     51.9      (9.8)          52.0     (8.6)                       13.95* 
  
Note:   DERS = Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale total scores (higher scores indicate greater difficulties with emotion regulation). 
                               AAQ-II = Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II total scores (lower scores indicate greater experiential acceptance). 
                                 CAMS-R = Cognitive Affective Mindfulness Scale-Revised total scores (higher scores indicate greater cognitive and affective   
                                 mindfulness) 
                                 CFS = Cognitive Flexibility Scale total scores (higher scores indicate greater cognitive flexibility) 
             *p<.001 
 
regulation skills increased significantly from pre- to post-training (DERS: F(1,196) = 
41.12, p < .001; AAQ-II: F(1,196) =39.88, p < .001; CAMS-R: F(1,196) = 48.79, p < .001; 
CFS: F(1,196) = 15.79, p < .001).  Significant TimeGroup interaction effects (p < .001 
in all instances, F values displayed in Table 5) showed that the pre- to post-training 
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change was moderated by group membership (ERST versus No-ERST).  Planned 
comparisons revealed that significant pre- to post-training improvement occurred in the 
ERST group (DERS: t(1,98) = 8.05, p < .001; AAQ: t(1,98) = 7.69, p < .001; CAMS: t(1,98) 
= 7.46, p < .001; CFS: t(1,98) = 5.29, p < .001), but not the No-ERST group (DERS: t(1,98) 
= .92, p = .36; AAQ: t(1,98) = .21, p = .83; CAMS: t(1,98) = 1.20, p = .23; CFS: t(1,98) = .17, 
p = .86) across all four emotion regulation measures. 
For ERST participants, there was no mood group effect on reported engagement 
with mindfulness meditation homework (F(2,96) = 0.36, p = .70), including use of an 
instructional mindfulness CD (F(2,96) = 0.27, p = .76), during the 7-14 day diarised 
mindfulness practice period.   
An overview of the impact of the various elements of the Session 2 experimental 
protocol on participants’ ratings of anxiety and dysphoria is provided graphically in 
figures 11a and 11b.  
3.2.2  Mood Induction Effects 
 The effect of the mood-inductions across the six groups (i.e., ERST anxious, 
No-ERST anxious, ERST neutral, No-ERST neutral, ERST dysphoric, and No-ERST 
dysphoric) can be seen in Figures11a (anxiety) and11b (dysphoria), between Time 2 and 
Time 3.  Participants’ self-reported anxiety (F(5,192) = 156.02, p < .001) and dysphoria 
(F(5,192) = 256.01, p < .001) mood ratings increased significantly between Time 2 and 
Time 3.  Non-significant Time(Time 2, Time 3)Group(ERST, No-ERST) interactions 
for anxiety (F(5,192) = .20, p = .65) and dysphoria (F(5,192) = 0.68, p = .41) indicated that 
changes in mood ratings between Time 2 and Time 3 did not differ between the ERST 
and No-ERST groups.  Significant Time(Time 2, Time 3)Mood(Anxious, Neutral, 
Dysphoric) interactions for anxiety (F(5,192) = 108.46, p < .001) and dysphoria (F(5,192) = 
162.33, p < .001) indicated that the increase in participants’ mood ratings between Time 
 87 
2 and Time 3 differed significantly depending on which mood group participants 
belonged to. 





Figure 11b:  Group means for VAS dysphoria ratings across seven assessment points 
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 Post-hoc comparisons between the three mood groups (i.e., anxious, neutral, 
dysphoric, collapsed across ERST conditions) revealed that, prior to mood inductions 
(Time 2), groups did not differ significantly on ratings of anxiety (F(2,195) = .97, p = .38) 
or dysphoria (F(2,195) = .11, p = .89).  Following the mood-inductions (Time 3), there 
were significant differences between the three groups for anxiety (F(2,195) = 42.22, p < 
.001) and dysphoria (F(2,195) = 88.66, p < .001).  Further post-hoc comparisons (using 
the Tukey HSD test) at Time 3 revealed that mean anxiety ratings were significantly 
higher for the anxious group than the dysphoric group (MD = 16.85, SE = 3.33; p < 
.001) or the neutral group (MD = 30.52, SE = 3.33; p < .001).  The dysphoric group’s 
mean anxiety ratings were significantly higher than the neutral group’s (MD = 13.67, 
SE = 3.33; p < .001).  Mean dysphoria ratings were significantly higher for the 
dysphoric group than the anxious group (MD = 29.09, SE = 3.21; p < .001) or the 
neutral group (MD = 41.65, SE = 3.21; p < .001).  The anxious group’s mean dysphoria 
ratings were significantly higher than the neutral group’s (MD = 12.56, SE = 3.21; p < 
.001).  Non-significant three-way interactions were observed for anxiety (F(5,192) = 0.68, 
p = .51) and dysphoria (F(5,192) = .05, p = .95).   
 Within the anxious group, mean anxiety ratings were significantly higher than 
mean dysphoria ratings at Time 3 (t = 10.95, p < .001).  Within the dysphoric group, 
mean dysphoria ratings were significantly higher than mean anxiety ratings at Time 3 (t 
= 9.73, p < .001).  Within the neutral group, mean anxiety ratings were significantly 
higher than mean dysphoria ratings at Time 3 (t = 3.20, p <. 005).  Overall, these results 
suggest that the mood-induction procedures successfully differentiated the groups on 
anxious, dysphoric, and neutral mood dimensions.  
3.2.3  Obsession-Like Thought Provocation Effect 
 The effect of the obsession-like thought provocation across the six groups (i.e., 
ERST anxious, No-ERST anxious, ERST neutral, No-ERST neutral, ERST dysphoric, 
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and No-ERST dysphoric) can be seen in Figures11a (anxiety) and11b (dysphoria), 
between Time 3 and Time 4.  Participants’ self-reported anxiety (F(5,192) = 556.36, p < 
.001) and dysphoria (F(5,192) = 297.81, p < .001) mood ratings increased significantly 
between Time 3 and Time 4.  
 The Time(Time 3, Time 4)Group(ERST, No-ERST) interaction was significant 
for anxiety (F(5,192) = 6.16, p = .01), indicating that increases in anxiety ratings between 
Time 3 and Time 4 differed significantly between the ERST and No-ERST groups.  
Post hoc t-tests revealed there were no significant differences for anxiety ratings 
between the ERST and No-ERST groups at Time 3 (t = .69, p = .49), but there were 
significant differences at Time 4 (t = 2.29, p = .02), with the No-ERST group (M = 
62.73, SD = 26.62) endorsing higher anxiety ratings than the ERST group (M = 54.86, 
SD = 21.47).  The Time(Time 3, Time 4)Group(ERST, No-ERST) interaction was not 
significant for dysphoria (F(5,192) = .02, p = .90), indicating that increases in dysphoria 
ratings between Time 3 and Time 4 did not differ significantly between the ERST and 
No-ERST groups.   
 Significant Time(Time 3, Time 4)Mood(Anxious, Neutral, Dysphoric) 
interactions were observed for anxiety (F(5,192) = 30.40, p < .001) and dysphoria (F(5,192) 
= 11.06, p < .001), indicating that increases in participants’ negative mood ratings 
between Time 3 and Time 4 differed significantly depending on which mood group they 
belonged to.  Post-hoc comparisons to clarify the significant interaction on the anxiety 
dimension indicated that the mean difference between anxiety ratings at Time 3 and 
Time 4 for the anxious group was significantly different from (i.e., lower than) the 
dysphoric group (MD = 12.99, SE = 3.52; p < .005) and the neutral group (MD = 19.80, 
SE = 3.52; p < .001).  Increases in the neutral and dysphoric groups’ anxiety ratings did 
not differ significantly (p = .13).  Post-hoc comparisons to clarify the significant 
interaction on the dysphoria dimension indicated that the mean difference between 
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dysphoria ratings at Time 3 and Time 4 for the dysphoric group was significantly lower 
than the anxious group (MD = 25.42, SE = 3.61; p < .001) and the neutral group (MD = 
34.38, SE = 3.61; p < .001).  The mean difference between dysphoria ratings was 
significantly lower for the neutral group than the anxious groups (MD = 8.95, SE = 
3.61; p = .04).  Non-significant three-way interactions were observed for anxiety 
(F(5,192) = .17, p = .85) and dysphoria (F(5,192) = .11, p = .89).   
3.3  Comparative Analysis of Appraisal Ratings  
Table 6 reports the means and standard deviations for appraisal ratings for the 
three mood groups (collapsed across ERST/No-ERST conditions) at Time 4 (i.e., post-
obsession-like thought provocation).  Within-groups analyses across the three appraisal 
domains revealed significant differences between appraisal ratings for the anxious 
group (F(1,65) = 36.16, p < .001) at Time 4.  Planned comparisons showed that for the 
anxious group, OET ratings were significantly higher than inflated responsibility ratings 
(MD = 17.14, SE = 4.79; p = .002) and OIT ratings (MD = 37.29, SE = 4.38; p < .001).  
For the anxious group, inflated responsibility ratings were also significantly higher than 
OIT ratings (MD = 20.15, SE = 4.50; p < .001).  There were significant differences 
between appraisal ratings for the dysphoric group (F(1,65) = 17.07, p < .001) at Time 4.  
Planned comparisons showed that for the dysphoric group, inflated responsibility 
ratings were significantly higher than OET ratings (MD = 25.52, SE = 8.32; p = .009) 
and OIT ratings (MD = 36.09, SE = 6.77; p < .001).  There were no significant 
differences between appraisal ratings at Time 4 for the neutral group (p > .05).  
Between-groups analyses assessing each of the appraisal domains revealed 
statistically significant differences between the mood groups (collapsed across 
ERST/No-ERST conditions) in relation to OET appraisals (F(2,195) = 6.99, p = .001) and 
inflated responsibility appraisals (F(2,195) = 4.39, p = .01) but not OIT appraisals (F(2,195) 
= 1.81, p = .17) at Time 4.  Planned contrasts revealed that the anxious group reported 
 91 
significantly more OET appraisals than the dysphoric group (t = 2.69, p = .008) and the 
dysphoric and neutral groups combined (t = 3.63, p < .001).  Whereas the dysphoric 
group reported significantly more inflated responsibility appraisals than the anxious 
group (t = 2.45, p = .02) and the anxious and neutral groups combined (t = 2.95, p = 
.004).  
Table 6.  Group means and standard deviations (SDs) for VAS ratings in the three  
    appraisal domains at Time 4  
   
                                              Anxious Group                   Neutral Group                  Dysphoric Group 
   Appraisal                                   n = 66                                  n = 66                                   n = 66 
   Domain                             Mean          (SD)                   Mean         (SD)                   Mean         (SD) 
 
   OET     93.79     (41.21)     67.68       (40.43)       74.24       (43.47) 
   Responsibility     76.65     (52.33)     74.67       (56.25)       99.76       (53.69) 
   OIT     56.50     (40.68)     71.86       (51.45)       63.67       (46.66) 
 
Note:        Appraisal Domain:  OET/Responsibility/ OIT = Visual analogue scale over-estimation of threat/inflated responsibility/ 
   over-importance of thoughts subscale scores.  
 
Analyses of ERST versus No-ERST mood group differences (i.e., ERST 
anxious vs. No-ERST anxious, ERST neutral vs. No-ERST neutral, ERST dysphoric vs. 
No-ERST dysphoric) in negative appraisals at Time 4 showed that appraisals were less 
strong in the ERST anxious group compared with the No-ERST anxious group in 
relation to OET appraisals (t = 1.99, p = .03; ERST anxious group M = 83.94, SD = 
39.65, No-ERST anxious group M = 103.64, SD = 40.97) but not inflated responsibility 
appraisals (t = 1.46, p = .08; ERST anxious group M = 67.33, SD = 51.69, No-ERST 
anxious group M = 85.97, SD = 52.07) or OIT appraisals (t = 1.42, p = .09; ERST 
anxious group M = 52.52, SD = 39.24, No-ERST anxious group M = 60.48, SD = 
40.68).  No significant differences were observed in negative appraisals between the 
dysphoric groups for OET appraisals (t = .32, p = .38; ERST dysphoric group M = 
72.55, SD = 29.10, No-ERST dysphoric group M = 75.94, SD = 54.64), inflated 
responsibility appraisals (t = 1.76, p = .09; ERST dysphoric group M = 91.30, SD = 
24.79, No-ERST dysphoric group M = 108.21, SD = 71.80) or OIT appraisals (t = .55, p 
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= .29; ERST dysphoric group M = 60.48, SD = 44.92, No-ERST dysphoric group M = 
66.85, SD = 48.83).  There were no significant differences in negative appraisals 
between the neutral groups (OET appraisals: t = 1.39, p = .09; ERST neutral group M = 
60.82, SD = 40.95, No-ERST neutral group M = 74.55, SD = 39.31; inflated 
responsibility appraisals: t = .05, p = .48; ERST neutral group M = 74.30, SD = 57.25, 
No-ERST neutral group M = 75.03, SD = 56.13; OIT appraisals: t = 1.40, p = .08; 
ERST neutral group M = 63.09, SD = 52.77, No-ERST neutral group M = 80.64, SD = 
49.33). 
3.4  Comparative Analysis of Neutralising Strategies  
 Table 7 presents the total number (or frequency) of times that participants in the 
three mood groups (collapsed across ERST/No-ERST conditions) reported using 
neutralising strategies in the three sub-categories (i.e., Change the Thought, Remove the 
Thought, and Ignore the Thought).  The table also displays the proportion of 
endorsement of each strategy sub-category relative to the total number of strategies 
selected within each group.  Results revealed no mood group differences in proportion 
of strategy selection across the Change the Thought, Remove the Thought, and Ignore 
the Thought neutralising strategy sub-categories (χ2 = 10.12, p = .26; χ2 = 3.40, p = .91; 
and χ2 = 1.9, p = .75; respectively).  
Table 7.  Frequency and proportion of endorsed neutralising strategies in the three  
    mood groups (collapsed across ERST/No-ERST conditions) 
   
                                             Anxious Group                   Neutral Group                       Dysphoric Group 
                                                     n = 66                                   n = 66                                        n = 66 
                                        Frequency   Proportion        Frequency   Proportion          Frequency   Proportion                    
 
  Neutralising Strategy  
  Change       52    (38.2%)       45         (36.0%)             47         (35.3%) 
  Remove      50    (36.8%)       42         (33.6%)            48         (36.1%) 
  Ignore         34    (25.0%)       38         (30.4%)            38         (28.6%) 
  
Note:        Neutralising Strategy:  Change/Remove/Ignore = Neutralising Strategies Inventory (NSI) Change the Thought/Remove the  
                            Thought/Ignore the Thought neutralising strategy subcategories.   
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 Table 8 presents the frequency and proportion of neutralising strategy selection 
for participants in the two ERST groups (i.e., ERST and No-ERST, collapsed across 
mood conditions) in the three neutralising strategy sub-categories (i.e., Change the 
Thought, Remove the Thought, and Ignore the Thought).  No significant ERST versus 
No-ERST group differences were observed in proportion of neutralising strategies 
selected in the Change the Thought (χ2 = .41, p = .52) or Remove the Thought (χ2 = .88, 
p = .35) subcategories.  A significant group difference was observed however in relation 
to the Ignore the Thought (χ2 = 16.04, p < .001) neutralising strategy subcategory, with 
69.7% of the ERST group endorsing the Ignore the Thought strategy, compared with  
41.4% of the No-ERST group.   
Table 8.  Frequency and proportion of endorsed neutralising strategies in the ERST and  
    No-ERST groups (collapsed across mood conditions) 
   
                                                                  ERST Group                                      No-ERST Group                   
                                                                        n = 99                                                    n = 99                                    
                                                           Frequency    Proportion                        Frequency    Proportion         
 
  Neutralising Strategy  
  Change           70          (34.0%)              74            (39.4%)        
  Remove           67          (32.5%)              73            (38.8%) 
  Ignore            69          (33.5%)              41            (21.8%) 
 
Note:        Neutralising Strategy:  Change/Remove/Ignore = Neutralising Strategies Inventory (NSI) Change the Thought/Remove the  
          Thought/Ignore the Thought neutralising strategy subcategories.   
 
3.5  Comparative Analysis of Neutralising Motivations 
Table 9 presents the total number (or frequency) of times that participants in the 
three mood groups (collapsed across ERST/No-ERST conditions) reported using 
particular neutralising motivations across the three motivation categories (i.e., Reduce 
Threat, Reduce Sense of Responsibility, Diminish Importance of the Thought).  The 
table also displays the proportion of endorsement of each motivation category relative 
to the total number of motivations selected within each group.   
 94 
Table 9.  Frequency and proportion of endorsed neutralising motivations in the three  
    mood groups (collapsed across ERST/No-ERST conditions) 
   
                                              Anxious Group                     Neutral Group                  Dysphoric Group 
                                                      n = 66                                     n = 66                                   n = 66 
                                         Frequency   Proportion         Frequency   Proportion        Frequency   Proportion                    
 
  Neutralising Motivation 
  RT                     106        (43.5%)        76          (32.5%)          90          (33.1%) 
  RSR                     54          (22.1%)        66          (28.2%)          104        (38.2%) 
  DIT                     84          (34.4%)        92          (39.3%)          78          (28.7%) 
 
Note:    Neutralising Motivation:  RSR/RT/DIT/RA/RD = Neutralising Motivations Inventory (NMI) Reduce Sense of Responsibility/Reduce  
          Threat/Diminish Importance of the Thought/Reduce Anxiety/Reduce Dysphoria neutralising motivation  
          categories.        
 
Significant differences were observed among the three mood groups in 
proportion of neutralising motivation endorsement for all three motivation categories.  
The anxious group reported a significantly larger proportion of reduce threat (RT) 
neutralising motivations in response to the obsession-like thought than the combined 
dysphoric and neutral group (Z = 4.79, p < .001; anxious group M = 43.5%, SD = 27.3, 
dysphoric/neutral group M = 32.8%, SD = 21.4).  The dysphoric group reported a 
significantly larger proportion of reduce sense of responsibility (RSR) neutralising 
motivations than the combined anxious and neutral group (Z = 5.58, p < .001; dysphoric 
group M = 38.2%, SD = 23.7, anxious/neutral group M = 25.2%, SD = 23.4).  The 
neutral group reported a significantly larger proportion of Diminish Importance of the 
Thought (DIT) neutralising motivations than the combined anxious and dysphoric group 
(Z = 3.71, p < .001; neutral group M = 39.3%, SD = 28.9, anxious/dysphoric group M = 
31.6%, SD = 22.4).   
Table 10 presents the total number (or frequency) of times that participants in 
the six mood groups (i.e., ERST anxious, ERST neutral, ERST dysphoric, No-ERST 
anxious, No-ERST neutral, No-ERST dysphoric) reported using particular neutralising 
motivations across the three motivation categories (i.e., Reduce Threat, Reduce Sense of 
Responsibility, Diminish Importance of the Thought).  The table also displays the 
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proportion of endorsement of each motivation category relative to the total number of 
motivations selected within each group.   
Table 10.  Frequency (F.), proportion (P.), and standard deviation (SD) of endorsed  
      neutralising motivations in the six mood groups  
   
                                               ERST Anxious                      ERST Neutral                  ERST Dysphoric             
                                                      n = 33                                     n = 33                                 n = 33      
    F.         P.        (SD)              F.         P.        (SD)              F.         P.         (SD)                                                                   
 
  Neutralising Motivation 
  RT         45      38.3%     (26.8)   39      31.7%     (20.8)      46      35.7%     (19.2) 
  RSR   28      23.9%     (19.5)   32      26.0%     (22.9)      41      31.8%     (24.8)       
  DIT         44      37.6%     (22.4)   52      42.3%     (31.1)      42      32.5%     (19.0) 
 
                                            No-ERST Anxious               No-ERST Neutral           No-ERST Dysphoric             
                                                       n = 33                                     n = 33                                 n = 33      
    F.         P.        (SD)              F.         P.        (SD)              F.         P.         (SD)                                                                   
 
  Neutralising Motivation 
  RT         62      48.8%     (27.6)   37      33.3%     (20.2)      41      30.8%     (24.2) 
  RSR   26      20.5%     (18.9)   33      29.8%     (24.4)      59      44.4%     (21.9) 
  DIT         39      30.7%     (19.3)   41      36.9%     (26.5)      33      24.8%     (24.8) 
 
Note: Neutralising Motivation:  RSR/RT/DIT/RA/RD = Neutralising Motivations Inventory (NMI) Reduce Sense of Responsibility/Reduce  
       Threat/Diminish Importance of the Thought/Reduce Anxiety/Reduce Dysphoria scores.      
 
Analysis of the impact of ERST on motivations to neutralise revealed significant 
reductions in the strength of mood-state-dependent neutralising motivations in the 
ERST anxious and dysphoric groups.  The ERST anxious group (M = 38.3%, SD = 
26.8) reported a significantly smaller proportion of reduce threat (RT) neutralising 
motivations (Z = 1.74, p = .04) compared with the No-ERST anxious group (M = 
48.8%, SD = 27.6).  There were no significant differences between the neutral groups (Z 
= .50, p = .31) or dysphoric groups (Z = 1.53, p = .06) in proportion of RT motivations.  
The ERST dysphoric group (M = 31.8%, SD = 24.8) reported a significantly smaller 
proportion of Reduce Sense of Responsibility (RSR) neutralising motivations (Z = 1.94, 
p = .03) compared with the No-ERST dysphoric group (M = 44.4%, SD = 21.9).  There 
were no significant differences between the anxious groups (Z = .34, p = .37) or neutral 
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groups (Z = .62, p = .27) in proportion of RSR motivations.  There were no significant 
differences between the ERST and No-ERST anxious groups (Z = 1.27, p = .10), 
neutral groups (Z = .40, p = .35), or dysphoric groups (Z = .59, p = .26) in proportion 
of Diminish Importance of the Thought (DIT) motivations. 
4.  Discussion  
Results provided further evidence in support of hypotheses regarding the 
differential impact of specific mood-states on appraisal processes and neutralising 
activity.  As in chapter one, mood-state-dependent patterns of responses were evident in 
relation to participants’ negative appraisals of an obsession-like thought and their 
motivations for neutralising behaviour.  In addition, investigation of the impact of 
emotion regulation skills training yielded results suggestive of ERST-related attenuation 
in mood-state-dependent appraisal and neutralising processes.   
4.1  Comparative Analysis of Appraisal Ratings 
4.1.1 Replication of Mood and Appraisal Findings 
Utilising a larger sample, the current results replicated the findings reported in 
chapter one in relation to the differential impact of specific mood-states on negative 
appraisals in response to an obsession-like thought.  Results reiterated that different 
mood-states appear to impact on the availability and salience of specific types of 
negative appraisals, engendering mood-state-dependent appraisal profiles.  Specifically, 
as expected, among participants who underwent anxious mood-induction (collapsed 
across ERST conditions), endorsement of OET appraisals was significantly higher than 
endorsement of inflated responsibility or OIT appraisals.  The finding of a significant 
difference between OET and inflated responsibility appraisals for the anxious 
participants was particularly noteworthy as this comparison had failed to reach 
statistical significance (p = .09) in the study reported in chapter one.          
 97 
Significant differences were also observed between appraisal ratings for the 
dysphoric mood-induced group (collapsed across ERST conditions).  As expected, 
among the dysphoric participants, endorsement of inflated responsibility appraisals was 
significantly higher than endorsement of OET and OIT appraisals.  The finding of a 
significant difference between inflated responsibility and OET appraisals for the 
dysphoric participants was again noteworthy as this comparison failed to reach 
statistical significance (p = .08) in the study reported in chapter one.  As predicted, 
among the neutral mood-induced participants (collapsed across ERST conditions), no 
significant differences were observed among the three appraisal domains.  Together, 
these findings provide additional evidence for the mood-state-dependent activation of 
OET and inflated responsibility appraisals and the relatively mood-independent nature 
of OIT appraisals.  OET appraisals were promoted in anxious mood-state, inflated 
responsibility appraisals were promoted in dysphoric mood-state, and OIT appraisals 
remained relatively constant, regardless of mood-state.   
In relation to between-group comparisons, as expected, OET appraisal 
endorsement was significantly greater among anxious mood-induced participants 
(collapsed across ERST conditions) than among dysphoric and neutral mood-induced 
participants combined.  OET appraisals in the anxious group were also significantly 
greater than OET appraisals in the dysphoric group, which was again noteworthy as this 
comparison had failed to reach statistical significance (p = .07) in the study reported in 
chapter one, which demonstrated a lack of power.  
Also in accordance with expectations, inflated responsibility appraisal 
endorsement was significantly greater in the group receiving dysphoric mood-induction 
(collapsed across ERST conditions) compared with the other two groups combined.  
Inflated responsibility appraisals in the dysphoric group were also significantly greater 
than inflated responsibility appraisals in the anxious group.  This comparison had also 
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failed to reach statistical significance (p = .10) in the study reported in chapter one.  As 
predicted, in contrast to OET and inflated responsibility, no significant differences were 
observed among the three mood groups in relation to OIT appraisal ratings.   
Findings of significant differentiation between OET and inflated responsibility 
appraisal endorsement in the contexts of anxious and dysphoric mood-states (in both 
within- and between-group comparisons) suggest that the failure to observe significant 
differences in these comparisons in chapter one (despite trends in the expected 
directions) may have been due to Type II error (associated with modest sample size and 
low statistical power) as opposed to being the consequence of mood-induction 
contamination effects or conceptual overlap between the OET and inflated 
responsibility constructs.   
In summary, these findings indicate that anxious mood-state increases the 
salience and accessibility of OET beliefs and thus engenders increased negative 
appraisal of an obsession-like thought in the OET domain relative to inflated 
responsibility and OIT domains.  Dysphoric mood-state, in contrast, increases the 
salience and accessibility of inflated responsibility beliefs and thus engenders increased 
negative appraisal of the obsession-like thought in the inflated responsibility domain 
relative to the OET and OIT domains.   
4.1.2 ERST-Related Attenuation in Mood-State-Dependent Appraisal Patterns 
Results showed significant reductions in the strength of mood-state-dependent 
patterns in negative appraisals among the participants who received emotion regulation 
skills training.  As expected, analyses revealed that participants who received ERST and 
underwent an anxious mood-induction procedure reported significantly less OET 
appraisals (but not less inflated responsibility or OIT appraisals) in response to an 
obsession-like thought than anxious mood-induced participants who did not receive 
ERST.  As predicted, this pattern of OET appraisal attenuation appeared specific to 
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anxious mood-induced participants (i.e., it was not observed in comparisons of OET 
appraisals for the ERST and no ERST groups of neutral and dysphoric mood-induced 
participants).   
Unexpectedly, analyses failed to detect a significant reduction in inflated 
responsibility appraisal ratings among dysphoric mood-induced participants who 
received ERST, compared with dysphoric participants who did not receive ERST.  
There was however a trend in the expected direction in this comparison which, although 
not statistically significant, nevertheless provided some evidence of specificity in 
ERST-related attenuation of inflated responsibility appraisals in the context of 
dysphoric mood-state.  That is, results demonstrated that for dysphoric mood-induced 
participants, ERST-related attenuation of inflated responsibility appraisals (t = 1.76, p = 
.09) was larger and clearer than ERST-related attenuation of OET (t = .32, p = .38) or 
OIT (t = .55, p = .29) appraisals.  As expected, for the participants receiving neutral 
mood-induction, there was no evidence of significant ERST-related attenuation of 
appraisals in any of the three appraisal domains.  Overall, results were consistent with 
hypotheses that enhanced emotion regulation skills would attenuate the impact of mood-
state on participants’ appraisals of an obsession-like thought and that attenuation effects 
would be differentiated across specific mood-states (and associated mood-state-
dependent appraisal domains).   
4.2 Comparative Analysis of Neutralising Strategies  
 As expected, results indicated that participants’ selection of neutralising 
strategies to respond to the obsession-like thought (across the Change the Thought, 
Remove the Thought, and Ignore the Thought categories) did not differ as a function of 
mood-state.  Comparisons conducted between the ERST and No-ERST groups 
(collapsed across mood conditions) revealed that the group receiving ERST endorsed 
the Ignore the Thought strategy significantly more than the group that did not receive 
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ERST.  Items contributing to the Ignore the Thought neutralising strategy sub-category 
on the NSI include Used Meditation, Reassured Yourself (that the thought is not 
important and normal), and Did Nothing (used no strategies to respond to the obsession-
like thought).  Possible explanations for the ERST group endorsing the Ignore the 
Thought strategy at higher rates than the No-ERST group include potential demand and 
priming effects whereby receiving mindfulness training as a part of the ERST program 
subsequently resulted in increased use of meditation as a strategy for dealing with the 
obsession-like thought.   
4.3  Comparative Analysis of Neutralising Motivations 
4.3.1 Replication of Mood and Neutralising Motivation Findings  
The current results replicated the findings reported in chapter one in relation to 
the differential impact of specific mood-states on neutralising motivations in response to 
an obsession-like thought.  Results provided evidence of mood-state-dependent 
response patterns among the three mood-induced groups (collapsed across ERST 
conditions) in relation to endorsement of Reduce Threat (RT), Reduce Sense of 
Responsibility (RSR), and Diminish Importance of the Thought (DIT) neutralising 
motivations.  The anxious group reported a significantly larger proportion of RT 
neutralising motivations than the combined dysphoric and neutral group.  The dysphoric 
group reported a significantly larger proportion of Reduce Sense of Responsibility 
(RSR) neutralising motivations than the combined anxious and neutral group.  And 
repeating an unexpected finding from chapter one, the neutral group reported a 
significantly larger proportion of Diminish Importance of the Thought (DIT) 
neutralising motivations than the combined anxious and dysphoric group.  This repeated 
unexpected finding provides support for the notion that DIT motivations may become 
the most prominent in the promotion of OCD symptoms in the absence of negative 
mood-state, reinforcing the proposed underlying, constitutive role for OIT appraisals 
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and DIT neutralising motivations in OCD.  Overall, these results provide further 
evidence that mood-specific negative appraisal profiles subsequently promote different 
mood-specific motivational profiles regarding the employment of neutralising activity. 
4.3.2 ERST-Related Attenuation in Mood-State-Dependent Neutralising 
Motivation Patterns 
In accordance with expectations, analyses revealed significant reductions in the 
strength of mood-state-dependent patterns in neutralising motivations among the groups 
that received emotion regulation skills training.  Participants who received ERST and 
underwent an anxious mood-induction procedure reported a significantly smaller 
proportion of Reduce Threat (RT; but not RSR or DIT) neutralising motivations 
compared with anxious mood-induced participants who did not receive ERST.  As 
predicted, this pattern of RT motivation attenuation appeared specific to the anxious 
mood-induced participants (i.e., it was not observed in comparisons of RT motivations 
for the ERST and no ERST groups of neutral and dysphoric mood-induced participants) 
although the comparison between the dysphoric groups was trending towards 
significance (p = .06, one-tailed).      
Participants who received ERST and underwent a dysphoric mood-induction 
procedure reported a significantly smaller proportion of Reduce Sense of Responsibility 
(RSR; but not RT or DIT) neutralising motivations compared with dysphoric mood-
induced participants who did not receive ERST.  As predicted, this pattern of RSR 
motivation attenuation appeared specific to the dysphoric mood-induced participants 
(i.e., it was not observed in comparisons of RSR motivations for the ERST and no 
ERST groups of neutral and anxious mood-induced participants).  As expected, for the 
participants receiving neutral mood-induction, there was no evidence of significant 
ERST-related attenuation in neutralising motivations in any of the three domains 
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assessed, providing further evidence for the relatively mood-independent nature of OIT 
appraisals/DIT neutralising motivations and their contribution to OCD.     
Overall, results were consistent with hypotheses that enhanced emotion 
regulation skills would contribute to an attenuation of the impact of mood-state on 
participants’ neutralising motivations in response to an obsession-like thought and 
further, that attenuation effects would be differentiated across specific mood-states and 
associated mood-state-dependent neutralising motivation domains.   
4.4 General Discussion 
  The current findings provide additional evidence of mood-state-dependent 
patterns in negative appraisals and neutralising motivations in response to an obsession-
like thought.  Among participants who all experienced the same obsession-like thought 
provocation, differences in mood-state were responsible for substantial differences in 
the way that people appraised the thought and were motivated to neutralise it.  
Replicating the findings reported in chapter one, anxious mood-state was associated 
with increased prominence of OET appraisals and Reduce Threat (RT) neutralising 
motivations, dysphoric mood-state was associated with increased prominence of 
inflated responsibility appraisals and Reduce Sense of Responsibility (RSR) 
neutralising motivations, and in the absence of negative affect (i.e., in neutral mood-
state), OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT appraisals were all equivalent, but 
Diminish Importance of the Thought (DIT) neutralising motivations were prioritised 
over RT and RSR motivations.   
  Beyond replication of the findings reported in chapter one, the research reported 
in the current chapter investigated, and provided preliminary evidence in relation to, the 
attenuation of mood-state-dependent appraisal and neutralising motivation patterns in 
the context of enhanced emotion regulations skills.  Results suggested that enhanced 
emotion regulation skills may contribute specifically to attenuation of mood-state-
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dependent OET appraisals and RT neutralising motivations in the presence of anxious 
mood-state.  Results also suggested that enhanced emotion regulation skills may 
contribute specifically to attenuation of mood-state-dependent inflated responsibility 
appraisals and RSR neutralising motivations in the presence of dysphoric mood-state 
(despite a non-significant, but trending (p = .09), finding in relation to inflated 
responsibility attenuation among the ERST versus No-ERST dysphoric participants).  
The findings that ERST and No-ERST neutral mood-induced participants were 
equivalent in endorsement of negative appraisals (in all three domains) and neutralising 
motivations (in all three categories) indicated that enhanced emotion regulation skills 
may only contribute to attenuation in negative appraisals and neutralising motivations 
when negative mood-states are present.  These results suggest that emotion-focused 
interventions may not be appropriate for use with OIT appraisals and DIT neutralising 
motivations, and that the contribution of these constructs to OCD may need to be 
addressed using alternate means (perhaps cognitive therapy).    
  In summary, the current findings provided additional evidence that different 
mood-states activate specific types of negative appraisals, yielding effects on 
neutralising motivations, further supporting the hypothesis that mood-state constitutes a 
condition under which appraisal processes operate differentially in OCD.  Findings 
reinforce the call, initially made in chapter one, for an expansion of appraisal models to 
incorporate consideration of the impact of affective processes on negative appraisal and 
neutralising motivation in OCD.  Results suggest that emotion regulation skills training 
may represent a means of remedying, or at least attenuating, the impact of negative 
mood-states on dysfunctional appraisal and neutralising activity.  
4.5  Limitations  
  As a partial replication of the study reported in chapter one, the current study 
inevitably shared many of the same methodological limitations.  Self-report measures 
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were heavily relied on, evidence for the construct validity of the novel self-report 
measures (i.e., III-M, VAS, NSI and NMI) was absent, a non-clinical sample was used, 
and a single, analogue “obsession-like” thought (not an actual obsession) was employed.  
A new limitation in the present study related to sample size.  Although the overall 
sample size was larger (N = 198, compared with N = 120 in the study reported in 
chapter one), division of the participants into groups of six (n = 33) to facilitate ERST 
versus No-ERST mood group comparisons resulted in a reduction in statistical power, 
increasing the likelihood of Type II errors.  This may have contributed to the failure to 
find a significant difference in the comparison between the ERST and No-ERST 
dysphoric groups on inflated responsibility appraisals, despite a trend in the expected 
direction (p=.09). 
  Finally, it is not clear to what extent the enhancement in emotion regulation 
skills among participants who received ERST in the current study accurately reflects the 
capacities of individuals receiving longer-term emotion regulation skills training, or 
otherwise exhibiting superior emotion regulation skills in naturalistic settings.  Hence, 
the generalisability of the current findings to the clinical OCD population and 
naturalistic settings is limited, and examination of clinical links is necessary before 
conclusions can be drawn about the relationship between mood-states, emotion 
regulation, and clinical OCD symptoms. 
4.6  Strengths 
  The current study enjoyed the same set of methodological strengths as the study 
reported in chapter one.  That is, it utilised an experimental design to explore the 
temporal relationships between the variables under investigation, and thus permitted 
causal inference.  It also demonstrated equivalence of the ERST and No-ERST groups, 
and the mood groups, on pertinent variables prior to experimental manipulation, and the 
obsession-like thought employed in the study represented a good analogue to a clinical 
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obsession.  A new strength in the present study was the larger overall sample size (N = 
198) which provided greater statistical power to detect significant differences in 
comparisons between the larger groups (i.e., ERST and No-ERST groups, n = 99; 
Anxious, Neutral, and Dysphoric groups, n = 66).  This power increase likely 
contributed to several significant findings in comparisons that had failed to reach 
significance in the study reported in chapter one (e.g., OET versus inflated 
responsibility appraisal comparisons within and between the anxious and dysphoric 
groups).  A final strength was the demonstrated effectiveness of the ERST program 
which successfully enhanced participants’ reported emotion regulation capacity in all 
variables under assessment (e.g., mindfulness, experiential acceptance, and cognitive 
flexibility).   
4.7  Treatment implications 
  The key treatment implication arising from the current findings is that OCD 
sufferers may benefit from incorporation of emotion regulation skills training within 
traditional cognitive-behavioural therapy for the disorder.  Results showed that 
enhanced emotion regulation skills were associated with attenuation in mood-state-
dependent appraisal and neutralising motivation patterns.  Abramowitz (2006b) 
suggests that cognitive therapy in CBT for OCD helps to “set the table” for E/RP, 
“tenderizing” dysfunctional beliefs and appraisals to the extent that patients can more 
easily engage with, and benefit from, E/RP.  The current findings indicate that ERST 
may represent a valid alternative or adjunct to cognitive therapy, helping to further 
“tenderize” obsessions and “set the table” for E/RP.  In particular, ERST appears to 
display potential for helping OCD sufferers to more effectively resist engaging in 
compulsive behaviours and maladaptive appraisal of obsessions (and to thus reduce the 
impact of mood-state-dependent appraisals and neutralising activity  in the maintenance 
of the disorder), even in the presence of strong negative mood-states. 
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4.8  Future Research  
 An obvious direction for future research emerging from the current findings is 
investigation of mood-state-dependent hypotheses in the clinical OCD context.  Clinical 
investigation would facilitate exploration of the generalisability of findings regarding 
mood-state-dependent appraisal and neutralising patterns and the attenuation of such 
patterns (in the context of enhanced emotion regulation skills) from non-clinical 
samples to OCD sufferers.  Research in this area has the potential to contribute to 
improvements in OCD treatment efficaciousness through the promotion of our 
understanding of the role of mood in the pathogenesis and maintenance of the disorder.   
Further analogue research, with larger samples (capable of producing greater 
statistical power in the six-group analyses), is required to provide additional testing and 
replication of the current hypotheses and results.  Such research would help ascertain 
whether non-significant trends in the current data (e.g., trending but non-significant 
findings in relation to attenuation in inflated responsibility appraisals between the ERST 
and No-ERST dysphoric groups) are merely noise in the data, or are in fact indicative of 
specificity.  
5.  Conclusion 
 The present study provides additional support (subsequent to the study reported 
in chapter one) for hypotheses regarding differential mood-state-dependent activation of 
negative appraisal domains in response to an obsession-like thought.  Results reiterate 
that specific negative mood-states have unique, activating influences on particular 
appraisal domains, and subsequently exert unique influences on obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms (including neutralising motivation).  Results provide support for the 
cognitive-affective-behavioural conceptualisations of OCD provided in Figures 7, 8, and 
9 in chapter one, and additionally suggest that the unique impacts of different negative 
mood-states on appraisal and neutralising processes in response to an obsession-like 
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thought may be attenuated in the context of enhanced emotion regulation skills.  
Assessment of the generalisability of the current results to the OCD clinical context is 
warranted.  Evidence of attenuation in negative appraisals associated with enhanced 
emotion regulation skills among OCD sufferers would suggest that emotion regulation 
may represent a new pathway to improved treatment effectiveness in OCD.  The 
following chapter reports a pilot study where ERST was administered in a treatment 
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The cognitive-behavioural therapies are the most consistently empirically-
validated psychological treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorder (Abramowitz, 
2006a; Abramowitz, Taylor, & Mackay, 2009; McKay et al., 2015).  Traditional 
cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for OCD is comprised of four basic (somewhat 
overlapping) treatment phases; psychoeducation and relaxation, cognitive therapy (CT), 
exposure with response prevention therapy (E/RP), and relapse prevention 
(Abramowitz, 2006b).  E/RP and CT are considered the principle active components 
(Abramowitz, 2006b) however, despite their front-line status, research literature has 
identified problems in relation to their acceptability and effectiveness, respectively.  
More recently, Twohig et al. (2010) evaluated an effective Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) manualised program for OCD.  In the pursuit of 
increasingly acceptable and efficacious treatment the current study provides preliminary 
exploration of potential covariation in the relationship between negative mood-states 
and negative appraisals among OCD sufferers.  The study also explores the potential 
utility of emotion regulation skills training as an augmentation to CBT for OCD by 
testing whether enhancing individuals’ capacity to regulate emotions impacts on 
negative appraisals and obsessive-compulsive symptom severity.    
1.1  Exposure with Response Prevention Therapy in OCD 
The behavioural component of CBT for OCD takes the form of exposure with 
response prevention therapy (E/RP).  E/RP was first developed by British psychologist 
Victor Meyer (1966), building on Mowrer’s influential Two-Factor theory of avoidance 
(1960).  The goal of E/RP is to provide patients with experiences in which obsessional 
stimuli are present, but compulsive (neutralising/safety-seeking) behaviour is resisted.  
When feared outcomes do not materialise in these contexts, patients learn that the 
obsessional stimuli are not as dangerous as they thought and that they are capable of 
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coping with and not being overwhelmed by intense fear and anxiety (see Abramowitz, 
2006b).  E/RP is essentially a counter-conditioning, involving the development of new, 
more adaptive associations.   
The effectiveness of E/RP as a treatment for OCD has consistently been 
demonstrated (Franklin et al., 2000; Deacon & Abramowitz, 2004) and many consider it 
the core treatment component in CBT for OCD (e.g., Kozak, & Coles, 2005).  However, 
it is an inherently aversive therapy, involving exposure to feared obsessions and 
situations, and as such has been associated with high overt refusal rates and treatment 
dropout (Foa et al., 2005; McLean et al., 2001).  Additionally, for those who do 
undertake E/RP, approximately 20% do not respond and another 20% relapse after 
treatment (Riggs & Foa, 1993).   
1.2 Cognitive Therapy in OCD 
The utilisation of cognitive therapy (CT) in the treatment of OCD emerged 
following the rise of the cognitive appraisal models (e.g., Salkovskis, 1985, 1989; 
Rachman, 1993, 1997).  Cognitive therapy is conducted in relation to the most 
prominent OCD-relevant dysfunctional belief and appraisal domains (as identified by 
the OCCWG; Clark, 2002) following assessment of each patient’s unique cognitive 
profile.  The main goals of CT for OCD are: to teach patients to identify negative 
appraisals and underlying dysfunctional beliefs in relation to their anxiety and 
obsessions, to consider the evidence (or lack thereof) in relation to, and helpfulness of, 
such cognitions, and to challenge unhelpful, unrealistic, illogical, or exaggerated 
appraisals, beliefs, and predictions and replace them with more helpful and realistic 
alternatives.  Techniques employed in CT for OCD include: cognitive restructuring 
(learning to appraise obsessions in more realistic and helpful ways), behavioural 
experiments (designing and executing experiments to see if a particular appraisal or 
belief is valid), perspective shifting (taking the perspective of someone who is not 
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obsessional, and thinking about obsession-related appraisals and beliefs from this 
viewpoint), and coping statements (developing realistic appraisals of obsessions that can 
be used to guide one’s response to obsessions when they occur).   
Early meta-analyses of the research investigating the effectiveness of cognitive 
and behavioural treatments for OCD yielded larger effect sizes for behavioural therapy 
(Cohen’s d = 1.47) than cognitive therapy (Cohen’s d = 1.04; van Balkom et al., 1994), 
leading to suggestions that CT was less effective than E/RP (e.g., Abramowitz, 1997).  
In the decade that followed, authors cautioned that the clinical utility of the more 
cognitive (post-appraisal model) approach to OCD treatment had not been consistently 
demonstrated (e.g., Clark, 2005) and that research showed cognitive techniques alone 
had limited efficacy in reducing obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Abramowitz, 2006b).  
Contrary to these assertions, van Oppen & Arntz (1994) provided early evidence of the 
efficacy of CT in the treatment of OCD and more recently a growing body of evidence 
has emerged supporting CT as a moderately effective stand-alone treatment for OCD 
(e.g., Wilhelm et al., 2005; Wilhelm, Berman, Keshaviah, Schwartz, & Steketee, 2015; 
Wilhelm & Steketee, 2006; Wilhelm et al., 2009).  Moreover, there is evidence that 
OCD sufferers find CT a more acceptable treatment than E/RP (Wilhelm et al., 2005; 
Wilhelm et al., 2009) and that CT may play a role in preventing treatment drop-out and 
maximizing adherence to exposure with response prevention therapy (Kozak & Coles. 
2005; Wilhelm et al., 2005; Wilhelm et al, 2009).  Furthermore, CT may be more 
effective than E/RP in ameliorating depressive symptoms in OCD patients 
(Emmelkamp, Visser, & Hoekstra, 1988).  
An important caveat to highlight regarding research assessing the relative 
efficacy of cognitive versus behavioural treatments is that both types of treatment 
employ similar techniques (i.e., behavioural experiments versus exposure) to achieve 
clinical benefits – although through different proposed mechanisms of change (i.e., 
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belief change versus extinction; Olatunji, Cisler, & Deacon, 2010).  An additional 
complication relates to confusion between therapeutic technique (e.g., cognitive 
restructuring versus exposure) and mechanisms of change (e.g., belief and appraisal 
modification versus extinction).  As such, findings indicating reduced efficacy of CT 
compared with E/RP in OCD treatment do not discount the possibility that changes in 
cognitive processes may be an important mechanism through which behavioural 
interventions work (Olatunji et al., 2010).  
In modern practice, the relative effectiveness of CT and E/RP has become 
something of a moot point given that both techniques are typically combined in the 
delivery of CBT for OCD.  However, even in combination, these treatments are neither 
universally nor completely helpful for OCD sufferers (Abramowitz, Franklin, Zoellner, 
& DiBernardo, 2002).  Indeed, CBT for OCD is less effective than CBT for many other 
psychological disorders (Fisher & Wells, 2005) with high refusal rates, treatment 
dropout, and partial treatment response (even after successful treatment, the majority of 
patients continue to experience residual symptoms; Abramowitz, 1998) identified as 
prominent short-comings.  These observations suggest that there remains considerable 
scope for improvements in OCD treatment efficacy.  Findings from the study reported 
in chapter two indicated that enhanced emotion regulation skills may potentially 
attenuate mood-state-dependent appraisal and neutralising processes in OCD.  The 
implication of these results is that emotion regulation skills training (ERST) may confer 
clinical benefits (in relation to mood-state-dependent negative appraisal and neutralising 
motivation patterns) above and beyond benefits currently available for OCD sufferers 
using CBT alone.   
The present study is an attempt to provide initial, preliminary exploration of the 
relationship between negative mood-states and negative appraisals among OCD 
sufferers.  The study investigates whether the specific patterns in mood-state-dependent 
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negative appraisals observed in the analogue studies reported in chapters one and two 
are generalizable to the clinical OCD population.  The current study also explores the 
potential utility of ERST in reducing negative appraisals and contributing to obsessive-
compulsive symptom improvement.  Four adults diagnosed with OCD were treated 
using traditional cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) with the addition of a six-session 
emotion regulation skills training (ERST) program.   
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
All participants attended the Australian National University (ANU) Psychology 
Clinic seeking psychological treatment.  Following assessment, individuals whose 
primary diagnosis was OCD were invited to participate in the current study.  Patients 
who chose not to participate were seen as part of normal therapist case-loads within the 
clinic.  Participants were not in treatment elsewhere and no participants were excluded 
from this investigation.  Participants received treatment free of charge and were under 
no obligation to participate, or continue participation, throughout.  Diagnosis of OCD 
and severity of symptoms were established using the Structured Clinical Interview for 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (SCID; First, Spitzer, 
Gibbon, & Williams, 2002), the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) and clinical interview.  
Participants were randomly assigned pairs of alphabetized initials in order to aid de-
identification.  Details of the four patients are provided in Table 11.  
2.2 Materials 
Emotion Regulation Skills Training (ERST) program.  A six-session ERST 
program was developed for the current study.  The program was designed to promote 
emotion regulation and psychological flexibility skills and contained the same basic 
structure as the 60-minute ERST program devised for the study reported in chapter two. 
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 Table 11.  Participant Characteristics 
   
  Participant   A.B.     C.D.         E.F.         G.H. 
 
  Sex       F       M           M               F 
  Age      45       42           18              28 
  Marital Status    M       M                              S                             S 
  Primary Obsessions        Contamination          Sexual and            Contamination         Harm and 
           Illness               and Symmetry   Contamination 
  Years with OCD     4       17            2                     10                                                        
  Primary Compulsions       Washing and               Checking Washing and   Checking and 
                 Cleaning        Ordering       Washing 
  Compulsive Style              Overt    Covert        Mixed          Overt 
  Co-Morbid Diagnoses    –         –         GAD    MDD and SP 
  Medication      –         –                –            Zoloft  
  Baseline OCI-R    25       24           23              39 
  Post-Treatment OCI-R   12       16            8              19 
 
Note:  Sex, F=female, M=male.  Marital Status, M=married, S=single.  Diagnoses, GAD=generalised 
anxiety disorder, MDD=major depressive disorder, SP=specific phobia. 
 
The six-session ERST program encouraged considerably deeper and more regular 
engagement with psychoeducation and practical exercises than was possible using the 
60-minute program.  Specific components (all derived from empirically-validated third-
wave therapies) included: 1) Psychoeducation regarding the nature of mindfulness, 
emotions, experiential acceptance, and maladaptive outcomes typically associated with 
experiential avoidance; 2) Practical mindfulness- and acceptance-based exercises; 3) 
Psychoeducation and practical exercises designed to promote psychological flexibility; 
and 4) Regular, guided, in-session and homework-based mindfulness meditation 
practice.  Components of the ERST program were modified and adapted to suit the 
OCD context as required.  For an overview of the ERST phase of therapy see Appendix 
J.  For detailed accounts of the components contained within the ERST program see 
Appendices H and I.        
2.3 Measures 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).   
The DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report inventory designed to assess the severity of 
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symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress.  The measure usually takes around five 
minutes to complete, is easy to administer and score, and is appropriate for use with 
adults (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998).  The DASS-21 possesses good 
internal consistency (subscale Cronbach’s alpha coefficients range from 0.81 to 0.84; 
Frazier et al., 2009) and validity has been established by substantial correlation of each 
subscale with similar constructs (Crawford & Henry, 2003; Henry & Crawford, 2005).  
The DASS-21 was used in combination with a modified version of the 
Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (III; OCCWG, 1997, 2001), the Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004) and the Obsessive-
Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa et al., 2002) to create a package 
providing assessment of patient’s mood-states, negative appraisals, emotion regulation 
skills, and obsessive-compulsive symptoms.  Reviews of the psychometric properties of 
the III, DERS, and OCI-R are provided in chapters one and two.  The full (i.e., six 
subscale) OBQ was utilised at the beginning of the cognitive therapy phase of treatment 
to help delineate each patient’s unique profile of obsessional beliefs prior to targeted 
intervention (see chapter one for psychometric review of the OBQ).    
A novel, jointly patient- and therapist-rated, in-session obsessive-compulsive 
symptom assessment measure was developed for the current study.  The measure 
assessed patients’ average time spent experiencing obsessions and engaging in 
compulsions each day over the past week on a continuum with anchors of 16 (all 
waking hours each day) and 0 (no time at all each day).  The measure also provided 
assessment of average overall obsessive-compulsive symptom severity over the past 
week on a ten-point Likert-type scale with 10 representing the worst obsessive-
compulsive symptom severity the patient has ever experienced and 0 representing 
complete absence of symptoms.  This measure was completed during every session that 
patients attended and required less than five minutes to complete on each occasion.   
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2.4 Procedure 
The experimental protocol was ratified by the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee.  Prior to participation all patients completed a standardised intake 
assessment session involving the SCID, the OCI-R, and clinical interview including 
questions regarding background and functioning.  A questionnaire booklet containing 
the DASS-21, the III-M, the DERS, and the OCI-R was completed at baseline and again 
prior to the first session of each new treatment phase (and at the mid-point of E/RP), 
thus creating a series of eight assessment points.   
2.5 Treatment 
The CBT for OCD program utilised in the current study was structured in 
accordance with standard contemporary models (see Abramowitz, 2006b; Franklin & 
Foa, 2007).  The current study adopted a multiple-baseline design by inserting emotion 
regulation skills training (ERST) into the CBT program at a different phase during 
treatment (on the basis of random assignment) for each patient.  The multiple-baseline 
design permitted investigation of the impact of enhanced emotion regulation skills at 
different phases of the cognitive-behavioural program.  Patient G.H. received ERST 
before phase 1 (psychoeducation and relaxation), patient E.F. received ERST before 
phase 2 (cognitive therapy), patient C.D. received ERST before phase 3 (exposure with 
response prevention therapy), and patient A.B. received ERST at the mid-point of phase 
3 (see Appendix J for a detailed overview of the phases of therapy).     
CBT for OCD typically requires approximately 20 sessions (Abramowitz, 
2006b; Andrews et al., 2003) however, with the addition of the six-session ERST 
program and a 2-3 month follow-up session, the “cognitive-affective-behavioural” 
treatment utilised in the current study required between 29 and 32 sessions for each of 
the participants to complete.  All treatment sessions were conducted between 22 
October, 2013, and 12 January, 2015, at the ANU Psychology Clinic.  The longest total 
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time span to complete the treatment program (including the 2-3 month follow-up 
session) for any patient was 63 weeks, the mean was 51 weeks (limited clinic access 
during university holidays contributed to treatment length).  Patients’ diagnostic status 
was re-assessed using the SCID at the 2-3 month follow-up session. 
2.6 Therapist Competency and Treatment Supervision 
All assessment and treatment was conducted by the researcher (Andrew 
Nicholls) who is a registered psychologist (with the Psychology Board of Australia) 
with over four years of experience and demonstrated competency in the delivery of 
CBT for OCD.  Assessment and treatment was delivered under regular supervision from 
Associate Professor Richard O’Kearney (who is a registered psychologist with 
approximately 25 years of experience in OCD treatment and research) at the Australian 
National University. 
3. Results 
Consistent with single subject research, visual inspection of scores was used to 
determine the effects of intervention (Barlow, Nock, & Hersen, 2008).   
3.1 Ratings of Obsessive-Compulsive Symptom Severity across Treatment  
 Phases 
Results indicated that all four patients achieved clinically significant change in 
relation to their obsessive-compulsive symptoms throughout the course of treatment.  
An overview of changes in session-by-session joint patient/therapist-rated overall 
obsessive-compulsive symptom severity for each patient is provided graphically in 
Figures 12, 13, 14, and 15.  All four patients’ OCI-R scores moved from the clinical to 
the sub-clinical range during therapy (see Table 11; OCI-R clinical range > 20), and at 
the 2-3 month follow-up session, none of the patients met diagnostic criteria for OCD 
using the SCID.   
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Figure 15.  Patient G.H.’s session-by-session ratings of overall symptom severity 
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3.2 Ratings of Obsessions and Compulsions across Treatment Phases 
Joint patient/therapist-ratings of the average time spent experiencing obsessions 
and engaging in compulsions (daily) showed that all four patients reduced their 
symptoms to sub-clinical levels (i.e., less than an hour per day) by the end of the active 
phases of treatment, and that gains were largely maintained at 2-3 month follow-up (See 
Figures 16, 17, 18, and 19).  Overall, patients primarily achieved reductions in 
compulsive activity during the exposure with response prevention (E/RP) phase of 
treatment (which is understandable given the behavioural nature of both E/RP and 
compulsions).  Whereas, substantial reductions in time spent experiencing obsessions 
were observed during the cognitive therapy (CT) and emotion regulation skills training 
(ERST) treatment phases, in addition to the E/RP phase. 
Patient A.B. achieved reductions in obsessions primarily during CT and E/RP, 
and reductions in compulsions primarily during E/RP (See Figure 16).  These results 
coincided with the largest reductions in A.B.’s OCI-R scores, which were observed 
during the CT and E/RP phases of treatment.  Overall, A.B. reduced her obsessions 
from 10 hours a day at presentation to 10 minutes or less a day at 2-3 month follow-up, 
and her compulsive activity from 4 hours a day at presentation, to 20 minutes a day or 
less at 2-3 month follow-up. 
In contrast to A.B., patient C.D. achieved the majority of his reduction in time 
spent experiencing obsessions during the ERST phase of treatment (with obsessional 
improvement continuing during E/RP), whereas an increase in obsessional activity was 
observed during the CT phase (See Figure 17).  This pattern of results was repeated in 
C.D.’s OCI-R scores which increased substantially during CT (moving further into the 
clinical range), and decreased substantially (moving, for the first time, into the sub-
clinical range) during ERST.  Similar to A.B., the majority of reduction in compulsive 
activity for patient C.D. occurred during E/RP.   
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Figure 16:  Patient A.B.’s session-by-session ratings of the number of hours per day  






Figure 17:  Patient C.D.’s session-by-session ratings of the number of hours per day        





Figure 18:  Patient E.F.’s session-by-session ratings of the number of hours per day 






Figure 19:  Patient G.H.’s session-by-session ratings of the number of hours per day  
                    spent experiencing obsessions and engaging in compulsions. 
 
Patient E.F. achieved substantial reductions in time spent experiencing 
obsessions during the ERST, CT, and E/RP phases of treatment, and reductions in 
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compulsions during ERST and E/RP (See Figure 18).  These results were consistent 
with E.F.’s OCI-R scores which decreased substantially during ERST (moving, for the 
first time, into the sub-clinical range) and E/RP (moving further into the sub-clinical 
range).   
Patient G.H. achieved reductions in time spent experiencing obsessions during 
the ERST, CT, and E/RP phases of treatment, and the majority of reduction in her 
compulsive activity occurred during E/RP (See Figure 19).  OCI-R scores for patient 
G.H. indicated substantial drops in level of obsessive-compulsive symptoms during CT 
and E/RP (moving into the sub-clinical range for the first time during E/RP).  
3.3 Tracking Mood-State and Negative Appraisals across Treatment Phases 
Figures 20a/b, 21a/b, 22a/b, and 23a/b provide an overview of changes in 
patients’ anxious and depressive symptoms, plotted against changes in negative 
appraisals in three domains (i.e., OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT), across the 
seven phases of treatment.  Visual analyses investigating potential covariation between 
negative affect and mood-congruent negative appraisals yielded limited evidence of 
specificity.  For example, a close association was evident in the covariance of DASS-21 
depression scores and inflated responsibility appraisals for patient C.D, especially from 
the post-CT time point onwards (see Figure 21b), and patient G.H. appeared to display 
some specific covariation between DASS-21 anxiety scores and OET appraisals, 
particularly from the post-psychoeducation time point onwards (see Figure 23a).  
However, evidence of mood-incongruent variation was also present.  For example, 
patient A.B. reported increases in DASS-21 anxiety contemporaneous with decreases in 
OET appraisals (at the mid- and post-E/RP time points; see Figure 20a), and increases 
in depressive symptoms contemporaneous with decreases in inflated responsibility 




Figure 20a.  Patient A.B.’s DASS-21 anxiety scores mapped across her appraisal 






Figure 20b.  Patient A.B.’s DASS-21 depression scores mapped across her appraisal 






Figure 21a.  Patient C.D.’s DASS-21 anxiety scores mapped across his appraisal ratings 






Figure 21b.  Patient C.D.’s DASS-21 depression scores mapped across his appraisal 






Figure 22a.  Patient E.F.’s DASS-21 anxiety scores mapped across his appraisal ratings 






Figure 22b.  Patient E.F.’s DASS-21 depression scores mapped across his appraisal 




Figure 23a.  Patient G.H.’s DASS-21 anxiety scores mapped across her appraisal 





Figure 23b.  Patient G.H.’s DASS-21 depression scores mapped across her appraisal 
ratings throughout the phases of therapy 
 
3.4 The Impact of Treatment Phase on Changes in Negative Appraisals and 
Symptom Severity 
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Figures 24, 25, 26, and 27 illustrate pre- to post- changes in patients’ negative 
appraisals (i.e., OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT) and OCD symptom severity 
across the phases of treatment.  In figures 24 to 27 treatment phases are presented in a 
standardized order for all patients (i.e., not necessarily in the same order encountered in 
therapy) to facilitate comparisons.  Columns rising above the X-axis represent 
improvement in the variable; columns falling below the X-axis represent deterioration. 
Commencing with exploration of the psychoeducation/relaxation phase of 
treatment, visual analyses suggest that this phase exerted a deleterious effect on patient 
A.B.’s negative appraisals (she reported becoming more aware of her obsessions than 
ever before), a positive effect on patient C.D.’s appraisals (he reported experiencing 
relief at the normalisation of his sexual obsessions) and minimal impact on the other 
two patients’ appraisals.  The psychoeducation/relaxation phase was not associated with 
substantial change in obsessive-compulsive symptom severity for any patient.   
The cognitive therapy (CT) treatment phase was associated with positive overall 
impacts on negative appraisals and obsessive-compulsive symptom severity for patients 
A.B. and G.H., however it appeared to impact minimally for client E.F., and impacted 
negatively on patient C.D. both in terms of appraisals and overall symptom severity.   
  The emotion regulation skills training (ERST) phase of treatment was 
associated with improvements in negative appraisals in all three domains (i.e., OET, 
inflated responsibility, and OIT) for three of the four patients.  In addition, a substantial 
improvement in obsessive-compulsive symptom severity was reported by all four 
patients during the ERST treatment phase.  Evidence of successful enhancement of 
emotion regulation skills during the six-session ERST phase was provided by 
substantial reductions in deficits in emotion regulation scale (DERS) scores pre- to post-
ERST for patients C.D., E.F., and G.H.  Patient A.B. reported no improvement in 
emotion regulation skills following ERST.   
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Figure 24.  Patient A.B.’s appraisal and O-C symptom severity change by treatment    





Figure 25.  Patient C.D.’s appraisal and O-C symptom severity change by treatment  





Figure 26.  Patient E.F.’s appraisal and O-C symptom severity change by treatment  





Figure 27.  Patient G.H.’s appraisal and O-C symptom severity change by treatment  
                    phase 
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The exposure with response prevention phase of treatment was associated with 
the largest and most consistent treatment gains overall.  All four patients reported 
improvements in OCD symptom severity and negative appraisals (across all three 
domains) during this phase.  
 For all patients, appraisal and symptom severity gains were largely maintained 
through the relapse prevention and 2-3 month follow-up phases of treatment.   
4. Discussion 
The present study investigated covariation in negative mood and negative 
appraisals, and the impact of ERST on negative appraisals and obsessive-compulsive 
symptom severity, in the OCD context.  Results were limited and preliminary, yet 
nevertheless provided initial clinical data regarding what appear to be generalised 
impacts of negative mood-states on the cognitive appraisal processes considered so 
crucial in the pathogenesis and maintenance of OCD.  Results additionally highlighted 
the potential utility of ERST as an augmentation to traditional CBT for OCD. 
All four participants in the present study achieved clinically significant change 
in relation to their obsessive-compulsive symptoms throughout the course of treatment.  
Findings supported E/RP as the more overtly impactful component in CBT for OCD, 
and hinted at an approximate equivalence between CT and ERST, particularly in their 
effectiveness in reducing obsessions and compulsions.  Specifically, reductions in the 
time spent engaging in compulsions were observed during E/RP (4 out of 4 patients) 
and ERST (1 out of 4 patients) phases of therapy, whereas reductions in the time spent 
experiencing obsessions were observed during E/RP (4 out of 4 patients), CT (3 out of 4 
patients), and ERST (3 out of 4 patients).   
In relation to covariation of negative mood symptoms and mood-congruent 
negative appraisals, current results yielded limited evidence of specificity.  Moreover, 
the current findings suggest that a more generalised pattern of covariation of negative 
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mood and appraisal may occur in the clinical population, compared with the more 
specific impacts of mood on appraisal observed in the analogue studies reported in 
chapters one and two.  In the present study, when negative mood-state increased 
(whether anxious or depressive) there was a trend for negative appraisals to increase as 
well, across all three domains (i.e., OET, inflated responsibility, and OIT).  Similarly, 
when negative mood-state attenuated, there was a trend for negative appraisals to also 
attenuate, across all three domains.   
Visual comparisons of the impact of each treatment phase on changes in 
patients’ negative appraisals and obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptom severity 
provided preliminary evidence for the potential utility of ERST as an augmentation to 
traditional CBT for OCD.  E/RP was associated with the largest and most consistent 
negative appraisal and symptom severity treatment gains (4 out of 4 patients reported 
improvements in negative appraisals and OC symptom severity).  However, ERST also 
produced substantial gains (3 out of 4 patients reported improvements in negative 
appraisals, and 4 out of 4 patients reported improvements in OC symptom severity).  
Interestingly, comparisons showed that CT was associated with less positive outcomes 
(2 out of 4 patients reported improvements in negative appraisals, and 2 out of 4 
patients reported improvements in OC symptom severity) than ERST.  Indeed, one 
patient (A.B.), experienced substantial challenges when engaging with cognitive 
techniques and exhibited symptomatic deterioration during this phase of therapy.  
Notably, A.B. was a primarily covert (i.e., cognitive) neutraliser.  For him, CT 
resembled the elaborate sequences of arguments and counterarguments he employed in 
response to his obsessions and cognitive techniques appeared to quickly become 
incorporated as a new aspect of his covert compulsive repertoire.  This outcome accords 
with Twohig’s (2009) acknowledgment of a subgroup of “verbally entangled” OCD 
clients “for whom discussions of cognition only fuel OCD” (p.27).  Indeed, the current 
 131 
findings hint at a possible division in CT- versus ERST-based OCD treatment response 
(with E/RP as the common factor in each) among overtly neutralising (relatively 
cognitively disentangled) versus covertly neutralising (cognitively entangled) sufferers.  
The presence of such a division would necessitate flexibility in OCD treatment, with CT 
and ERST being used as separate or combined options to “set the table” for E/RP, on 
the basis of each patients degree of cognitive entanglement and covert neutralisation.   
Strengths of the present study included regular assessment of the variables under 
investigation (permitting temporal analysis) and the utilisation of a 2-3 month follow-up 
session (providing evaluation of the durability of treatment effects).   
There were numerous methodological limitations of the current study.  It is 
suggested that results should be considered exploratory and preliminary, and used as 
guidance for future investigation.  The small and relatively homogeneous sample, for 
instance, cautions that findings may not be fully generalizable.  In addition, utilisation 
of DASS-21 anxiety and depression subscales (which measure severity of anxious and 
depressive symptomatology, respectively) may not have provided the most sensitive 
assessment of patients’ fluctuating mood-states throughout treatment.  Future research 
may benefit from the use of mood-state visual analogue scales (VAS; as employed in 
chapters one and two) or non-introspective methodologies (such as implicit memory 
tasks or physiological measures) to provide additional, and potentially more fine-
grained, assessment of the impact of patients mood-states on appraisals across the 
course of therapy.    
A further methodological limitation was the lack of a control patient (receiving a 
null treatment phase instead of ERST) which prohibited conclusions that patients’ 
ERST-phase improvements were attributable to ERST as opposed to placebo effect, the 
effect of prior treatment phases, the passage of time, or other unobserved confounding 
factors.  Additionally, the potential for demand and confirmation biases should be 
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reduced in future studies by utilising an assessor who is blind to the nature of the study 
(and the treatment received) to undertake the 2-3 month follow up SCID assessments. 
Moreover, future research should include treatment fidelity assessment to check that the 
ERST program and the various phases of CBT for OCD are delivered as intended.    
An additional caveat regarding interpretation of the present results relates to the 
inevitable contamination of patients’ responses in treatment phases as the consequence 
of having encountered prior treatment phases.  Furthermore, patients’ idiosyncratic 
characteristics and preferences inevitably yield individualistic responses to different 
treatment phases (irrespective of the specific aims and functions of each phase).  As 
such, generalizability of findings is limited and comprehensive evaluation of the 
contribution of ERST to CBT for OCD will require clinical investigation on a larger 
scale.   
In conclusion, the current study offered preliminary exploration of the 
association between negative mood-state, emotion regulation, negative appraisals, and 
symptom severity in obsessive-compulsive disorder.  Results provided some limited 
evidence of covariation between mood-state and negative appraisal and highlighted the 
potential utility of ERST as an augmentation to CBT for OCD, particularly for sufferers 
who are cognitively entangled and in cases where CT exacerbates covert neutralisation.  
Deeper investigation in this area may contribute to the development of more 
comprehensive and flexible treatments, with improved therapeutic outcomes, than are 




















1. Recapitulation of Research Aims and Main Findings 
In pursuit of treatments with improved effectiveness and acceptability for 
OCD sufferers, the main aims of the current research project were to investigate 
the impact of different mood-states and enhanced emotion regulation capacity on 
patterns of negative appraisals, neutralising activity, and OCD symptom severity.  
These aims were achieved using two experimental analogue studies and one N = 4 
OCD clinical case series investigation.   
In overview, findings identified mood-state as an important pathogenic 
process which appears to intersect with cognitive and behavioural processes in the 
development and maintenance of OCD.  Results from the first analogue study 
yielded evidence of mood-state-dependent patterns in negative appraisals and 
neutralising motivations in response to an obsession-like thought.  Specifically, 
induced anxious mood-state promoted both appraisals which over-estimated threat 
and neutralising motivations aimed at reducing threat.  Induced dysphoric mood-
state specifically promoted both appraisals of inflated sense of responsibility and 
neutralising motivations aimed at reducing this sense of responsibility.  Whereas, 
negative appraisals were equivalent across all domains and neutralising 
motivations aimed at diminishing the perceived importance of intrusive thoughts 
were promoted in the context of neutral mood-state.  Crucially, the experimental 
design of the current research (involving the manipulation of mood) permitted 
inference of a causal role for anxious and dysphoric mood-states in the availability 
and likelihood of specific negative appraisals.  Further, the patterns of results 
imply that enhanced capacity to regulate negative affect may be useful in 
attenuating the impact of mood-state on negative appraisals and neutralising 
activity. 
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Results from the second analogue study replicated and extended the 
findings of the first study.  The same specific mood-state-dependent patterns in 
negative appraisal and neutralising motivation responses were observed, 
reinforcing the inferences of causal relationships between anxious mood-state, 
OET appraisals, and neutralising motivations aimed at reducing threat, and 
between dysphoric mood-state, inflated responsibility appraisals, and neutralising 
motivations aimed at reducing this sense of responsibility.  Overall, these findings 
show that mood-states differentially colour the experience of intrusive thoughts.  
Anxious mood-state appears to furnish intrusions with threat-related meaning, 
whereas dysphoric mood-state furnishes intrusions with self/obligation-based 
meaning.  In addition, results of the second analogue study revealed attenuation of 
mood-state-dependent patterns of responses (both negative appraisals and 
neutralising motivations) in the context of enhanced emotion regulation skills. 
Specifically, anxious mood-induced participants who received emotion regulation 
skills training (ERST) reported significantly lower OET appraisals and 
neutralising motivations aimed at reducing threat compared with those not 
receiving ERST.  Reductions in inflated responsibility appraisals among ERST 
versus No-ERST dysphoric mood-state induced participants failed to reach 
statistical significance (possibly due to a lack of statistical power in the 
comparison), however reductions in neutralising motivations aimed at reducing 
sense of responsibility were significant.  Results imply that enhancement of 
emotion regulation capacity may translate to attenuation of pathogenic mood-
state-dependent appraisals and neutralising activity in OCD.    
Results from the N = 4 clinical case series analysis provided preliminary 
evidence of ERST-related symptom reduction and attenuation of negative 
appraisals among OCD sufferers and generalised (rather than specific) covariation 
 136 
in negative mood and negative appraisals.  This generalised as opposed to specific 
covariation may reflect naturalistic fluctuations in mood-states over time in 
clinical as opposed to laboratory conditions.  The ERST phase of treatment 
yielded substantial reductions in obsessions for three of the four patients, and 
reductions in compulsions for one patient.  Furthermore, three patients reported 
substantial reductions in negative appraisals and all four patients reported 
improvements in obsessive-compulsive symptom severity during ERST.  In 
comparison, three patients reported reductions in obsessions, but no patients 
reported reduced compulsions, and only two patients reported substantial 
reductions in negative appraisals and obsessive-compulsive symptom severity 
during the cognitive therapy phase of treatment.  These findings provide 
preliminary evidence that ERST may represent a valuable augmentation to CBT 
for some OCD sufferers.   
2. Theoretical Implications 
Present findings provide basic support for the cognitive appraisal models 
of OCD, with results supporting a vital role for negative appraisals in obsession-
related distress and motivations to neutralise.  However, appraisal models exhibit a 
limited focus on affect – primarily viewing mood disturbance as an outcome of 
negative appraisal, and overlooking the impact of mood-state on the appraisal 
process.  In repudiation of this view and consistent with Miranda and colleagues’ 
(1988, 1990, and 1998) mood-state-dependent hypothesis, current results suggest 
that different mood-states exert specific, mood-congruent impacts on negative 
appraisal processes in the OCD context.  Indeed, patterns of mood-state-dependent 
appraisals and neutralising motivations observed in the current data identify mood-
state as a crucial component of the negative appraisal process itself.  Results from 
two analogue studies showed that different mood-states differentially furnish 
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obsession-like thoughts with mood-congruent meaning and subsequently promote 
mood-state-specific neutralising activity.  These findings were in broad 
accordance with previous research demonstrating links between anxiety and OET 
beliefs and appraisals (e.g., Muris et al., 2003), dysphoria and inflated 
responsibility (e.g., Steketee et al., 1998), and the lack of any links between 
negative affect and OIT (e.g., Lee, Cougle, & Telch, 2005).  Furthermore, 
attenuation of the impact of negative mood-states on appraisals and neutralising 
motivations observed in the second and third studies suggested that reduced 
emotional reactivity in the context of enhanced emotion regulation skills 
subsequently translated to reduced cognitive reactivity in the form of negative 
appraisals.  These results accorded with previous theory and research identifying 
an inter-connection between regulatory processes across response domains (e.g., 
Cicchetti, Ackerman, & Izard, 1995; Damasio, 1994, 2004; Davidson, Jackson & 
Kalin, 2000; Dodge & Garber, 1991; LeDoux, 1998; Mennin, 2005).    
 Findings substantially extend existing conceptualisations of the role of mood in 
OCD (e.g., MacDonald and Davey, 2005a, 2005b) and counsel that contemporary 
appraisal models of OCD should be expanded to include deeper consideration and 
recognition of the role of specific mood-states on negative appraisal and neutralising 
motivation processes.  Based on the present results, initial cognitive-affective-
behavioural models of OCD in the special cases of anxious, dysphoric, and neutral 
mood-state are offered in Figures 7, 8, and 9 (see chapter one).  Further research is 
required to investigate the possible existence of additional associations between mood-
states and OCD-relevant appraisal domains and to further explicate the links between 
anxious mood and OET, dysphoric mood and inflated responsibility, and neutral mood 
state and OIT observed in the present investigation.  
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Current results also provide a possible explanation for the failure to 
discriminate OET and inflated responsibility belief and appraisal constructs 
(despite theoretical distinctions) in the OBQ and III validation studies (OCCWG, 
2001, 2003, and 2005).  Present findings suggest that differences in the impacts of 
OET and inflated responsibility beliefs and appraisals on individuals’ experience 
may only become apparent in specific mood contexts which differentially activate 
particular belief and appraisal domains.      
3. Treatment Implications   
Despite improvements in treatment outcome in recent decades, problems 
with the effectiveness and acceptability of psychological treatment for OCD 
persist.  Cognitive appraisal models came to dominate conceptual and therapeutic 
approaches to OCD, and the role of mood was largely obscured.  Current findings 
provide an expanded account of the role of mood in OCD and imply that emotion 
regulation skills training may confer new benefits for OCD sufferers, beyond those 
offered by traditional CBT, particularly in terms of reducing mood-state-
dependent negative appraisals of obsessions and subsequent mood-congruent 
neutralising motivations.  Results suggest that the prominence of specific negative 
appraisals is likely to wax and wane as a function of patients’ fluctuating mood-
states, thus highlighting the need for OCD therapists to carefully consider, assess, 
and address mood-state when conducting CT.  In addition, the case series results 
illustrate that enhancing OCD patients’ capacity to deal with negative mood-states 
may be a potentially important and hitherto under-exploited means of attenuating 
the negative cognitive appraisals considered so crucial in the pathogenesis and 
maintenance of the disorder.   
Moreover, the experiences of patient C.D. suggest that ERST may have 
utility as an alternative to the CT component of treatment for cognitively 
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entangled and predominantly covertly neutralising OCD sufferers.  For patient 
C.D., who was almost exclusively a covert (i.e., cognitive) neutraliser, CT was 
associated with a deterioration of symptoms and negative appraisals.  Cognitive 
techniques appeared to readily become incorporated into his covert compulsive 
rituals.  This patient responded considerably more positively to ERST techniques, 
which helped him come into new relationships with his thoughts and emotions 
whereby he learned to accept their presence instead of wrestling with them 
cognitively.  Current results thus imply the need for flexibility in OCD treatment, 
hinting that different means of “tenderizing” beliefs and appraisals may be 
differentially effective for different types of OCD patients.  In particular, findings 
suggest that ERST may be especially helpful for the cognitively entangled and for 
predominantly covert neutralisers and that CT may not be appropriate for this sub-
population of OCD sufferers.   
4. Strengths, Limitations, and Directions for Future Research 
Overall strengths of the present research project included the utilisation of 
experimental designs which provided exploration of the temporal relationships 
between variables under assessment and thus permitted causal inference.  The use 
of a replication study (see chapter two) delivered opportunities for replication of 
mood-state-dependent findings observed in study 1 and provided additional 
support for the hypothesis that mood-state constitutes a condition under which 
appraisal processes operate differentially in OCD.  Manipulation of emotion 
regulation capacity in the second study permitted exploration of the attenuation of 
mood-state-dependent impacts on appraisals in the context of enhanced ER skills.  
The addition of a case-series analysis provided preliminary exploration of the 
generalisability of analogue findings to the clinical OCD population.  Finally, 
integration of emotion regulation skills training with traditional components of 
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CBT for OCD in the case-series analysis offered initial exploration of the 
application and potential utility of ERST as an augmentation to existing treatment.    
Several methodological limitations were shared by the two analogue 
studies including use of a non-clinical sample, a single, analogue “obsession-like” 
thought (not an actual obsession), and heavy reliance on self-report measures.  The 
exclusive reliance on self-reported emotional responding may have been 
particularly limiting, as some participants may not have had full awareness of their 
emotional responses, thereby reducing the extent to which they could accurately 
report on those responses in the experiments (see Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  There 
was evidence of statistical power issues in both analogue studies, and in the 
context of various “trends” in the data towards significance in expected directions, 
larger sample sizes or an examination of effect sizes might be warranted in future 
research.  An additional limitation of the analogue studies was the utilisation of the 
OBQ for assessment of baseline equivalence in participants’ obsessive beliefs.  As 
discussed in chapter one, validation studies have highlighted several limitations of 
the OBQ, particularly in relation to high correlations among the subscales 
(OCCWG, 2001, 2003).  Recently however, Moulding and colleagues (2011) 
addressed many of the limitations of the OBQ in the development of the OBQ-
TRIP.  This short version of the OBQ benefited from a rigorous examination of 
the factor structure of the original OBQ, with results suggesting a four factor 
solution in which OET and inflated responsibility constituted separate dimensions 
(Moulding et al., 2011).   The OBQ-TRIP was not yet available when the current 
research project was being designed, however might be preferable for use in future 
testing of mood-state-dependent appraisal and neutralising motivations patterns.  
The clinical case-series analysis exhibited several methodological 
limitations including the lack of a control patient (receiving a null treatment phase 
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instead of ERST), the use of a non-blind researcher/assessor, and the relatively 
small and homogeneous sample.  Moreover, this study was intended as an initial 
investigation of the association between negative mood-state, emotion regulation, 
negative appraisals, and symptom severity in OCD and as such, results should be 
considered preliminary and exploratory and used as guidance for future 
investigation.   
Further investigation regarding the impact of affective processes on 
appraisal and neutralising in OCD has the potential to contribute to new (more 
comprehensive and flexible) therapeutic interventions and much-needed 
improvements in treatment effectiveness.  Additional analogue research, with 
larger samples (capable of producing greater statistical power), is required to 
provide further testing and replication of the current hypotheses and results.  Such 
research would help ascertain whether non-significant trends in the current data 
(e.g., trending but non-significant findings in relation to attenuation in inflated 
responsibility appraisals between the ERST and No-ERST dysphoric groups) are 
merely noise in the data, or are in fact indicative of specificity.  Clinical research 
on a larger scale is required to provide more comprehensive investigation of the 
impact of mood-states on appraisal and neutralising processes in OCD and the 
potential utility of ERST as an augmentation to CBT for OCD.  Current results 
suggest that investigation of the utility of ERST among cognitively entangled and 
covert neutralising OCD sufferers may be particularly fruitful.      
5.  Conclusion 
 Cognitive appraisal models ascribe a crucial role to dysfunctional 
appraisals of intrusive thoughts in OCD, however little is known about the 
conditions under which appraisal domains may operate differentially.  The current 
research represented the first experimental investigation of mood-state-dependent 
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hypotheses in the OCD context.  Findings provided an expanded account of the 
role of mood in the aetiology and maintenance of OCD and supported the 
hypothesis that mood-state constitutes a condition under which appraisal domains 
operate differentially in OCD.  Specifically, results indicated that anxious and 
dysphoric mood-states exert unique, activating influences on specific types of 
negative appraisals, which subsequently yield mood-influenced effects on 
neutralising motivations.  The present research provides a preliminary outline of a 
theoretical and therapeutic approach to OCD which addresses the 
interrelationship between emotion and cognition.  The current findings counsel 
that prevailing cognitive-behavioural models of OCD should be expanded in 
recognition of the moderating role that mood-state appears to play in promoting 
negative appraisals and OCD symptoms.  Results suggest that affective processes 
should no longer be considered secondary to cognitive appraisal in OCD, but 
should instead be recognised as a crucial, causal aspect of the broader appraisal 
process.  It is hoped that further research in this field will lead to enhanced 
understanding of the cognitive-affective-behavioural nexus of OCD and in turn 
create a foundation for clinical interventions that more flexibly, comprehensively, 
and effectively treat this debilitating illness. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory – Modified (III-M) 
Over-estimation of Threat (OET) Appraisal Subscale 
1. Having this thought increases the likelihood of me being publicly embarrassed. 
2. Having this thought makes the world a more dangerous place. 
3. Having this thought threatens the safety of myself and/or others. 
4. Having this thought increases the chance that I’ll be punished. 
5. Any harm that comes about because of this thought will be severe. 
6. This thought could lead to a disaster. 
7. This thought means that it’s more likely that bad things will happen. 
8. This thought represents a real threat that someone will be injured. 
9. There is a greater chance that I’ll encounter serious problems because I’ve had this thought. 
10. Having this thought increases the likelihood that I’ll accidentally harm myself or others. 
 
Development of the OET appraisal subscale statements 
The questions that constitute the over-estimation of threat (OET) appraisal 
subscale were developed by adapting the questions from the OET subscale of the OBQ 
to measure appraisals rather than beliefs.  This procedure ensured that a close 
association remained between the OBQ over-estimation of threat subscale statements 
and the new III-M over-estimation of threat subscale statements.  Such an association 
was very much evident in the format of the original OBQ and III subscale statements.  
For example, the OBQ responsibility subscale belief statement “when I see any 
opportunity to do so, I must act to prevent bad things from happening” clearly 
corresponds with the III responsibility subscale appraisal statement “because I've 
thought of bad things that might happen, I must act to prevent them”.  The crucial 
difference between the two statements is that the former refers to general responsibility 
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beliefs while the latter refers to responsibility appraisals relating to specific intrusive 
thoughts identified by the participant.  Another example of this distinction is evident in 
the difference between the OBQ over-importance of thoughts subscale statement 
“having bad thoughts means I am weird or abnormal” and the III over-importance of 
thoughts subscale statement “having this thought means I am weird or abnormal”.  This 
belief versus appraisal distinction, while preserving the basic form of the statement, was 
applied in the development of the new OET III-M subscale as well.   For example, the 
OBQ over-estimation of threat subscale statement “I am more likely than other people 
to accidentally cause harm to myself or to others” was adapted to “having this thought 
increases the likelihood that I’ll accidentally harm myself or others” for the new III-M 





Appendix B: Anxiety and Dysphoria Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) 
 
These questions ask you to rate your current mood state.  In making your ratings 
you should indicate how you are feeling right now.   
 
Because people are different, there are no right or wrong answers.   
 
Please read each question carefully and make an assessment of the intensity of your 
current mood in regard to the mood domain specified by each question (eg sad or 
anxious).  As accurately as you can, indicate the intensity of your current mood in each 
mood domain by placing an X anywhere along the line below each question.  
 
1.   How sad do you feel right now?  
 
 
       Not at all                                                 Moderately                                                Extremely  
            sad                                                            sad                                                            sad 
 
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 




2.   How anxious do you feel right now? 
  
 
       Not at all                                                 Moderately                                                Extremely  
        anxious                                                     anxious                                                     anxious 
 
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 
              0          10         20         30         40         50          60        70         80         90         100 
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Appendix C: Inflated Responsibility, Over-Estimation of Threat (OET), and Over-  
                 Importance of Thoughts (OIT) Appraisal Visual Analogue Scales  
The following questions relate to your attitudes and beliefs regarding the car 
accident thought that you engaged with in the preceding stage of the experiment.  
People differ naturally in the ways that they think about things.  As such there are no 
right or wrong answers to these questions.  Please read each question carefully and then 
indicate where your attitude lies by placing an X anywhere along the line below each 
question.  
 
1.  How likely is it that the accident will occur because you’ve had the thought about it? 
      
 
      Not at all                                                 Moderately                                               Extremely  
         likely                                                         likely                                                       likely 
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 
              0          10         20         30         40         50          60        70         80          90        100 
 
 
2.  How irresponsible would it be to ignore your thoughts about the accident? 
     
 
      Not at all                                                  Moderately                                             Extremely  
    irresponsible                                              irresponsible                                          irresponsible 
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 
              0          10         20         30         40         50          60        70         80          90        100 
 
 
3. If the accident did happen, how likely is it that it would be a serious accident? 
 
 
       Not at all                                                 Moderately                                              Extremely  
          likely                                                         likely                                                       likely 
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 








4.  How morally wrong was it to think about the accident occurring? 
 
 
    Not morally                                               Moderately                                            Extremely  
    wrong at all                                              morally wrong                                     morally wrong            
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 
              0          10         20         30         40         50          60        70         80          90        100 
 
 
5.  How responsible would you feel if the car accident did occur in the next 24 hours? 
 
 
      Not at all                                                 Moderately                                             Extremely  
      responsible                                              responsible                                             responsible 
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 
              0          10         20         30         40         50          60        70         80          90        100 
 
 
6.  How likely is it that the car accident will happen?  
 
 
       Not at all                                                  Moderately                                              Extremely  
          likely                                                         likely                                                      likely 
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 




Note – Questions 1 and 4 tap OIT appraisals (question 1 taps likelihood-TAF; question 
4 taps Moral-TAF).  Questions 2 and 5 tap inflated responsibility appraisals (question 2 
taps responsibility for the thought; question 5 taps responsibility for the outcome).  
Questions 3 and 6 tap OET appraisals (question 3 taps threat severity estimation; 
question 6 taps threat probability estimation). 
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Appendix D:  Urge to Neutralise Visual Analogue Scale 
How strong is your urge to reduce or cancel the effects of writing the sentence? 
      Not strong                                                Moderately                                             Extremely  
          at all                                                         strong                                                     strong 
 
              _________________________________________________________________ 
 






Appendix E: Neutralising Strategies Inventory (NSI) 
People are known to use a range of different strategies in responding to negative 
thoughts (thoughts like the one that you just had about a car accident happening to your 
friend or family member).  We are interested in which strategies (if any) you used 
during the last two minutes to stop, remove, or reduce in strength the thought about the 
car accident and any discomfort associated with it.   
 
Please indicate which strategies you used in responding to the thought about the 
car accident by placing ticks in the boxes next to the relevant strategies in the list below.  
Choose as many strategies from the list as are relevant.  
 
What did you do to respond to the thought about the car accident? 
 
1.      REPLACED THE THOUGHT (for example – replaced the thoughts of the  
 accident with pleasant thoughts or images, or with other negative thoughts or        
 worries) 
 
2.      REAPPRAISED THE THOUGHT (for example – reinterpreted the thought,   
             tried to analyse the thought rationally, or challenged the thoughts validity) 
 
3.      PLANNED AN ACTION (for example – made a plan to see or call the person    
             imagined in the car accident to check that they’re okay or to warn them to be   
             careful) 
 
4.      PUNISHED YOURSELF (for example – got angry at yourself, or pinched,  
             slapped, scratched or otherwise physically punished yourself) 
 
5.      PERFORMED A RITUAL (for example – counted, repeated a meaningless  
             phrase, positioned objects or used some other ritualistic action or gesture) 
 
6.      TRIED TO STOP THE THOUGHT (for example – tried to ignore the thought,   
             tried to force the thought out of mind, tried to suppress the thought) 
 
7.      REASSURED YOURSELF (for example – tried to convince yourself that the  
 thought is not important, evaluated the thought as unimportant, or assessed the       
   normality of the thought) 
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8.      TRIED TO “UNDO” THE THOUGHT (for example – visualised the accident  
but with a less serious or a positive outcome, physically or mentally altered the         
sentence you wrote about the accident to change its meaning, or “put the 
thought right” by saying prayers) 
 
9.      USED MEDITATION OR RELAXATION (for example – using any kind of  
             relaxation or meditation technique to combat thoughts of the accident) 
 
10.    PHYSICALLY ALTERED THE SENTENCE (for example – tore, scrunched or 
folded the paper up, or crossed out some or all of the words) 
 
11.    DID NOTHING (endorsing this option indicates that you used no strategies  
             at all to respond to the thought about the car accident) 
              














Appendix F: Neutralising Motivations Inventory (NMI) 
In this part of the experiment you are asked to indicate why you used each of the 
strategies that you ticked previously.  From the list below choose as many reasons for 
using each strategy as you like.  You are free to choose the same reason(s) for more 
than one strategy. 
 
In the space provided below enter the number associated with one of the coping 
strategies that you used and then tick as many boxes as are relevant to indicate why you 
used that strategy.  Repeat this process on a separate sheet for each coping strategy that 
you used. 
 
The reason(s) that I used strategy number _______ for dealing with my thoughts about 
the accident were:  
 
    To diminish my sense of responsibility for any negative outcomes associated with    
        my having the thought. 
 
    To keep the friend or family member that I imagined in the car accident safe from  
 harm. 
 
    To make the thought have no effect. 
 
    To fulfil my responsibility to do something about the thought. 
 
    To make myself feel safer. 
 
    To make me feel like I’m a good person. 
 
    I don’t know why I used this strategy. 
 









Appendix G: Self-Referential Mood-Induction Statements 
Anxious Mood-Inducing Statements 
1. I am worried about giving a talk in front of my peers later today.  
 (M = 3.22, SD = 3.11) 
2. I’m feeling a little tense.  (M = 4.67, SD = 3.24) 
3. Public speaking always makes me nervous. (M = 5.11, SD = 4.37) 
4. I’m finding it hard to relax.  (M = 5.67, SD = 5.27) 
5. I have “butterflies” in my stomach.  (M = 6, SD = 5.1) 
6. I’m going to feel very nervous when I enter the seminar room. (M = 9, SD = 5.34) 
7. It would be horrible to mess up the talk.  (M = 9.67, SD = 1.8) 
8. I have not prepared my talk well enough.  (M = 10, SD = 3.87) 
9. I’m concerned that I might feel panicked as I stand in front of my peers. 
(M = 10.11, SD = 3.33) 
10. I’m going to be embarrassed in front of everyone.  (M = 10.44, SD = 4.53) 
11. I feel like I’m running out of time.  (M = 10.67, SD = 5.05) 
12. There is a lot of pressure on me to do well.  (M = 10.78, SD = 5.04) 
13. If I do poorly in this talk I will fail the unit. (M = 12.11, SD = 2.89) 
14. Failure is not acceptable. (M = 13.11, SD = 5.93) 
15. Everyone is going to laugh at my incompetence. (M = 13.55, SD = 4) 
16. My hands and legs are trembling. (M = 14.22, SD = 5.65) 
17. I feel I am being crushed by the expectations placed on me. (M = 14.22, SD = 5.65) 
18. My mouth has gone dry and I can hardly speak. (M = 14.33, SD = 4.69) 
19. I can’t cope. (M = 16.33, SD = 5.59) 
20. I feel I can’t control my panic. (M = 16.78, SD = 3.77) 
 
Note – The order of presentation of the newly developed anxiety-inducing self-
referential statements was determined by expert ranking of the statements in terms of 
anxiety elicited.  The expert panel consisted of 10 postgraduate students in the clinical 
psychology program at the Australian National University.  Means and standard 
deviations of the expert rankings are provided, above. 
 
Dysphoric Mood-Inducing Statements: 
1.         I feel a little down today. 
2.         Sometimes I feel so guilty that I can't sleep. 
3.         I wish I could be myself, but nobody likes me when I am.                                                         
4.         Today is one of those days when everything I do is wrong. 
5.         I doubt that I'll ever make a contribution in the world. 
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6.         I feel like my life is in a rut that I'm never going to get out of. 
7.         My mistakes haunt me, I've made too many. 
8.         Life is such a heavy burden. 
9.         I'm tired of trying. 
10.       Even when I give my best effort, it just doesn't seem to be good enough. 
11.       Nobody understands me, or even tries to. 
12.        I don't think things are ever going to get better. 
13.        I feel worthless. 
14.        What's the point of trying? 
15.        When I talk no one really listens. 
16.        I feel cheated by life. 
17.        Why should I try when I can't make a difference anyway? 
18.        Every time I turn around, something else has gone wrong. 
19.        There is no hope. 
20.        I feel I am being suffocated by the weight of my past mistakes. 
Neutral Mood-Inducing Statements: 
1.  There are sixty minutes in one hour. 
2. A neuron fires rapidly. 
3. New Mexico is in the United States. 
4. Apples are harvested in the autumn. 
5. Basket weaving was invented before pottery making. 
6. Some cricket bats are made from the wood of the ash tree. 
7. It snows in Thredbo. 
8. Perennials bloom every year. 
9. You have to take the ferry to get to the island. 
10. Sydney is the Capital of New South Wales. 
11. Elephants carried the supplies. 
12. The Pacific Ocean has fish. 
13. Some high schools have a school band. 
14. Some think that electricity is the safest form of power. 
15. Most oil paintings are done on canvas. 
16. Corn is sometimes called maize. 
17. An orange is a citrus fruit. 
18. Some say that lady bugs are good for the garden. 
19. Diamonds really can cut glass. 
20. Some chimps have been taught to use sign language. 
 
 175 
Appendix H: Emotion Regulation Skills Training (ERST) booklet 
How do you relate to your thoughts and 
emotions? 
 
Do you ever get “stuck” in unwanted 
thoughts or feelings? 
 
This booklet provides some information and exercises which may help you to 
relate to negative thoughts and strong emotions in new, potentially helpful ways.  The 
booklet provides education and training in relation to three unique psychological skills; 
mindfulness, acceptance, and cognitive flexibility.  It is hoped that engagement with the 
concepts contained in this booklet, in combination with completion of some practical 
homework exercises, will promote emotion regulation and adaptive thought 







Bad News Radio 
 
…playing all the bad news, all day, every day! 
 
An analogy that can be helpful when you are just trying to notice your thoughts 
(instead of getting “hooked” by them) is to think of your unwanted or unhelpful 
thoughts as a bad news radio station. 
 
Let ‘Bad News Radio’ play on in the background without trying to suppress it, 


















                                      
(Adapted from: Forsyth & Eifert, 2007; Hayes & Smith, 2005; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999)   
 
“Blah, blah, blah… You’re 
hopeless.  It’s a disaster. 
Something terrible is  
about to happen. You’re a 
bad person… etc., etc.,”  
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Passengers on the Bus 
 
Imagine you’ve been driving a bus called “My Life” and the road you’ve 
decided to take is towards a full, rich and meaningful life.  As you drive along, you pick 
up passengers, memories, emotions, thoughts, and so on.  Some of the passengers you 
like – friendly ones, funny ones and supportive ones.  You hope they will sit up the 
front near you.  Some passengers you don’t like at all.  If only these passengers had 




Sometimes difficult passengers come up the front of the bus and start trying to 
get you to go a different way. 
 
“Turn left!” 
“You’ve got to turn right!” 
“This way is too hard, go this way” 
“Speed up, slow down” 
 
If you do what they say and turn the bus in the direction they want to go, they 
quieten down and you might feel better for a while - get some peace and quiet.  
However, giving in to their demands means you are driving your “life bus” in a 
direction you don’t really want to go.  You can end up focusing on how to keep these 
difficult passengers quiet and completely lose your way.  After a while, you are likely to 
feel worse. 
 
Naturally, you would really like the difficult passengers to get off the bus, but 
because they are your thoughts, feelings and memories, there is no way to get rid of 
them.  Even turning around to argue with them distracts you from driving where you 
want to go.   In the end, to have the life you want, you will need to find ways to take all 
the passengers – the likeable and difficult ones – along for the ride.  You will need to 
find a way to stop making deals with them, which turn the control of the bus over to 
them.  
  
Can you find a way to drive your bus in a direction that makes your heart glad? 
 
(Adapted from: Forsyth & Eifert, 2007; Hayes & Smith, 2005; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999)   
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The Guest House (by 13th Century poet, Rumi, translated in    
Barks, Moyne, Arberry, & Nicholson, 1997) 
 
This being human is a guest house. 
Every morning a new arrival. 
 
A joy, a depression, a meanness, 
Some momentary awareness comes 
as an unexpected visitor. 
 
Welcome and entertain them all! 
Even if they’re a crowd of sorrows, 
Who violently sweep your house 
Empty of its furniture, 
 
Still treat each guest honourably. 
He may be clearing you out 
for some new delight. 
 
The dark thought, the shame, the malice. 
Meet them at the door laughing, 
and invite them in. 
Be grateful for whoever comes, 
because each has been sent 
as a guide from beyond. 
  
 
The Guest House poem conveys the essence of experiential acceptance. It stands 
in sharp contrast to the approach that many people take toward their thoughts, feelings, 
and bodily sensations, particularly those that we label “unwanted”.  The Guest House 
reminds us that each one of our internal experiences – even those that may feel 
unpleasant in the moment – represent important “messengers” for us.  If we label 
experiences as “unwanted” or “bad” and try to suppress, avoid or ignore them, we risk 
missing important information.  The Guest house encourages us to accept all internal 
experiences as welcome guests and to receive all their messages.  
 
(Adapted from: Block-Lerner, Salters-Pedneault, & Tull, 









Put simply, emotions are electrical and chemical signals within your body that 
tell you what is happening.  When something pleasurable is happening to you, you feel 
good; when something distressing is happening, you feel bad. In some ways your 
emotions are like a TV reporter, giving you constant updates about what you’re doing 
and what you’re experiencing.   
  
Experiencing strong emotions can be an intense experience.  For this reason, 
some strong emotions (like fear or sadness) come to be labelled as “bad” or “negative” 
emotions.  However, creating these kinds of distinctions (and therefore preferences for 
various emotions) can be unhelpful (and even unfair).  Let’s explore how emotions, 
even the “bad” ones, can help us live full, rich and meaningful lives. 
 
Emotions contribute to intuition 
Sometimes our “gut feelings” of fear can alert us to the presence of danger.  Feelings 
(whether they are “positive” or “negative”) can help us work out who to trust and who 
not to trust. 
 
Emotions motivate us to act on our values 
Anger can encourage us to fight for justice.  Fear can energise us to run from danger.  
Love can move us to reach out to others. 
 
Emotions help us to clarify our preferences and values 
Our emotional responses guide us to understand what is important to us and what we do 
and don’t like. Without emotions, how could be decide which flavour ice-cream to buy? 
 
Emotions link us to others 
Facial expressions of emotion (such as sadness) communicate much faster than words.  
We link with others via our tendency to “catch” emotions from each other.  This is the 
basis of empathy and the prompt for compassion. 
 
Living in Technicolour 
It’s tempting to try to hold onto pleasure and avoid pain.  Unfortunately, numbing 
ourselves to pain and sadness also tends to numb our capacity for happiness and love 
too. It’s a package deal – you can live life in shades of grey, or embrace the full, rich 
tapestry of life in a palette of bright, dark and pale colours. 









Take a look at one of the images on this page.  What do you see?  Some people 
see a vase.  Others see two faces.  If you first saw the vase, try now to shift your view 
and see the faces.  If you saw the faces first, look again and seek out the vase.   
 
Neither view is wrong, but nor does either view provide the absolute, 
comprehensive or only correct perspective on the picture.  In fact, each of these pictures 
can be viewed in two very different and yet equally valid ways.   
 
Having the flexibility to view things from different perspectives can provide us 
with a more balanced, more thorough impression of those things.  This exercise reminds 
us of the existence of alternative perspectives.  It’s not that our initial view or thoughts 
or reactions to things are the final view or the only view, or even necessarily the right 
view.  Often, if we deliberately seek out alternative perspectives on things, we find 
them.  Furthermore, we often find that the alternative perspective is also valid or 













(Adapted from: Martin, 1997) 
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What is Mindfulness? 
 
 
Mindfulness is bringing your awareness to your here-and-now experience with an 






Mindfulness involves trying to observe your thoughts and feelings and the world around 

















Being fully present 
Shift the focus of your thinking - let go of thoughts about the past and the future and 
focus instead only on the present moment.  
 
Having a singular focus 
Focus your awareness only on your breath. 
 
Approaching with openness and curiosity 
Observe your breath as if for the first time.  As if you are an alien who has never 
experienced breathing before. 
 
Letting go of judging and comparing 
Try to observe your breath without engaging in comparison or evaluation.  Let go of 
any labelling of your experience as pleasant or unpleasant.  
 
Being accepting 
Try to allow the experience of your breath as it is, without attempting to transform it or 
control it in any way.  Mindfulness is not about having pleasant experiences, or 
distracting ourselves, or even relaxing.  In fact, mindfulness can be practiced using 









How to Practice Mindfulness 
 
Step 1:   Bring your full attention to your breath in the here and now. 
 
Observe the breath with curiosity, as though you have never come across 
something like this before. 
 
Step 2:   When your attention naturally wanders away from the breath, gently,  
    smilingly, return it to the breath once more. 
 
When you find yourself judging, evaluating, categorising or comparing, then    
patiently and persistently bring your attention back to the breath as it is, in  
the present moment.   
 
Step 3:   Practise! 
    Practise! 





















1. First, find a comfortable position sitting or lying down in a location where you 
will not be interrupted.  
 
2. Minimise the distraction to your five senses. Such as turning off the TV and 
radio, and using soft lighting.  Choose a time to practise when you are least 
likely to be disturbed by others. 
 
3. Wear loose clothing and remove your shoes. 
 
4. Avoid practicing after big, heavy meals, and do not practice after consuming any 













































Mindfulness Diary         
 participant code: __ __ __ __ __             








Did you listen 
to the 
mindfulness 
CD Provided?  
(Yes/No) 
If you didn’t use the 







    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 
    
 
 




Appendix I: Mindfulness of Thoughts and Emotions Meditation Script 
Please relax in your seat, make yourself comfortable, and close your eyes if you 
like.  These instructions are designed to help you relax and calm your mind and body.  
This exercise can be used at any time, but you may find it particularly helpful during 
times when unwanted thoughts are present in your mind or when you are feeling strong 
emotions. 
Let’s begin now by bringing your attention to a sense of your body, in its 
entirety, sitting or lying here in this moment.  Right now, as you sit or lie here, bring 
your attention to the awareness of the feelings of contact in all those places where your 
body is being supported by your chair or bed.  [pause 5 seconds] Notice the physical 
sensations at these areas of contact.  Perhaps there is pressure, perhaps heat, perhaps 
itchiness or tingling.  It could be anything.  Just observe these sensations, as they are, in 
this moment.   
Feel how the air in the room surrounds your body and touches your skin as it 
moves ever so subtly.  See if you can just become aware of the subtle sensations of the 
air moving across your skin now.  [pause 5 seconds] Feel how air, in the form of your 
breath, also moves through your body.  Slowly let your attention focus on your breath.  
Feel the rhythm of your breath as it moves in and out of your lungs.  Let your attention 
ride on the waves of the breath’s sensations, perhaps at your stomach which rises and 
falls with each in and out breath, or perhaps at the nostrils where the air touches the skin 
at the base of your nostrils and the skin between your nose and upper lip as air moves in 
and out.  Focus your attention wherever the feeling of the breath moving is most 
accessible and vivid for you.  Let each breath come and go, naturally, in its own way.  
Feel the sensations of the breath moving in and out moment by moment by moment.  
[pause 20 seconds] 
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Keep your attention in touch, as best you can, with the full duration of each 
breath coming into the body, and the full duration of each breath leaving the body.  Feel 
the breath’s sensations as they change moment by moment by moment.  You’re doing 
very well. [pause 5 seconds] 
Try to just rest in this awareness of your body in its entirety, breathing, moment 
by moment and breath by breath.  Feel your body melt or sink deeper and deeper into 
the surface of your chair or bed with every out breath as all the muscles in your body 
relax.  And begin to notice now if there are any times when your mind wanders or is 
carried away with thoughts or feelings.  In those moments notice what is on your mind 
or what emotions you are feeling, and then gently bring your attention back to the 
breath and to your body as it is, here in this moment.  [pause 20 seconds] 
As you follow these instructions, you may discover that it is not so easy to keep 
your attention on the breath.  It doesn’t take long to realise that the mind has a life of its 
own, and will invariably take off into the past or the future, planning or worrying, liking 
or disliking, remembering, daydreaming, becoming impatient or bored, or sleepy.  This 
is totally normal and not a problem at all. When you notice that your mind is no longer 
on your breath then notice what is on your mind in that moment, and then gently let go 
of whatever it is.  This doesn’t mean pushing it away, but just recognising it and letting 
it be, as you guide your attention back to the stomach or to the nostrils.  Back to this 
breath, in this moment.  And once again bring breathing to the centre of your awareness.  
[pause 5 seconds] And if the mind wanders away from the breath a hundred times, as it 
surely will, each and every time, when you become aware that it is somewhere else, 
gently and patiently note what is on your mind or what emotion you are experiencing in 
this moment.  And without being harsh or critical or judgemental of yourself, simply 
recognise what is arising for what it is, and let it be, as you come back to feeling this 
breath in this moment as you begin again and again and again.  [pause 40 seconds] 
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 When you become aware of feelings, of emotions, just notice them.  
Acknowledge their presence, and see if you can make room for them.  Don’t try to hold 
on to them nor make them go away.  Just try to make room for the feeling, make room 
for the sadness or the anxiety or the frustration or the boredom.  If they are there, allow 
them to be there.  Welcome and acknowledge each and every feeling.  Remember, the 
purpose is not to feel better, but to get better at feeling and being with all your 
experience, as it is.  So when you become aware of thoughts or emotions, acknowledge 
them, let them be, and continue returning your attention to the breath. [pause 40 
seconds] 
Since it is in the nature of the mind to wander, it is not that you’re failing if your 
mind doesn’t stay on the breath; on the contrary, it’s that you are discovering something 
very important about the nature of the mind itself, and that is, that the mind has waves 
of thought and emotion, much like the ocean has waves.  Just let the waves of thought 
and emotion come, and let them go.  Simply sit on the beach beside your ocean of 
thoughts and feelings and listen to the sound of the waves as they gently break on the 
shore and wash away.  To be replaced by yet more waves of thought and emotion that 
also break on the shore and wash away. [pause 20 seconds] 
 Notice that thoughts are just thoughts, emotions just emotions, they come and 
they go.  You are not what those thoughts or feelings say, no matter how persistent or 
intense they may be.  You are the place and the space for these experiences.  You are 
the observer of these experiences. Try to make that observing space a kind space, a 
gentle space, a welcoming space.   Continue working in this way now, patiently and 
persistently.  Observe the sensations of the breath and return your attention to the breath 
whenever you notice that the mind has wandered.  You are bound to succeed.  You have 
done extremely well.  [pause 60 seconds] 
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It will soon be time to finish this mediation exercise.  In a few seconds I’ll ask 
you to come out of your relaxed, meditative state and to bring yourself back to the 
environment around you.  I’ll count backwards from 5 to 1, and when I reach 1 please 
open your eyes, look around and re-familiarise yourself with your surroundings.  5 - 4 - 


















(Adapted from: Forsyth & Eifert, 2007; Kabat-Zinn,          
1990; Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Kabat-Zinn, 2007) 
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Appendix J: Overview of the Phases of Therapy (Study 3) 
Phase 1 – Relaxation and Psychoeducation (4 Sessions). 
During the relaxation and psychoeducation phase of treatment patients were 
provided with feedback on their assessment results, case conceptualisation, and 
diagnosis.  In addition, they received relaxation training in the form of progressive 
muscular relaxation (PMR) and psychoeducation regarding the nature of anxiety, 
normalizing obsessional thinking, the cognitive-behavioural conceptualisation of OCD, 
and the rationale for CBT for OCD (including exposure with response prevention 
therapy).  Initial suicide risk assessment was conducted.  When required, safety 
contracting was initiated and safety plans were collaboratively created and revisited.  
Phase 2 – Cognitive Therapy (5 sessions). 
Cognitive therapy included introduction to the six OCD-relevant cognitive 
domains highlighted by the OCCWG (i.e., over-estimation of threat, inflated 
responsibility, over-importance of thoughts, excessive need for control, intolerance of 
uncertainty, and perfectionism; Clark, 2002) and identification of the most prominent 
belief and appraisal domains in each patients’ unique cognitive profile.  The origins, 
consequences and maintenance of each patient’s beliefs and appraisals in these OCD-
relevant domains were explored.  Cognitive challenging and restructuring techniques 
were employed to help patients identify, evaluate, and modify these dysfunctional 
thinking patterns underlying their obsessional fears and compulsive urges.  When 
required, ongoing suicide risk assessment and intervention was conducted during this 
treatment phase.  Note that patient C.D. terminated treatment phase 2 earlier than 
scheduled (after four phase 2 sessions) due to his experience of aversive responses and 
symptom deterioration during this phase.   
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Phase 3 – Exposure with Response Prevention (11 - 13 sessions). 
  The exposure with response prevention (E/RP) treatment phase commenced with 
collaborative establishment of an exhaustive hierarchy of each patient’s feared thoughts 
and avoided situations.  Schedules and deadlines were contracted with each patient for 
tapering off (and eventually completely ceasing) all compulsive, neutralising activity.  
Family-based psychoeducation was provided on the role of “accommodators” in 
enabling compulsions and avoidance and providing reassurance about obsessional fears.  
A family-accommodation therapy session was conducted in which each patients 
primary accommodator declared their independence from the patient’s OCD and 
collaboratively agreed upon a three-to-four week schedule (with deadline) for 
completely tapering off all reassurance provision.  Psychoeducation regarding common 
difficulties experienced by patients during exposure therapy was provided.  Individual 
tailoring of exposure with response prevention exercises was informed by the hierarchy 
of feared thoughts and avoided situations collaboratively developed with each client.  
E/RP exercises were systematically approached according to their anxiety-provocation 
ranking in the hierarchy.  Where possible, E/RP exercises were conducted with patients 
in off-site locations where the ecological validity of exercises was maximised (e.g., 
shopping malls, public swimming pools, and A-League soccer matches).  Ongoing 
suicide risk assessment and intervention was conducted when required. 
Experimental Phase – Emotion Regulation Skills Training (6 sessions).  
Individual elements of the ERST program that patients engaged with included 
theoretical and practical introduction to mindfulness meditation, experiential acceptance 
psychoeducation and practical exercises including ‘Passengers on a Bus’ and The Guest 
House borrowed from acceptance and commitment therapy and mindfulness-based 
therapy (Hayes et al., 1999; Segal et al., 2002) and exercises designed to promote 
psychological flexibility.  It was expected that patients’ engagement with the program 
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would help them transform and defuse their relationships with unwanted cognitions and 
emotions and in this way increase their capacity to resist engaging in dysfunctional, 
emotion-driven appraisals of their obsessions and subsequent neutralising behaviours.  
Ongoing suicide risk assessment and intervention was conducted when appropriate.  On 
the basis of random assignment, each patient received the ERST treatment phase at a 
different point in the overall CBT for OCD regime.  Patient G.H. received ERST before 
phase 1, patient E.F. received ERST before phase 2, patient C.D. received ERST before 
phase 3, and patient A.B. received ERST at the mid-point of phase 3.   
Phase 4 – Relapse Prevention (2 - 4 sessions).   
  Given the well-established proneness of OCD-sufferers to relapse following 
treatment (Foa et al., 2005; McLean et al., 2001) comprehensive relapse prevention was 
conducted over two-to-four gradually tapered sessions according to the patients’ needs.  
Relapse prevention involved identification of potential triggers for relapse, re-
assessment of patients’ social and support networks, and engagement in behavioural 
activation designed to bolster their support network and resilience.  Relapse prevention 
also encompassed comprehensive review of the various phases of therapy patients 
completed including the rationale for each, the skills learned, and each patient’s 
personal experiences and reflections upon them.  Patients also engaged in a treatment 
outcomes review exploring the patterns of their results on the various psychometric 
scales and symptom ratings they completed throughout the course of therapy, and 
possible explanations for changes in symptoms at various stages.  Each patient’s 
treatment progress was celebrated and ways in which they could consolidate gains into 
the future were explored.  Suicide risk assessment was conducted. 
Phase 5 – Two to Three Month Post-Treatment Follow-Up (1 session). 
The follow-up session was utilised to enhance each patient’s sense of security 
when leaving therapy.  It also provided opportunities for patients to formally review 
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their progress and fine-tune their coping skills.  Additionally, the follow-up session 
allowed the clinician to gather additional research data and identify any areas of 
slippage in treatment gains that required follow-up intervention.  Suicide risk 
assessment was conducted. 
 
